Ćerimagić: Regional cooperation to be linked to EU membership

The EU has invested considerable efforts in stimulating regional cooperation in the Balkans over the last decades, yet the results are questionable. Which are the reasons behind such slow progress and where does Bosnia and Herzegovina stand? We talked about it with Adnan Ćerimagić analyst at ESI

It has been over two decades since the first regional cooperation initiatives sprouted in the Western Balkans. Initially the stimulus came from the European Union and some member states seeking to foster societal reconciliation. In the last few years, a new positive trend has emerged with the Balkan leaders demanding greater cooperation in specific areas such as trade, energy or transport, in the light of their prospective accession to the EU. 

In front of the recent multiple crises in place and with the Union navigating in uncharted waters, the return to bilateral disputes and nationalistic threats is raising questions about the level of maturity of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. 

“I fear that in ten years we will conclude that there has been too much focus on bringing the region closer and not enough on bringing the region into the EU”, notes Adnan Ćerimagić, senior analyst at European Stability Initiative.

How do you assess the level of regional cooperation in the Balkans today?

Since the Kosovo war ended and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched in Sarajevo in 1999, a quarter century ago, the region has seen the emergence of multiple initiatives. This has boosted cooperation at different levels. It tore down barriers and brought our societies closer. From trade and culture to youth and climate change. But although a lot has been achieved, I fear that we have never been closer to going back to the horrors of the 1990s. We have seen all the signals last year. The return of violence in north Kosovo, the breakdown of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, all the challenges to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s statehood, and the constant calls for changing borders and creation of monoethnic territories. 

Which is the reason behind this development?

The reason why we are in this situation is not exclusively linked to what is happening in the region. These horror ideas of the 1990s never disappeared. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, yes, Milorad Dodik’s rhetoric and actions intensified recently, but they have remained unchanged since 2006. What has changed is the European and global context. The credibility of EU enlargement vanished, and present geopolitical shifts, from Ukraine to the USA, made the ideas of the 1990's more attractive again. 

When we look back at the past quarter century, I fear that in ten years we will conclude that there has been too much focus on bringing the region closer and not enough on bringing the region into the EU. I still believe it is not too late for the EU to act, but it needs to be quick and decisive.

How do you see the role of the decade-long Berlin Process in bringing the region closer? 

Successful regional cooperation must be directly linked to EU integration. This was a key ingredient when the CEFTA regional trade agreement was signed. In parallel, the region negotiated the trade agreement with the EU (SAA). But as the credibility of the EU accession process started to fade away, issues have emerged in regional cooperation as well. Everything has become more difficult. 

The recent return of the Berlin Process is important as it allows us to ask if we, as the region, and the EU want us to stick to established institutional and rule-based cooperation in the region. The signing of different agreements was encouraging, of course, but the most important signal sent from Berlin was that the EU is still present and wants to stand behind all those rule-based institutions the region and the EU created over the past 25 years.

We have so many regional initiatives floating around…

Yes, but at the moment we face two challenges. Firstly, not all these regional initiatives are based on an institutional architecture built in the past 25 years, or on the rules and standards that exist in the EU. Yes, these can be demanding and often slow, but for a reason. They are the basis for building trust and they offer longer-term sustainability. There cannot be trust in regional cooperation without clear rules, competences and institutional frameworks.

And the second challenge we are faced with is that many regional organizations built in the last 25 years are now in a deep crisis. The best thing that the Berlin Process could do is to stand behind them, support them, and give them real meaning again. 

Isn’t there a decoupling of the Union's approach towards the region? We are recently facing a push from the EU towards intra-regional economic integration, which postpones the membership perspective. 

The current policy of the EU is following a similar logic as before with two parallel tracks, one being regional cooperation and the other integration with the EU. The question is if what the EU offers the countries in the region is attractive enough for them to cooperate at the regional level and do the required reforms. 

Last November the Commission proposed a new instrument, the so-called New Growth Plan for the region, with a financial envelope of 2 billion Euros of grants and 4 billion Euros of cheap loans. Let’s be honest, this is neither a considerably high amount of money, nor does it come close to actual needs of the region. The EU has also offered partial access to the EU Single Market. Let’s be honest here as well, that is a very, very small segment of the otherwise very attractive single market. And in some areas like energy and transport the offer is also not new. So the question is whether the Balkan politicians will see it as a game changer. At the moment we get mixed signals, from huge praise to more disappointed tones. I fear those later will be proven right. 

At the European Council of last December, Bosnia and Herzegovina was promised to get the accession negotiations opened by March upon fulfillment of certain conditions. Can we expect a positive outcome by this month?

It would be great if Bosnia and Herzegovina started accession talks in March. At the technical level, it would allow the country to catch up with Ukraine and Moldova, whose screening process has just started. 

In Brussels and most other EU capitals, Ukraine and Moldova are seen as motors of a new EU enlargement momentum. In this sense, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been given a chance to be on the same train with these two countries. It would be a pity not to use it. 

But for that to happen, Bosnia and Herzegovina is expected to implement certain reforms. The European Commission’s report from November 2023 showed clearly that the country lagged behind Ukraine and Moldova.

The question is why so?

There are many reasons, but one was the mistake of the EU not to treat Bosnia and Herzegovina in the same way as Ukraine and Moldova. These two countries were given seven and nine concrete steps with their candidate status in June 2022. Implementation of at least half of these steps was enough to start accession talks. Bosnia and Herzegovina was given nine similarly difficult steps with candidate status in December 2022, but was also told that if it wants  to start accession talks, it still needs to fulfill 14 key priorities from 2019, including several constitutional reforms. Up until summer 2023, the message from Brussels was that Bosnia and Herzegovina could not catch up with Ukraine and Moldova, and should instead develop a plan to implement these two sets of conditions by 2026. It was just in the last couple of months, leading to November 2023, that at least Brussels started to send different signals. At the same time the key EU capitals, Berlin, Hague and Paris, sent different messages. This was very confusing and has had a major impact on the country eventually doing less than Ukraine and Moldova.