

Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna
Vytautas Magnus University at Kaunas
Saint Petersburg State University

Master of Arts in
Interdisciplinary research and studies on Eastern Europe
MIREES (LM 52)

GRADUATION THESIS

*In-State Building, Nationalism and Development In
Eastern Europe*

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ‘YUGOSLAV/SERBIAN’ ENEMY BY
THE ALBANIAN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT

CANDIDATE
Xhorxhina Molla

SUPERVISOR
Stefano Bianchini

Academic Year 2020/2021
March session

Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary research and studies on Eastern Europe (MIREES)

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

With this statement I hereby declare that the submitted Master's thesis is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no sources or resources other than the ones mentioned and acknowledged.

The sources used have been stated in accordance with the rules and regulations applied at the Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary research and studies on Eastern Europe (MIREES).

I have indicated all quotes, citations and references that were literally taken -in full, or parts of them- from publications, i.e. books, journals, academic articles, whether published or unpublished, as well as web sources, newspapers, reports, etc.

I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, even though I may have received assistance from others on style, presentation and language expression.

Furthermore, I have not submitted any essay, paper, or thesis with similar contents elsewhere.

I am fully aware that in case of proof that the thesis has not been written and structured in accordance with this declaration, the Commission of the Master of Art in Interdisciplinary Research and Studies on Eastern Europe (MIREES) will consider the fact as negligence or as a deliberate and intentional act aimed at making it impossible for the defence commission to give a correct judgment of the candidate's expertise, insights and skills.

I am also aware that submitting the work of another writer as one's own constitutes a crime, according to the Italian Act no. 475/1925 "Punishment of candidates for master's degrees, diplomas, public positions, qualifications and honours for the false quote of someone else's works"¹

Place		Date
Forlì		28/02/2022

Student's full name
Xhorxhina Molla

Student's signature


¹ Italian act no. 475/25 "Those who submit the work of another writer such as dissertations, studies, publications, technical designs as one's own on the occasion of exams or competitions, prescribed or required by authorities or public administrations for the assignment of master's degrees or any other school or academic degree or qualification, for the license to teach and practice a profession, for the issue of diplomas, shall be punished by imprisonment from three months to one year. The imprisonment cannot be less than six months in case the intent is accomplished".

“You've got to keep them pretty scared, because unless they're properly scared and frightened of all kinds of devils that are going to destroy them from outside or inside or somewhere, they may start to think, which is very dangerous, because they're not competent to think.”

Noam Chomsky

Abstract

This thesis focuses on the Yugoslav/Serbian enemy construction through the lenses of the Albanian communist government of Enver Hoxha, from the beginning of his leadership till his death in 1985. Enemy propaganda was indeed a recurrent theme during the Cold War between both sides of the blocs. The theoretical framework is based on an interpretive approach from a discourse analysis perspective. The purpose is to understand how the Yugoslav and Serbian enemies were constructed within the Albanian party narrative and to enlighten the distinction, between the two types of enemies: the ideological and the ethnic one. In particular, the present work aims at contributing to filling the academic gap over Tirana's perspective on the Yugoslav/Serbian enemy, which differs from Pristina's one. Additionally, it put emphasis on the connection between the external and the internal enemy within the Albanian communist narrative. This study is based on the analysis of the Albanian dictator's speeches, articles, notes, and writings during his rule. Primarily, it is centred on a selection of his major works.

Keywords:

Albania; Yugoslavia; Serbia; enemy construction; propaganda; communism.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	2
List of Abbreviations	4
Introduction	5
Literature Review	8
1. Theoretical framework	10
1.1 The interpretative approach	10
1.2 The discursive and historical Analysis	19
2 The Yugoslav-Albanian friendship	23
2.1 The creation of the Albanian Communist Party (CPA).....	23
2.2 The People’s Republic of Albania as a satellite of Yugoslavia.....	33
2.3 The Balkan Federation.....	40
2.4 From brothers to saboteurs	43
3 The process of the “enemy construction.”	47
3.1 The education system and the history books	47
3.2 The Khrushchevites by Enver Hoxha.....	55
3.3 Articles published in the newspaper ‘Zëri I popullit’	65
3.4 The Titoites and the Kosovo Question	75
4 Conclusion.....	86
Bibliography	89

List of Abbreviations

CPA	Communist Party of Albania
CPY	Communist party of Yugoslavia
LPA	Labour Party of Albania
NLA	National Liberation Army
UNNRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

Introduction

During the Cold War period, the constructing party's enemies were a crucial tool in the hands of Communist governments used to target those who were perceived as a threat to their power, either outside or inside the country. State propaganda became a crucial means to control the people under the regime¹. The Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha and his communist party (CPA) have taken the same path. Hoxha indeed addressed the enemy discourse against different actors throughout his career: from the Yugoslav Federation at the end of 1948, the Soviet Union in 1961, and China after 1976. As a matter of fact, still nowadays, the Albanian-Serbian relationship has often been perceived as complicated and essentially characterised by ethnic clashes and conflictual interests. This was primarily the result of the war in Kosovo, the former Yugoslav region, during the Balkan wars of the 90s. However, the Serbian-Albanian relation hasn't always been merely characterised by ethnic confrontation. It is essential hence to differentiate between the Albanians living in Yugoslavia and those living in the Albanian Socialist Republic. Otherwise, it appears as if the Albanian and the Serbian people had never gotten along with each other and as their enmity was mainly based on ethnic hostility. Especially during the Albanian communist regime, the Serbian people weren't considered a threat to the Albanians. However, most of the current research has been considering quasi-exclusively the point of view of Pristina, while less is known on the Tirana perspective. The Albanian Socialist Republic of Enver Hoxha had taken a different path than its Yugoslav neighbour, and their relationship had been evolving differently. Albania under Hoxha was characterised by a harsh communist regime of the Stalinist type, where all the means of forces and power were under the control of one person. The CPA took over total control in 1946, firstly under the assistance and support of the Yugoslav communist party. After the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, the alliance shifted from Belgrade to Moscow. The Albanian secret police, the *Sigurimi*, was always ready to find new alleged spies and enemies, targeting singular people or specific groups as internal enemies of the Albanian

¹ Chomsky N. (1997), "Media Control. The Spectacular Achievements Of Propaganda", The Open Media Pamphlet Series, Seven Stories Press First Edition.

communist regime. Terror and repressive means were “intermittent and an integral part”² of the Albanian communist regime. In fact, forced labour camps were part of the CPA’s “strategy to secure its power”³. Several political opponents ended up in concentration camps, which were considered preventive measures against dissent. The enemy construction narrative was used to target those same opponents of the regime as an existential threat to the Albanian communist society; hence it played an essential role as a justification of the Party’s actions.

Research aim and issues

This dissertation focuses on the enemy construction process through the lenses of the Albanian Communist government. Enemy propaganda was indeed a central part of the communist regimes of the time. The purpose of this work is to examine how the Albanian communist leadership constructed the Yugoslav/Serbian enemy, in particular trying to understand if the Yugoslav and the Serbian enemy correspond or represent two different types of the enemy within the communist narrative. In fact, there was no clear distinction between the current academic literature that considered the CPA perspective. Therefore, this work aims to fill the academic gap related to Tirana’s perspective on the Albanian-Yugoslav conflictual relationship in the Cold War and understand the differences in handling the Kosovo question from the beginning to the end Hoxha’s government.

The enemy construction process is founded on a discourse analysis method, thus centred on Hoxha’s speeches and memoirs, some history books published at the time, and articles that appeared in the state-owned journal, *Zëri I Popullit*. The main theoretical framework is presented by the legal theorist and political philosopher Carl Schmitt in his work “The Concept of the Political” related to the construction of the friend and enemy distinction

² Këlliç K. (2020), “Defining the Internal Enemy: Detention Camps in Early Communist Albania, 1945–1950”, *Pamięć I Sprawiedliwość*. 2:138-152, p. 140, available at: <https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=1009385>.

³ Ivi, p. 147.

in internal and external policy⁴. As the Albanian Stalinist system, the Albanian dictator's words were shaped and interpreted through his words, whether oral or written. Enver Hoxha changed his standpoints targeting old friends as enemies depending on his interests and preferences. The time framework considered starts from the beginning of the formation of the Albanian communist party at the end of the second world war to the death of the Albanian communist dictator in 1985.

Structure and sources

The present work is organised as it follows. The first chapter presents the theoretical approach based on the interpretative theory accompanied by a discourse analysis method, through which understand and examine the process of friend and enemy construction developed by the Albanian communist leadership. The main theoretical framework is taken from Carl Schmitt and his friend-enemy distinction. The second chapter analyses the Yugoslav-Albanian friendship, therefore it is mainly based on Hoxha's memoirs and notes, while describing the gradual development from a narrative based on the friendly and fraternal CPY to the ideological enemy. In particular, the aim is to identify the crucial moments of the gradual transition from ally to enemy. The third chapter focuses on the enemy construction process, and it is based on different resources such as Albanian history books, articles published on state-owned journal *Zëri I Popullit*, and writings of the Albanian dictator such as "The Khrushchevites" and "The Titoites". In this regard, a peculiar emphasis over internal party enemies is represented by figures such as Koçi Xoxe and Mehmet Shehu. Finally, the conclusion offers an overview of the types of enemies that emerged from Hoxha's discourse and propaganda. Especially, a reflection over the distinction between the ideological Yugoslav enemy and the ethnic enemy represented by the Great Serbs.

⁴ Schmitt C. (2007), "The concept of the political. Expanded Edition", George Schwab trans., The University and Chicago Press, ISBN-13: 978-0-226-73892-5.

The sources of this dissertation have been primary sources, such as the Selected Works of Enver Hoxha, his memoirs and notes, his articles published in *Zëri I Popullit*⁵, economic agreements signed between Tito and Hoxha, but also secondary sources such as academic papers, academic books, reports, history books, and analysis. In this regard, it is essential to specify that the term ‘Kosova’, rather than Kosovo, is used in the Albanian primary sources as written and pronounced in the Albanian language. This terminological preference has a nationalistic purpose as it is in contraposition to the Serbian variant ‘Kosovo’.

Literature Review

Several studies and books cover the history of the Albanian-Yugoslav relations, a few to mention are the work of Elidor Mëhilli, an Albanian American scholar, and in particular his book “From Stalin to Mao: Albania and the Socialist World” where the various alliances of Socialist Albania are explored, showing their impacts in the country. In particular, the first chapter gives an insight into the profound economic and Yugoslav political support to Albania, based on the historical archives. In “Albania in a Nutshell: A brief history and chronology of events”, Robert Elsie briefly describes the political relationship between Yugoslavia and Albania. The book “The Albanians. A Modern History” by Miranda Vickers gives a peculiar insight into the Albanian and Yugoslav communist parties’ relations and perception of the time. Significantly, the book provides Hoxha’s impressions of Tito and analyses the question of Kosovo from Tirana’s standpoint. In “Enver Hoxha: The iron fist of Albania”, the Albanian journalist Blendi Fevziu presents a biography of Enver Hoxha based on the Albanian historical archives, several interviews and the notes written by the dictator. It gives a peculiar perspective on Hoxha’s foreign policy and relation with Tito, from his allies to enemies. Finally, Vladimir Dedijer, in his “Jugoslovensko-Albanski Odnosi (1939–1948)”, focused on the first relation between the Yugoslav communists and the Albanian partisan movement

⁵ See, Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I/II/III/IV”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana.

during the Second World War. Other authors have focused their studies on the economic cooperation and pacts between the two countries, as in “Economic Agreements in the Yugoslav-Albanian Relations” by Shameti Ornela and Dibra Pranvera.

Regarding the enemy discourse, fewer sources deal with the issue within the Albanian-Yugoslav framework, as most of the attention is driven by the ethnic conflict between the Albanian and Serbian minority in Kosovo. In the “Figura e armikut: riperfytyrimi I marredhënieve shqiptaro-serbe” (Enemy figure: a review of the Albanian-Serbian relations) published in 2016, a group of scholars deeply analyse the origins of the rivalries between the Albanians and the Serbs, the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia and the role of the media in the Kosovo war of the 90s. Lately, in 2019 the book “Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations. Figuring out the enemy” takes an exciting analysis around the question of the enemy perspective. Each chapter focuses on different periods, although the focus during the communist era remains mainly on the Albanians living in Yugoslavia. This is due to several reasons, primarily because Albania remained isolated from the rest of the world for almost 50 years. The war of Kosovo and the ethnic division between Serbs and Albanians attracted much more attention in the last years. Indeed, it is much easier to find books that deepened the condition of the Albanians living in Kosovo and the tension between them and the Serbian minority. This thesis tries to fill the scholar gap by giving an overview of the Albanian communist discourse over its neighbour, aggravated by Albanians living within Yugoslavia’s borders.

1. Theoretical framework

Throughout history, enemies and allies have been constructed and undone uncounted times. Yet, it remains one of the most exciting processes studied, taking different perspectives and approaches depending on the matter. When it comes to Albania, mainly the period dominated by its Albanian Communist dictator, Enver Hoxha, one of the first things that emerge is his ability to switch from one ally to another, modifying and manipulating the national rhetoric and memory, while remaining soled in power. Indeed, Hoxha's Albania changed its alliances from Yugoslavia to Soviet Russia in the 50s, and then to Mao's China in the 70s, each recreating new national rhetoric that condemned the ex-ally. Behind these positions' changes, there is not merely the specific national interest of the country or its political ideologies. Still, it results from a complex interaction between beliefs, preferences and narratives. In particular, in this work, the analysis focuses on the relationship between the Albanian communist regime and the Yugoslav one from the perspective of the Albanian government of the time. Specifically, I will use a combination of the historical and the interpretative approach to interpreting the Albanian and Yugoslav relationship, particularly regarding the image of the "Yugoslav enemy" through the lenses of the Albanian Communist government.

1.1 The interpretative approach

Interpretivism (or post-positivism) aims at "understanding social meanings embedded within international politics"⁶. Therefore, it moves away from the empirical researchers that mainly aim to clarify events. Instead, it tries to go a little further and so "to understand identities, ideas, norms and culture"⁷ in IR. Specifically, Hoxha's narrative and national discourse under his rule by analysing different elements that could bring to the construction of an "enemy" emerges. The interpretative approach is, in this case, an exciting tool to analyse the process since, differently from other approaches, it offers

⁶ Lamont, C.K (2015), "Research methods in international relations", Los Angeles: Sage, p.19

⁷ Ibidem.

“interpretations of interpretations”⁸. An important starting point of the interpretative theory has been introduced by Bevir and Rhodes, who have identified two critical assumptions that are common among interpretivist researchers. Firstly, since people act following their beliefs and preferences, “it is possible to explain their actions by referring to the relevant beliefs and preferences”⁹. Secondly, it is not possible to reduce “people’s beliefs and preferences from objective facts about them such as their social class, race, or institutional position”¹⁰. In this regard, it means that the product of this type of approach cannot be an empirical and verifiable outcome but rather a narrative that explains what lies behind a specific human action. Even though this theory has similarities with constructivism and poststructuralism, it takes distance from them since it underlines the role of agency rather than structure¹¹. Therefore, the focus is on the actors, Key concepts of the interpretative approach are beliefs, traditions, narrative, and dilemmas. Human actions and practices are explained through traditions and dilemmas¹².

On one side, tradition is described as “a set of theories or narratives, and associated practices, which people inherit from the background”¹³. It can change depending on different motivations and is strictly linked to the historical framework. Better said, tradition is seen as “a set of understandings someone receives during socialisation”¹⁴, which is transmitted orally from time to time. In particular, Eric Hobsbawm elaborated the concept of ‘invented tradition’ defined as a “set of a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which

⁸ Bevir, Mark (2005) “Interpretation and Its Others (with R.A.W. Rhodes)”, *Australian Journal of Political Science* 40, 169–87.

⁹ Bevir, M., Rhodes, R.A.W. (2002), “Interpretive Theory”, In: *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Second edition. London, Macmillan, 2000, p.4, available at: <https://escholarship.org/content/qt0bk3k2nq/qt0bk3k2nq.pdf>

¹⁰ Ivi, p. 5.

¹¹ Bevir, M., Daddow, O. (2012), “Interpreting Foreign Policy: National, Comparative and Regional Studies”, *International Relations* 29, n. 3: 273–87, p.4, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815600930>.

¹² Bevir, M., Daddow, O., & Hall, I. (2013), “Introduction: Interpreting British Foreign Policy”, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 15(2), 163–174. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2012.00537.x>

¹³ Bevir, M., Rhodes, R.A.W. (2002), “Interpretive Theory”, In *Theory, and Methods in Political Science*, Second edition. London, Macmillan, 2000, p. 15, available at: <https://escholarship.org/content/qt0bk3k2nq/qt0bk3k2nq.pdf>

¹⁴ Bevir, M., Daddow, O. (2012), “Interpreting Foreign Policy: National, Comparative and Regional Studies”, *International Relations* 29, n. 3: 273–87, p. 280, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815600930>.

seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past”¹⁵. Interestingly, he points out that not every nation is based on a great historical past, and in this case is more likely to create its tradition by “borrowing from the well-supplied warehouses of official ritual, symbolism and moral exhortation”¹⁶. In this sense, old traditions are transformed, and ancient materials are accumulated to serve the upcoming national goals¹⁷. Furthermore, through this sort of historical manipulation, it’s conceivable to create a continuity with an invented past that never actually occurred, just for the nation’s sake. In particular, Hobsbawm identifies three types of traditions: firstly, the ones that create or symbolise social cohesion or communities; secondly, the ones that establish or legitimise any institution, status or relations of authorities; finally, those that aim to socialise, inculcate beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviours¹⁸. All those types are seen as overlapping with one another. Moreover, Hobsbawm underlines a relevant difference between old and invented traditions, as the first ones are binding and precise. In contrast, the last ones are indefinite and vague¹⁹, as in the case of concepts such as “loyalty” or “patriotism”. A crucial symbolic role is played by emotionally and symbolically signs that seek to represent a group or a community, such as flags, national anthems, ceremonies or images²⁰. This is also true and evident when speaking about communist systems, as we will see in the case of Albania.

On the other side, a dilemma comes into place when “an idea stands in opposition to existing beliefs or practices, and so forces a reconsideration of the existing beliefs and associated tradition”²¹. Therefore, dilemmas force a change in the general tradition to respond to new circumstances to which the previous narrative could not give a solution or an answer. This generates the need to elaborate a new narrative that can legitimate the

¹⁵ Hobsbawm E., Ranger T. (1983), “The Invention of Tradition”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1-2.

¹⁶ Ivi, p. 6-7.

¹⁷ Ivi, p. 6.

¹⁸ Ivi, p. 9.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Ivi, p.12.

²¹ Bevir, M., Daddow, O. (2012), “Interpreting Foreign Policy: National, Comparative and Regional Studies”, *International Relations* 29, n. 3: 273–87, p. 280, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815600930>.

unique situation. The group accepts it since the previous one can no longer provide a reasonable explanation. As politicians or parties, the agents within this system do not act independently. Still, they instead base their actions following a specific tradition that reflects “a set of beliefs concerning the country’s past, its role in the world, its heroes, its enemies (past and present), its traumas and glories”²². In this sense, the construction of a national enemy could be seen as a competition between different political figures who try to present their beliefs and tradition as the only conceivable ones²³. Hence, a particular narrative emerges as the natural result of this political battle. However, a political practice naturally evolves and changes as a reaction to different dilemmas²⁴ that put into question the existing narrative. In this regard, the role of the interpretative researcher is to understand what lies behind human action, hence, to try to comprehend the narrative that influences their behaviour.

Several studies in memory politics have revealed how political elites played with cultural memory, selecting specific elements to gain and preserve political legitimacy²⁵. Jan Assman described cultural memory by linking together memory, culture and society²⁶ and identifying its five main features. First of all, “the concretion of identity” (1), or also defined as the relation to the group, which depicts what cultural memory transmits as characteristics and elements which define the group membership as such, and what it’s not part of it and has to be considered as foreign²⁷. Hence, it is seen as a sort of collective historical record. Second of all, “the capacity – of cultural memory - to reconstruct” (2) refers to the fact that cultural memory, even though it’s based on a common historical

²² Dian, M. (2017), “Chapter 1 - Theorizing the Role of Collective Memory in International Politics”, In: *Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy*, Elsevier, p. 23, ISBN 9780081020272, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102027-2.00001-8>.

²³ Ibidem.

²⁴ Bevir, Mark, e Oliver Daddow (2012), «*Interpreting Foreign Policy: National, Comparative and Regional Studies*», *International Relations* 29, p.6, n. 3: 273–87, p.4, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815600930>.

²⁵ V. Pavlaković (2020), “Memory politics in the Former Yugoslavia”, *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 18, z. 2, s. 9-32, p. 13.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2020.2.1>.

²⁶ Assmann, J., & Czaplicka, J. (1995), “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity”, *New German Critique*, 65, 125–133, <https://doi.org/10.2307/488538>, p. 129-130.

²⁷ Ivi, p. 130.

past, it reconstructs itself each time concerning the contemporary framework²⁸. In other words, “each contemporary context puts the objectivized meaning into its perspective”²⁹. Thirdly, “formation” (3) refers to the crystallisation of the collectively shared knowledge as a precondition for its transmission as part of the “culturally institutionalised heritage of a society”³⁰. Then, it comes to “organisation” (4) in the sense of an institutional reinforcement of communication, for instance, through ceremonies, and a specialisation of the carriers of cultural memory, hence the presence of specialised practice to nurture³¹. Another feature is “obligation” (5) which reflects the need to have a nexus with a normative self-image of the group, which produce a defined “system of values and differentiation in importance”³² that design “the cultural supply of knowledge and symbols”³³. In particular, Assen stressed that the binding knowledge of cultural memory has two main characteristics: the formative one, which refers to instructive and civilising goals, and the normative one, which instead relates to the rules of conduct that have to be respected³⁴. Lastly, cultural memory is “reflexive” (6) in three ways: practice-reflexive, since it interprets common practice using proverbs or rituals; self-reflexive since used itself not only to explain or reinterpret but also to censure, limit or eliminate; additionally, it reflects over its appearance as it represents the self-image of the group³⁵. Nevertheless, this kind of discourse also has an effect on the state's foreign policy, which demonstrates the power of narratives as “instruments of politics”³⁶.

The narrative is a process and is generally defined as “the ways in which we construct disparate facts in our own words”³⁷, and then put them together to make sense of it. In particular, narratives influence our political understanding and hence “play a crucial role

²⁸ Assmann, J., & Czaplicka, J. (1995), “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity”, *New German Critique*, 65, 125–133, <https://doi.org/10.2307/488538>, p. 129-130.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ Ivi, p. 130-131.

³¹ Ivi, p. 131.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ Ivi, p.132.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ Kotkin, S. (1998), “1991 and the Russian Revolution: Sources, Conceptual Categories, Analytical Frameworks.”, *The Journal of Modern History* 70 (2): 384–425, p. 404.

³⁷ Patterson, M., & Renwick Monroe, K. (2010), “Narrative in political science”, In M. Bevir (Ed.), *Interpretive political science*. London: SAGE, p. 315.

in the construction of political behaviour”³⁸. As narratives are one of the most typical forms of discourse, it is possible to analyse how people perceive themselves and others³⁹. In this regard, Somers and Gibson elaborated a definition of the concept taking into account four main elements: firstly, “relationality of parts”, which means that to make sense, each event must be about others; secondly, “casual employment”, which helps to create a meaningful system of relationships since every element is put in a plot with a casualty connection between them; thirdly, “selective appropriation” which refers to the selection by the author of certain features to involve in the narrative and the exclusion of others; fourthly, “temporality, sequence and place”, as we can get the meaning of each event only by placing it temporarily and spatially in connection with the others⁴⁰. Moreover, referring to this concept definition, it is possible to identify four types of narrative: ontological, public, conceptual, and “meta” narrative. The ontological narrative refers to “the stories that social actors use to make sense of their lives”, therefore defining themselves and acting accordingly⁴¹. The public narratives are the ones “attached to cultural and institutional formation larger than the single individual, to intersubjective networks or institutions”⁴² such as the ones related to the family, religion, political government or the nation. The conceptual narrativity relates to any notion or idea elaborated by social researcher, which is about ontological or public narrative and the so-called “social forces” as “market patterns, institutional practices, organisational constraints”⁴³. Finally, the metanarratives indicate the “master-narratives” where “we are embedded as contemporary actors in history and as social scientists”⁴⁴, this refers to Enlightenment, Marxism or Liberalism. As it has been stressed so far, being narrative is a selective process; within a state, it’s up to the government to decide which elements to maintain and which ones will be forgotten.

³⁸ Patterson, M., & Renwick Monroe, K. (2010). Narrative in political science. In M. Bevir (Ed.), *Interpretive political science*. London: SAGE, p. 315-316.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ Somers MR, Gibson GD (1994), “Reclaiming the epistemological other: narrative and the social constitution of identity”, In *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, ed. C Calhoun, pp. 35-99, Oxford, UK: Blackwell, p. 60.

⁴¹ Ivi, p. 61.

⁴² Ivi, p. 62.

⁴³ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁴ Ivi, p. 63.

Considering this, we can design five models of narratives that governments may use when drawing their past. The first type is called “glorification” (1). It can be identified when a state justifies its violent past as an act of heroism in the name of national interests; hence it glorifies national heroes and justifies wars⁴⁵. Then, there is “self-victimhood” (2) of the state, absolving it from any atrocities done to others or the people as victims of their government or an external enemy⁴⁶. Another exciting type is “amnesia” (3) which comes out when a government tries to eliminate a specific traumatising event from the national discourse⁴⁷. Even though a complete eradication of an event from the history of a country is not easy to achieve, it has been proved possible in the past.

On the contrary, “acknowledgement” (4) requires that the government in charge recognises the crimes or injustices of its past. Often leaders use this narrative to call for a better future where the burden of the past is left behind⁴⁸. Finally, the “contrition” (5) narrative implies a recognition of the crimes committed as something that cannot be justified in the name of ideologic or moral reasons. Instead, in this circumstance, the state even influences public opinion through museums and events⁴⁹. All these different varieties of narrativity help us to identify and interpret the world we live in; nevertheless, at the same time, it is relevant to underline the risks that lie behind the interpretation. Indeed, the interpretative approach considers that an objective analysis is impossible. However, while using this methodology, the goal is to make it as impartial as possible⁵⁰.

As previously said, narrativity is an essential political tool in the hands of the actors in power; this is also true when identifying a national enemy. However, how can we define an “enemy”? Said, “an enemy is someone (a group, a nation, a person) who tries to destroy ‘Us’”⁵¹. More specifically, it is helpful to distinguish between traditional enemies and

⁴⁵ Dian M. (2017), “Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy”, Elsevier, p. 24, ISBN 9780081020272, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102027-2.00001-8>.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ivi, p. 25.

⁵⁰ Patterson, M., & Renwick Monroe, K. (2010), “Narrative in political science”, In M. Bevir (Ed.), “Interpretive political science”, London: SAGE, p. 326.

⁵¹ Margit Feischmidt (Ed.) and others (2017), “Mobilization through Enemy Images in Central and Eastern Europe”, Centre for Social Sciences Hungarian Academy of Sciences, *Intersections*, EEJSP,3(3): 5-13. DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v3i3.397, p,17.

enemy images to better understand the concept in political science. While the first one is usually linked to war, hence to an external and physical peril, the latter refers to modern and political enemies that may not be necessarily external⁵². Furthermore, following Silverstein's study, when it comes to nations depicted as an enemy, they are perceived as more aggressive through a selective information process. Henceforth, it is more probable that the amount of chosen negative information of that specific nation will be predominant if compared with the positive ones⁵³.

One of the most relevant roles the national enemy plays is the consolidation of the imagined political community "by strengthening loyalty and evoking strong emotions, and collective enemy images can strengthen the capacity for mobilisation of these imagined communities"⁵⁴. In Schmitt's political theory, the concepts of enmity and friend are crucial and interlinked. On one side, the friend is the one that supports us, and hence it is part of the same public community. Conversely, the enemy is defined as a group in opposition or antagonism to another group of people but has nothing to do with morality or aesthetics⁵⁵. Additionally, Schmitt stressed that it's not necessarily an economic competition between the two groups as "it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transaction"⁵⁶. Instead, it's a matter of intensity as all political issues are inevitably polemic⁵⁷. Consequently, given this precondition of opposition, people can be divided using these two main criteria.

⁵² Margit Feischmidt (Ed.) and others (2017), "Mobilization through Enemy Images in Central and Eastern Europe", Centre for Social Sciences Hungarian Academy of Sciences, *Intersections*, EEJSP,3(3): 5-13. DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v3i3.397, p.17.

⁵³ Silverstein, B. (1989), "Enemy Images: The Psychology of US Attitudes and Cognitions Regarding the Soviet Union", *American Psychologist*, 44(6): 903-913, <https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066x.44.6.903>.

⁵⁴ Margit Feischmidt (Ed.) and others (2017), "Mobilization through Enemy Images in Central and Eastern Europe", Centre for Social Sciences Hungarian Academy of Sciences, *Intersections*, EEJSP,3(3): 5-13. DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v3i3.397, p.18.

⁵⁵ Kujawski J. (2020), "Enemy and War in Carl Schmitt's Political Theory", *Zoon Politikon Issue 11*, p.30-31, DOI: 10.4467/2543408XZOP.20.002.12529.

⁵⁶ Petrović P. (2009), "Enemy as the Essence of the Political", *Review Article*, n.13, WBSO, UDK: 141.7 Шмит К, p.4.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*.

Moreover, it appears clear that the same existence of an enemy and a friend are “in a sense constitutive for the existence of a nation in itself”⁵⁸ while acting politically has to have in mind whom to consider a friend and as an enemy. In particular, Schmitt identifies three distinct types of enemies: limited, accurate, and absolute⁵⁹. The first one is limited by law and norms; thus, this type has to be beaten and removed from the country’s territory. The real enemy aims to destroy their enemies and change the current political system but defend their country or identity from invasions⁶⁰. Similarly, to the latter, the absolute enemy seeks to undermine the political order, but in this case, it has a greater purpose: to spread the revolutionary cause⁶¹. Finally, war itself is seen as the final stage of enmity.

Conclusively, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the interpretative approach is a post-positivistic one, which seeks to develop an interpretation of a particular topic to elaborate a new perspective. The combination with a historical system is helpful to reconstruct the sequence of events that led to the development of a specific narrative related to the figure of the Yugoslav state, as it changed from being a friend to quickly becoming an enemy in the post-war period the communist regime. In particular, an analysis of Hoxha’s narrative would be beneficial to gather such a view. In this way, the relevance of the role played by cultural memory, political narrative, beliefs, and dilemmas appear clear. I’ve decided to use the interpretative approach because it allows me to go beyond the simple reconstruction of history while understanding the past. In particular, it explains both the solidity and the change of a national narrative throughout time, which can be determined by the imposition of one tradition above the others or by a compromise between various traditions⁶².

⁵⁸ Petrović P. (2009), “Enemy as the Essence of the Political”, Review Article, n.13, WBSO, UDK: 141.7 Шмитт К, p.32-33.

⁵⁹ Margit Feischmidt (Ed.) and others (2017), “Mobilization through Enemy Images in Central and Eastern Europe”, Centre for Social Sciences Hungarian Academy of Sciences, *Intersections*, EEJSP,3(3): 5-13. DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v3i3.397, p.19.

⁶⁰ Ibidem.

⁶¹ Ibidem.

⁶² Dian, M. (2017), “Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy”, Elsevier, p. 27, ISBN 9780081020272, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102027-2.00001-8>.

1.2 The discursive and historical Analysis

In this paper, I've decided to adopt a discursive analysis approach to examine the evolution of the narrative adopted by the Albanian communist party, mainly through its leader Enver Hoxha. The discursive analysis is a qualitative method focused on analysing the language, explicitly searching for repetitions of language within texts while considering the socio-cultural background to which the text belongs⁶³. It also observes how these language patterns can shape a specific view of the world and identities while understanding how they are constructed through discourse⁶⁴. This field of study was firstly theorised in France by Zellig Harris, who defined this concept in 1952, referring to it as a tool connected to texts and speeches. Better said, discourse is described “as a sociohistorical meaning-making practice in context”⁶⁵; hence it is a product of communication and language practices that are strictly linked to its context. It is mainly based on discretionary research since it hasn't a specific method; Rather, it uses multiple methods and tools⁶⁶. It contains diverse oral and written sources such as documents, discourses, media, interviews, and⁶⁷. This method is applied to the government propaganda, in this case, intended as a “socio-political discourse”⁶⁸. Indeed, propaganda is described as the “strategically planned attempt to construct, spread and implement a certain collective identity, combined with the use of various forms of pressure or even violence”⁶⁹.

In this work, the discursive approach is combined with the historical one. The main goal is to reconstruct the historical development of the Albanian dictator's discourse regarding

⁶³ Paltridge B. (2021), “Discourse Analysis: an introduction”, Bloomsbury Academic, London, p.1.

⁶⁴ Ibidem.

⁶⁵ Angermuller J. (2015), “Discourse Studies”, International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), Elsevier, pp. 510-515, ISBN 9780080970875, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.03216-5>.

⁶⁶ Ibidem.

⁶⁷ Ritchie J., Lewis J. (2003), “Qualitative Research Practice. A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers”, SAGE Publication: London, p. 35.

⁶⁸ Hanisch-Wolfram, A. (2014), “Totalitarian Propaganda as Discourse: A Comparative Look at Austria and France in the Fascist Era”, In K. Postoutenko (Ed.), Totalitarian Communication: Hierarchies, Codes and Messages, p. 201, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839413937-009>

⁶⁹ Ibidem.

the “enemy”. The starting point of this analysis is Schmitt's theory of friend and enemy, where the enemy represents “the other, the stranger”⁷⁰. In particular, the goal is to detect “the moments in which enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognised as the enemy”⁷¹. The enemy construction can be analysed then through a series of actions undertaken by the Labor Party of Albania. First, the rhetorical framing, as history textbooks were repeatedly updated to respond to the new policy or decisions of the communist government, from the first image of the “friend”, “mentor”, “comrade” to the one of an “enemy of the party and the people”, a “revisionist” and an “invader”. Second, delegitimation of the target enemy; indeed, the enemy is treated by “governmental decision-making designed to signal the enemy’s outsider status”⁷². In other words, the hostile rhetoric adopted by the Albanian government caused, for instance, the denouncement and condemnation of figures such as Koçi Xoxe or the elimination of any Yugoslav influence or presence in the country. Another element to consider is separating the internal enemy and the external one. In addition, another critical role in the PLA discourse is the internal enemy. As theorised by Schmitt, central in the internal-enemy construction is creating a link between the alleged domestic enemy and the external one, in other words “if a part of the population declares that it no longer recognizes enemies, then, depending on the circumstance, it joins their side and aids them”⁷³. Whenever an individual was not recognizing the enemy along with the declarations of the Albanian communist party, he automatically became a threat as well. Better said, by doing so, those individuals revealed “their role as an internal enemy that will inevitably aid external ones”⁷⁴. An example of this was the internal enemy construction of the *Balli Kombetar*, *Legaliteti*, or Koçi Xoxe and Mehmet Shehu. The first was a nationalistic movement accused of being a collaborator of the Fascist and Nazi occupiers during the National Liberation War of the 40s; the second, a pro-monarchist faction similarly accused of being cooperating with the

⁷⁰ Schmitt C. (2007), “The concept of the political. Expanded Edition”, George Schwab trans., The University and Chicago Press, p. 76.

⁷¹ Ivi, p. 130.

⁷² Andersen Jones R., Grown Sun L. (2017), “Enemy construction and the press”, BYU Law Research Paper No. 17-23, SSRN, p. 15.

⁷³ Schmitt C. (2007), “The concept of the political. Expanded Edition”, George Schwab trans., The University and Chicago Press, p. 107, ISBN-13: 978-0-226-73892-5.

⁷⁴ Andersen Jones R., Grown Sun L. (2017), “Enemy construction and the press”, BYU Law Research Paper No. 17-23, SSRN, p. 15.

same invaders, against the communists; finally, Koçi Xoxe and Mehmet Shehu, both eminent members of the Albanian communist party, were condemned as Yugoslav spies and agent.

These methods are applied to a series of documents, speeches, and discourse by Enver Hoxha throughout his dictatorship when describing his Yugoslav/Serbian enemy and its allies. In particular, the narrative of the Yugoslav enemy is developed by the government propaganda through the education system, the state-owned media and the press. The national media was meant in the hands of the Albanian nomenklatura. They cooperated in creating the regime's enemies—furthermore, the correspondence and agreements signed between the two witnesses and the changes in their relationship. Owning the media system made it possible for the regime to control and shape the mind of its citizens⁷⁵. Not to mention that Enver Hoxha himself wrote and published books and notes throughout his dictatorship while deleting and censoring anything that could have been in contrast with his current position. His memoirs were used as lenses through which the party, the media, or society could interpret the Albanian socialist reality. In a Stalinist and repressive system such as Hoxha's, his speeches and writings were followed scrupulously to avoid being captured or tortured by the police state, the *Sigurimi*. The Albanian leadership and its publications were the only sources of truth, and the press and public institutions followed its lead. Therefore, the Albanian communist system he created could change its skin multiple times and still be seen as credible by the masses thanks to powerful state propaganda. This undoubtedly reduces the material available to analyse Hoxha's discourse and scripts on the Yugoslav before 1948 but is nevertheless relevant to understanding the transformations of Hoxha's policy and construction of enemies.

What is the purpose of the enemy construction mechanism? There are undoubtedly several reasons why a government could create an enemy. For instance, it could favour the unity of a political community⁷⁶, especially in the case of the Albanian one, which

⁷⁵ Chomsky N. (1997), "Media Control. The Spectacular Achievements Of Propaganda", The Open Media Pamphlet Series, Seven Stories Press First Edition.

⁷⁶ Andersen Jones R., Grown Sun L. (2017), "Enemy Construction and the press", BYU Law Research Paper No. 17-23, SSRN, p. 36.

was relatively new and lacked cohesion. At the same time, it helps diverge from any internal societal issue⁷⁷. In addition, it could help build an alliance against a common identified enemy, as happened in the case of Tirana when it closed the relationship with Belgrade in 1948 to align with Moscow⁷⁸. Finally, it can diverge society's attention from "existing social problems or future policy failures"⁷⁹.

Before applying the discourse-analysis method, presenting a terminological distinction between the Yugoslav and the Serbian enemy image, on one side, in the Albanian internal propaganda, in most of Enver Hoxha's writings and PLA's report, the enemy is 'ideological' and 'Yugoslav', a 'modern revisionist', an 'evil agent', even though sometimes is referred as Belgrade, there is no ethnic connotation; on the other side when it comes to the Kosovo question, and especially within Hoxha's memoir 'The Titoites', the tone gets more nationalistic. The enemy is 'Serbian', 'bloody' and 'ferocious'. This is an exciting aspect as it shows a different approach to the same subject. The discourse of Hoxha when it comes to the situation of the Albanians living in the Kosovo region becomes more like the Kosovo ethnic discourse that was developing in Kosovo, as he uses expressions like "genocide", "massacres", "bloody actions". Nonetheless, it seems to be more characterised by nationalistic connotations related to the country's independence and the unity of the Albanian people⁸⁰.

⁷⁷ Andersen Jones R., Grown Sun L. (2017), "Enemy Construction and the press", BYU Law Research Paper No. 17-23, SSRN, p. 36.

⁷⁸ Ivi, p. 37.

⁷⁹ Ibidem.

⁸⁰ See, Hoxha E. (1982), "Selected Works. Volume I/II/III/IV", The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The "8 Nentori" publishing house: Tirana.

2 The Yugoslav-Albanian friendship

2.1 The creation of the Albanian Communist Party (CPA)

To better capture the evolvment of the “enemy” image developed by the Albanian dictator and his government towards its Yugoslav neighbour, it is relevant to look at their relation as allies since the beginning, when the Albanian communist party was yet to come. Before the opening of the Second World War, on the 7th of April 1939, the Kingdom of Albania was quickly invaded and occupied by Mussolini’s Fascist Italy. Although the country was already an Italian protectorate since 1927, after the invasion, it played an even more strategic role from an economic and military point of view⁸¹. The country’s weak resistance was easily defeated, and its king, Zogu I, ran away with his family to Greece⁸². At the same time, the kingdom of Albania was unified under the Italian crown of Vittorio Emanuele III. Under Italian rule, the Albanian resistance was almost none. When Italy signed its armistice in September 1943, Albania was eventually occupied by Nazi Germany, trying to avoid any allied force in the area. Only on the 29th of November 1944 did the last Nazi soldier leaves Albania. As none of the Allied armies came, the Albanian National Liberation Movement (in Albanian, *Lëvizja Nacional-Çlirimtare*) could claim itself as the only liberator in the country⁸³ and the only force who was able to face the foreign invaders. It was a political organisation created in September 1942 and composed of different political movements and ideologies, united by the same aim. Its creation didn’t come out of anywhere. Unlike most Eastern European countries, in Albania, the communist regime didn’t come out due to an imposition by the Soviet Red Army nor a product of Albania itself. Still, it was instead the product of the support of the

⁸¹ Villari, G. (2007), “A Failed Experiment: The Exportation of Fascism to Albania”, *Modern Italy*, 12(2), 157-171, doi:10.1080/13532940701362698, available at: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/modern-italy/article/abs/failed-experiment-the-exportation-of-fascism-to-albania/16E2F314D5574ECA42487BFAA6B49AE9>

⁸² Veremis T., “The Modern Balkans: a concise guide to nationalism and politics. The rise and decline of the nation state”, LSEE Research on Southeast Europe, p.85, available at: <https://www.lse.ac.uk/LSEE-Research-on-South-Eastern-Europe/Assets/Documents/Publications/Other/Veremis-Concise-Guide-to-Nationalism.pdf>

Yugoslav members of the Communist party (CPY). This was the case probably since Albania lacked the presence of a working-class⁸⁴. Indeed, during the war, after the occupation of Albania by the Italian Fascist army, the secretary of the Kosovo Committee, Miladin Popović, was appointed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) as the one in charge of the relationship with the Albanian communists⁸⁵. Only at the end of November 1941 in Tirana did the Albanian Communist movement come into existence. It was the head of the National Liberational Front, an agglomeration of partisan campaigns against the fascist and Nazi invasion. In this first phase, the narrative developed around the Yugoslav communists by the first embryonic of the Albanian communist party was instead the one of a ‘big brother’, a ‘friend’, and a ‘mentor’ from whom to learn. This was already evident in a directive delivered by the National Liberation Movement presented in 1943:

“We must popularise the national liberation struggles going on throughout Europe, and especially those in Yugoslavia and Greece. Openly and without hesitation, we must raise the problem of our brotherhood with the peoples of Yugoslavia and Greece. We must convince our people that the supreme interests of our country demand that to fraternise with the Greek and Yugoslav peoples. [...] We have to convince our people that the national liberation movements of Yugoslavia and Greece, far from endangering our independence, help us to win it.”⁸⁶

The message sent to the Albanian communist members of the National Liberation Movement was to promote and construct an image of the Yugoslavs, and Greeks, based on *brotherhood*, *friendship*, and *solidarity*. The need is imperative: *we must convince* every Albanian to believe so. The enemy discourse was only directed toward the Fascist and Nazi occupiers and their agents. How to reach the aim? Through clandestine press and propaganda. The propaganda sector, which started to be developed already under the

⁸⁴ Stephen Schwartz (2009) “‘Enverists’ and ‘Titoists’ – Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941–99: From the Partisan Movement of the Second World War to the Kosova Liberation War”, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 25:1, 48-72, p. 51, DOI: 10.1080/13523270802655613

⁸⁵ Previšić, M. (2021), “Breaking Down Bipolarity: Yugoslavia's Foreign Relations during the Cold War”, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, p.43, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110658972>.

⁸⁶ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 229.

occupation, was crucial for the Albanian communist to promote their view of the anti-fascist war:

“Communiques, leaflets, and newspapers should be printed very carefully and distributed everywhere among the people. The propaganda section should always be on its toes, exposing every enemy tactically and explaining the situation to the comrades and the public.”⁸⁷

During the war, the contact between the CPY and the Albanian communist party was arduous since the fascist army heavily controlled the border between the two. However, when Yugoslavia succumbed, most communists living in Kosovo were interned in Albania, while Popović⁸⁸ was saved from being imprisoned by the Albanian communists. Popović was a Montenegrin leader of the CPY provincial committee, known in area⁸⁹. It would have been the Yugoslav Dušan Mugoša and him that would have played a significant role in creating the Albanian communist party (CPA) while also standing behind the organisation of their local resistance movement⁹⁰. The goal of the two was to find followers for the Yugoslav anti-fascist movement⁹¹. Dušan, in particular, was the only Serb who could speak and understand Albanian, and he was the main intermediary between the two parts. On the other side, Popović will be the one to designate Enver Hoxha as the head of the CPA since he was thought to be out of the power struggle, thus viewed as the best option among the others⁹². Also, Hoxha was perceived as easier to control because he hadn't shown any leadership interest until ⁹³. Hoxha was indeed elected head of the CPA in 1941. The Albanian party leader also confirmed this unique relationship with Popović in one of his writings, where he stated:

⁸⁷ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 245-246.

⁸⁸ Ibidem.

⁸⁹ Blendi F. (2016), “The Iron Fist Of Albania”, I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London/ New York, p. 117.

⁹⁰ Previšić, M. (2021), “Breaking Down Bipolarity: Yugoslavia's Foreign Relations during the Cold War”, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, p.43, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110658972>.

⁹¹ Stephen Schwartz (2009) “‘Enverists’ and ‘Titoists’ – Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941–99: From the Partisan Movement of the Second World War to the Kosova Liberation War”, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 25:1, 48-72, p. 51, DOI: 10.1080/13523270802655613.

⁹² Blendi F. (2016), “The Iron Fist Of Albania”, I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London/ New York, p. 121

⁹³ Ibidem.

“I seemed to be Ali’s⁹⁴ favourite. He had great trust in me. I trusted him too [...] Ali trusted no one, except for me”⁹⁵.

It appears clear that initially, the guidance of the CPY was crucial for the establishment of the newly born CPA, and it was seen and described as a positive and trustworthy “mentor”. Hoxha will use this unique relationship between him and Popović to justify his leadership role in the Albanian communist party. During the party conference in Labinot on 18 March 1943, Hoxha spoke openly about how he reached the head of the party:

“How did it happen that I became close to Ali? I don’t know [...] All I know is that Ali was in favour of me becoming a political secretary”⁹⁶.

Hence, once again, the narrative that matures around the figure of Popović is still one of the friends to whom Hoxha recognised a relevant role for the formation of the CPA. Hoxha will confirm this particular relation with Popović in his memoirs, describing him as an honest and trustful man. The Albanian leader always stated that the Tito did not send Miladin, nor was he acting under the CPY⁹⁷. Miladin Popović and Enver Hoxha spent lots of time together, and since Popović could speak only basic French, he had to rely on Hoxha if he wanted to communicate with the other members of the CPA⁹⁸. The Labinot Conference was focused on the discussion related to strengthening the democratic people’s power as the main issue. At the same time, there was an agreement on the Constitution and the rules of the national liberation councils. Additionally, there was the election of the new National Liberation General Council.

From the beginning, till 1944, the goal of the Yugoslav leaders was to promote an international approach, and they became the main link between the CPA and the Communist international. Therefore, it seems that the CPY wasn’t looking at Albania as

⁹⁴ Miladin Popović was called Ali by the Albanians.

⁹⁵ Hoxha E., "Autokritike ne Plenumin e Beratit", Central State Archives in Blendi F. (2016), “The Iron Fist Of Albania”, I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London/ New York, p. 121.

⁹⁶ Enver Hoxha, “Notes on the conference of Labinot”, CSA in Blendi F. (2016), “The Iron Fist Of Albania”, I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London/ New York, p. 121.

⁹⁷ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 36- 37.

⁹⁸ Ivi, p. 122.

its zone of interest⁹⁹, but rather as a way to help the implementation of the revolution abroad, as encouraged by the Comintern at the time. In his book, ‘The Titoites’, Hoxha referred to the friendly relationship with Belgrade:

“We regarded the links with the CPY as something natural, as links between communists, between brothers of common ideals. We would exchange experience and assist one another in the sacred fight for the freedom and independence of our countries, and between us, based on Marxism-Leninism [...]”¹⁰⁰

Given the situation, this period is better connected to the image of the CPY as a mentor and a brother with whom he was sharing *common ideals*. This image is marked by the perspective of Enver Hoxha and the National Movement Resistance. In the report of the 1st Plenum, the role of the Yugoslav partisans was particularly applauded:

“The National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia is growing from day to day and becoming the pivot of the fraternity of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. [...] The formation of the provisional government is a great political success for the national liberation war of Yugoslavia. Today, the Yugoslav army is one of the allied armies fighting the occupiers”¹⁰¹.

In line with this position, any eventual conflict between the Albanian and the Yugoslav people in the region was explained as a result of the Nazi’s interference or influence:

“With the assistance of Albanian reactionaries, Hitler is trying to mobilise the Albanian population of Kosova and Macedonia against the Serbian-Montenegrin-Macedonian populations and to use the Kosova problem to sow confusion among the Albanian people, to divide them, and to incite the

⁹⁹ Previšić, M. (2021), “Breaking Down Bipolarity: Yugoslavia's Foreign Relations during the Cold War”, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, p.43, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110658972>.

¹⁰⁰ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 12.

¹⁰¹ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 295.

pseudo-patriots to struggle against the national liberation movement of the Albanian people.”¹⁰²

However, in 1944 Popović was called back by the CPY because he was too involved in the Albanian communist leadership; thus, he was substituted by Velimir Stojnić¹⁰³. Miladin Popovic acted as the actual leader of the CPA from November 1941 to March 1943, as he was the one chairing the meetings and ending speeches¹⁰⁴. The removal of Popović scared the Albanian communist leadership, who suddenly found themselves without their main Yugoslav interlocutor. During the Secondary Party Plenum in Berat at the end of November 1944, the first clashes were between the Albanian communists and the Yugoslav delegate, Velimir Stojnić. Some Albanian communists denounced the party’s wartime tactics as brutal. In particular, Hoxha was accused of eliminating CPA members, although he defended himself by stating he was just acting on Popovic and Mugoša¹⁰⁵. Velimir Stojnić came to Albania as chief of the military mission of Yugoslavia in Albania. On that occasion, Enver Hoxha, in his Notes on the “Titoites”, said he had welcomed Stojnić “warmly and whole-heartedly”¹⁰⁶. In Berat, regarding the relationship with the Yugoslav delegates, Hoxha also held:

“We were like pupils who asked their teacher for advice about everything, seeking their approval and guidance”¹⁰⁷.

Also adding that:

“Ours is a young party, and we need to know the experience of older and bigger parties, and to exchange opinions”¹⁰⁸.

Remarking once again on the position of the subjection of the Albanian communist party compared to the CPY, to whom Hoxha seemed very attached as they were his only

¹⁰² Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 197.

¹⁰³ Previšić, M. (2021), “Breaking Down Bipolarity: Yugoslavia's Foreign Relations during the Cold War”, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, p.43, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110658972>.

¹⁰⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁵ Blendi F. (2016), “The Iron Fist Of Albania”, I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London/ New York, p. 161.

¹⁰⁶ Hoxha e., “The Titoist”, Historical Notes, part. 2, p. 133

¹⁰⁷ Blendi F. (2016), “The Iron Fist Of Albania”, I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London/ New York, p. 162.

¹⁰⁸ Hoxha E., “The Titoist”, Historical Notes, part. 2, p. 134.

provider of economic and military sources and political support. The perspective of the newborn CPA is still one of the “pupils” who look at the teacher for advice. Hoxha undoubtedly recognises that the CPY is in a higher position, and he’s also aware that he needs their help at this moment. The image of allies will remain strictly connected to the figure of Popović as time passes, especially after 1948. This is particularly distinct in Hoxha’s writings and memoirs.

In this first phase, the CPA was still acting within the National Liberation Movement, not on its behalf, following the Comintern's guidance to all communist parties in the Eastern European region. During the war, the Albanian and Yugoslav partisans cooperated against the enemy (the fascist and Nazi invaders), as Tito provided strategic and ideological support to Hoxha¹⁰⁹. However, with the Congress in Permet organised on 24 May 1944, Hoxha showed himself in public for the first time to all the communist partisans to present himself as the leader of the National Liberation Army¹¹⁰. During the same Congress, he reminded:

“With the advance of the Red Army, the patriotic forces of various countries are gathering their strength [...]. Our Yugoslav neighbours are waging a heroic war. [...] All these factors are of great importance for our National Liberation War, as they increase our confidence in victory.”¹¹¹

At the 2nd Meeting of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council on October 1944, again Hoxha underlined the role played by the CPY:

“In this terrible war in which the oppressed peoples of Europe have fought with rare heroism, the heroic people of Yugoslavia and their National Liberation Army occupy a special place.”¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Vucinich, W. S. (1951), “Communism gains in Albania: Part II”, *Current History*, 21(124), p.350, 345–352, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45308031>

¹¹⁰ Blendi F. (2016), “The Iron Fist Of Albania”, I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London/ New York, p. 200-201.

¹¹¹ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume II”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 336.

¹¹² Ivi, p. 363.

However, one of the thorny topics between the CPY and the CPA was Kosovo, and other Albanian nationalist groups, such as the '*Balli Kombetar*' (the National Front) and '*Legaliteti*' (the Legality Movement), who wanted to incorporate all the ethnic Albanians in one state. The first one, known as Balli, was a nationalist and anti-communist movement active during the Second World War; the second was an Albanian royalist and pro-monarchy front. Already in 1943, Hoxha was sharing a report with his communist followers:

“The ‘Balli Kombetar’ is an organisation which emerged as a reaction against the national liberation movement; it has fallen into the trap prepared by the enemy to divide the Albanian people and to bring about a fratricidal war. [...] Its opportunist policy should be denounced without mercy, its demagogical campaign for unity should be combatted ...”¹¹³

Balli Kombetar was *de-facto* constructed as an internal enemy of the Albanian people. He was not only against the National Liberation Movement, but it had a connection with the Italian and German fascist occupiers. Although one of the main points of contention with the Balli was the Albanian question, they were blamed for having disseminated a *fratricidal war* among the Albanians. On the contrary, it was said that the National Movement really wanted the “true unity of the Albanian people”¹¹⁴ of the Balkans. The effect was a delegitimisation of the *Balli Kombetar* battle, as they were also assumed to have emerged merely as a threat to the Albanian National Liberation Movement rather than as against the occupiers:

“The ‘Balli’ must purge its ranks of those elements who have connections with the fascist invaders, of spies, criminals and speculators linked with the speculating cliques of the enemy in their efforts to take the food from the very mouths of the people in these difficult wartime conditions.”¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 197.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹¹⁵ Ivi, p. 198.

Again, a solid delegitimizing of Balli's fight and aim assumed they were cooperating with the *fascist invaders, spies, criminals, and speculators*. This could permit Hoxha and the Albanian communists to gradually eliminate the members of Balli from the political game and thus justify their actions against them:

“We must prepare ourselves. The ‘Balli’ is preparing for this clash and must not catch us with our arms folded. [...] The situation forces us to act, but in order to act, we must be prepared, especially, militarily.”¹¹⁶

At the 1st Meeting in 1944, he added:

“They (Balli Kombetar members) launched a broad propaganda campaign against us through a powerful and well-organized press [...]. Their campaign was conducted with notorious anti-communist slogans ...”¹¹⁷

The call to prepare for the fight foresees an imminent and inevitable confrontation between the two movements; therefore, the only response would have been to act immediately. Through this narrative, the image and credibility of the *Balli* as part of the anti-fascist war was gradually destroyed and substituted with the one of an internal and untrustful enemy. The same destiny was given to *Legaliteti*:

“Consistent in their betrayal, the Balli Kombetar and Legaliteti not only did not fire a single shot against the invading enemy, but united completely with them in the war against the people. [...] Thus, the anti-popular and anti-national character of the big landowners, the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intellectuals, was completely exposed.”¹¹⁸

At this stage, Hoxha had still left the question of Kosovo aside to be resolved after the liberation of the country, even though there was a relevant number of ethnic Albanians living in the region. The Albanian question was not taken as a point of discussion between

¹¹⁶ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 200.

¹¹⁷ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume II”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 299.

¹¹⁸ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume III”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 297.

the two sides involved, indeed also the project of unification presented by the Second League of Prizren was rejected¹¹⁹. This was done following the concerns of Belgrade¹²⁰, particularly the one of Miladin Popović, who appeared not to be comfortable with the notion of an ethnic Albania that would have probably incorporated Kosovo, at the time of Yugoslavia¹²¹. The principle of self-determination was ignored on purpose by Yugoslavia. Hoxha, on one side, was able to use this as a tool to eliminate any political adversary by cutting the relationship with the *Balli Kombetar*; on the other side, it seems that he didn't want to lose the support of Popović, and then Stojnić since he wasn't yet politically strong enough. Indeed, while endorsing a fight against the fascist members of the *Balli Kombetar*, Hoxha stressed the necessity of a:

“Joint struggle together with the great British-Soviet-American allies, with the oppressed peoples, and in particular, with the national liberation movements of the neighbouring people of Yugoslavia and Greece...”¹²²

The enemies were the fascist invader and their internal agents, also called ‘Albanian traitors’¹²³; hence what was urgent now was to join the battle against them and not discuss the unification of all the Albanians living in the Balkans. Concerning the Kosovo region, Hoxha commented that the goal was finding:

“The solution of the question of Kosova in accordance with the wishes of the Kosova people”¹²⁴.

The Albanian question was thus postponed, while Hoxha simply said that the goal of the Liberation Movement was to defend all the Albanians. Therefore, it's clear that the

¹¹⁹ Stamova, M. (2017), “The Albanian Factor in Serbia/Yugoslavia in 19th and 20th Centuries”, *Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne*, 2017, Tom XXV, p. 229-238, pa. 2017. ISSN 2543-733X. Available at: <https://www.ejournals.eu/SSB/2017/Tom-XXV/art/10035/>, doi: <https://doi.org/10.4467/2543733XSSB.17.015.7261>.

¹²⁰ Mehilli E. (2017), “From Stalin to Mao. Albania and the Socialist World”, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, p.39.

¹²¹ Blendi F. (2016), “The Iron Fist Of Albania”, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd London/ New York, p. 183.

¹²² Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 198.

¹²³ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume III”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 376.

¹²⁴ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 198.

problem connected to the Albanians living outside the borders was not only a Yugoslavian problem (internal), somewhat it was also connected to the Yugoslav-Albanian partnership (external)¹²⁵.

2.2 The People's Republic of Albania as a satellite of Yugoslavia

The image of the ally and friend was perpetuated by Enver Hoxha at the beginning as the head of the newborn communist government. Once in power, the Labor party adopted a new constitution was adopted unanimously and as expected, heavily inspired by Yugoslav and the Soviet one. During the speech delivered on Independence Day, the 28th of November 1944, Enver Hoxha praised the Yugoslav peoples' heroism:

“In their National Liberation War, our people have had the support of the heroic struggle of the Yugoslav peoples. Our neighbours and brothers, from the very first days they were occupied, threw themselves into a resolute liberation struggle. Our army and that of Yugoslavia are shedding their blood side by side on the fields of Kosova and Metohia: our soldiers and the Yugoslav soldiers bind each other's wounds suffered in fierce battles against the same enemy, and our friendship is being consecrated in the mingling of their blood. [...] The bonds of friendship between our people and the peoples of Yugoslavia are bonds of blood and hardships faced together. On this great festive day for our country, we send our greetings to the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia.”¹²⁶

Several Albanian partisans joined the Yugoslav troops during the war to free the southern former Yugoslav territories, especially Kosovo¹²⁷. As it appears, the Albanian dictator repeatedly referred to the Yugoslav as *neighbours* and *brothers*, constructing and reinforcing the positive image of an ally as he had promoted till then. He specifically

¹²⁵ Stamova, M. (2017), “The Albanian Factor in Serbia/Yugoslavia in 19th and 20th Centuries”, *Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne*, 2017, Tom XXV, p. 231, pa. 2017. ISSN 2543-733X. Available at: <<https://www.ejournals.eu/SSB/2017/Tom-XXV/art/10035/>>.

¹²⁶ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 405-406.

¹²⁷ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I.B.Tauris. p. 159, ISBN 978-0-85771-025-3.

underlined the shared heroic liberation war against the occupiers, underlining the Yugoslav bond to the Albanians. The *enemy* is the same: the fascist first, the nazis then. The *friendship* that unifies them is raised from the blood on the battlefield, hence there is a shared emotional and challenging past between the two. This speech was delivered during a symbolic day, Independence Day, which reinforced the message. Some years later, at the 5th Party Session he would have indeed affirmed:

“With Yugoslavia, correct and sincere relations should be created in all spheres of activity. The possibilities for this have been created, and the war has made this job much easier.”¹²⁸

The anti-fascist war made it more accessible for the Albanian leader to promote the partnership with Tito. A series of events favoured the construction of a positive image of the CPY. While Stalin wasn't interested in Albania's affairs, the CPY could influence it. Tito was the first to internationally recognise the Albanian communist government of Hoxha while always providing support in the international sphere. They promoted Albanian's application to join the United Nations and the U.N.R.R.A.¹²⁹, even when it comes to its claim for reparation or when asking to be part of the Paris Peace Conference¹³⁰. In this regard, Hoxha expressed his gratitude openly to their *friendly* support in an article published in the newspaper *Bashikimi* on March 25, 1946:

“[...] In reply to the friendly defence of the Soviet, Yugoslav, and the Polish delegation. Our people are very grateful to these delegations and their countries.”¹³¹

And again, in another article published in the same newspaper in October 1946:

¹²⁸ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume III”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 516.

¹²⁹ Acronym of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

¹³⁰ Vucinich, W. S. (1951), “Communism gains in Albania: Part II”, *Current History*, 21(124), p.345, available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45308031>, p.350.

¹³¹ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume III”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p.533.

“The Recognition of the Democratic Government of Albania by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was a victory for us and a fully deserved satisfaction for the entire Albanian people.”¹³²

Hoxha repeatedly stressed his gratitude for his “valued friend”¹³³ as his country was finally joining the “family of the allied nations”¹³⁴. Moreover, when the relationship between Greece and Albania worsened, Yugoslavia decided to stipulate a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with Albania on 9th July 1946¹³⁵. During every inauguration of any economic initiative between the two countries, Tito’s name was recalled alongside the one of Stalin and Hoxha¹³⁶. Local newspapers used to remark on the heroism of the Yugoslav partisan and the economic developments within the Yugoslav republics¹³⁷.

In the treaty, the cooperation between the two countries in wartime is praised while stressing the desire to improve their friendship in the economic and cultural sectors. Since its beginning, it has been remarked their fighting against their common enemies in the past and their willingness to defend each other in case of an attack from a third country. The image of an old friend was reinforced not only through public inaugurations and events but also within public economic contracts. The treaty was accompanied soon by a series of financial and technical agreements to integrate their national economies¹³⁸. At the end of November 1946, an Economic convention was signed that aimed at further implementing the economic cooperation among the two while also asking for the abolition of any frontier formality¹³⁹. Also, custom and a currency union were designed, supplemented by a Planning Agency and even a joint bank. Therefore, according to this

¹³² Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume III”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 640.

¹³³ Ibidem.

¹³⁴ Ibidem.

¹³⁵ Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance Between the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and The People’s Republic of Albania, 9 July 1946, available at: <http://www.forost.ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19460711-1.pdf>

¹³⁶ Mehilli E. (2017), “From Stalin to Mao. Albania and the Socialist World”, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, p. 40.

¹³⁷ Ivi, p. 40-41.

¹³⁸ Vucinich, W. S. (1951), “Communism gains in Albania: Part II”, *Current History*, 21(124), p.345, 345–352, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45308031>

¹³⁹ Ivi, p. 350.

agreement, the Albanian currency would have been abandoned and substituted by the Yugoslav one while creating a customs union based on the Yugoslav standards¹⁴⁰. Several joint companies were created that dealt with the construction and railroads, oil, mining, electrification, naval, and commerce¹⁴¹. It is worth mentioning that the Economic Convention was not published, but only later after the split up in 1948¹⁴². At the 4th Plenum of the PLA on the 17th of October 1945, referring to the need of improving the economic condition of the country after the war, Hoxha indeed recognised the Yugoslav financial support:

“Yugoslavia has supplied us with materials, based on an agreement under which we repay Yugoslavia with the equivalent value in our products. We must meet these commitments.”¹⁴³

And again:

“Naturally, we were prepared to gain as much as possible from the organisational experience of the council, the Party, the economy, and the army in Yugoslavia, experience which at that time we considered necessary.”¹⁴⁴

The PLA recognized the need to get the necessary information and aid from the CPY as it had more experience; therefore, there was a rapport of dependence, especially at the start of their newborn government. While at the 5th Plenum one year later, while discussing the exploitation of the mines, the Party leader affirmed:

“Their exploitation should be studied very seriously, not only for the short term and for the narrow local interests, but we should think at the same time

¹⁴⁰ Shameti, Ornela & Dibra, Pranvera. (2014), “Economic Agreements in the Yugoslav-Albanian Relations”, *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, p. 290, 5. 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n13p289.

¹⁴¹ Mehilli E. (2017), “From Stalin to Mao. Albania and the Socialist World”, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, p. 40.

¹⁴² Ivi, p. 291.

¹⁴³ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 452.

¹⁴⁴ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 276.

of the importance of their maximum exploitation to aid our allies, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.”¹⁴⁵

In each Plenum, the Yugoslavs were described and perceived as allies by Enver Hoxha, while Albania had the duty to repay them of their generosity. This positive image was constructed as they were pursuing the same aim under the communist umbrella. Anyway, the image as ally and friend wasn't confined merely to the economic sector. The idea of Tito and his party as saviours and partners was incremented during the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian communist party at the end of February 1946, where Hoxha openly declared that “the country should breed the love toward Yugoslavia”¹⁴⁶. He added that without Yugoslavia, it would have been impossible for the party to remain in power¹⁴⁷. At the same Plenum, he also stated:

“Did the Party define a political and organisational line for the liberation period? Yes, it did, and I believe we are all of one mind. We defined the political line of the Front, the political line in connection with the allies and Yugoslavia, we defined the economic and social line to be followed by our Party, we defined the organizational line of our Party”¹⁴⁸.

At the same time, there was massive pro-Yugoslav propaganda in 1946, followed by a complete orientation to Yugoslavia in foreign policy¹⁴⁹. As a matter of fact, Hoxha was convinced to keep on strengthening the partnership with its neighbour in every field. Similarly, in the education system, the Serbo-Croatian language was introduced in the curriculum, while several Albanian students went to Belgrade to learn economics and agrarian studies. Concerning the issue of education, at the 4th Plenum of the PLA, Enver Hoxha remarked the role of Yugoslavia as one of the *friendly countries*:

¹⁴⁵ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 505.

¹⁴⁶ Shameti, Ornela & Dibra, Pranvera. (2014), “Economic Agreements in the Yugoslav-Albanian Relations”, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, p. 290, 5. 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n13p289.

¹⁴⁷ Mehilli E. (2017), “From Stalin to Mao. Albania and the Socialist World”, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, p. 41.

¹⁴⁸ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 482.

¹⁴⁹ Shameti, Ornela & Dibra, Pranvera. (2014), “Economic Agreements in the Yugoslav-Albanian Relations”, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, p. 290, 5. 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n13p289.

“In addition, we are trying to send some students abroad to study at universities abroad. Here too we handicapped by financial worries and financial relations with other countries. We have asked friendly countries to admit our students on bursaries.”¹⁵⁰

The precarious financial condition eased this economic integration that Albania was facing after the war, as it needed substantial economic aid, and Yugoslavia was ready to give it. Indeed, the Economic convention with Belgrade was justified saying it would have meant “greater food rations for everyone”¹⁵¹, even though shops keep lacking enough provisions. During a dinner given in honour of Marshall Tito, Hoxha stated that “Belgrade effectively served as Albania’s window into the world”¹⁵² as all the information reached Albania via Yugoslavia. Even during public manifestation, the name of Hoxha was always praised with Tito’s name¹⁵³. The portrait of Tito, along with the one of Stalin, was always present during this kind of exhibition. In addition, also the country was full of slogans in his honour, like *Rroft Tito* (Long Live Tito)¹⁵⁴. In his writings, the Albanian dictator recalled the words of Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, “the Soviet Union will unsparingly help the Albanian people to rebuild their economy, but this help will be given through Yugoslavia, purely for reasons of foreign policy”¹⁵⁵. Even when it came to Soviet economic aid, it was usually sent through Belgrade, proving that Albania was seen as Yugoslavia’s influence domain¹⁵⁶ even from abroad. A rather famous slogan of the time was indeed “the road to Moscow runs through Belgrade”¹⁵⁷.

Recalling the National Liberation War in the newspaper *Bashkimi* in October 1946, Enver Hoxha declared:

¹⁵⁰ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume III”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 460.

¹⁵¹ Mehilli E. (2017), “From Stalin to Mao. Albania and the Socialist World”, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, p. 42.

¹⁵² Ivi, p. 41.

¹⁵³ Ibidem.

¹⁵⁴ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I.B.Tauris. p. 167.

¹⁵⁵ Hoxha E. (1974), “The development of economic relations between Yugoslavia and our country” in Selected Works I: November 1941 – October 1948, published by decision of the central committee of the party of labour of Albania, Tirana: the 8 Nentori.

¹⁵⁶ Hoxha E (1982)., “Titoists”, p. 198 in “Aleanca mes Jugosllavisë dhe Shqipërisë gjatë viteve 1945-1961”, Klemendi Ilir, PhD thesis, p.4.

¹⁵⁷ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 344.

“Our National Liberation War not only liberated the country from the foreigners and the internal traitors, but it opened the way to friendship with the neighbouring people of the new Yugoslavia. The friendship and alliance with Yugoslavia are not the work of just two or three people, but the Albanian and Yugoslav people, and this was hammered out in common struggle. On the battlefield, we clasped hands as comrades sincerely and fraternally.”¹⁵⁸

The construction of the friendly and fraternal narrative around the image of Yugoslavia was often present in the Albanian dictator’s discourse. The shared past, fighting together against the common enemy, would have often recurred in his speeches to reinforce Party’s narrative. However, even though the leaders of the PLA kept promoting the “brotherhood and unity” between the two, not all party members favour such close integration. Soon there were rumours that behind the generosity of the CPY, there was an attempt to invade the country and make it the 9th Yugoslavian republic. This will be the first step toward the transition from friend to enemy from the Albanian perspective. However, in these first years (1946-1947), the CPY was instead described as a saviour, a friend that fought against the same enemies in the past, and an indispensable economic and political partner in the present. Indeed, he described his visit to Belgrade in 1946 in quite positive and friendly words:

“We were going abroad for the first time as representatives of a people’s government, of course, to a friendly country, and we had considered it our first duty to express to our friends, both the Yugoslav people and their leadership, the pure feeling of the sincere friendship of our people [...]”¹⁵⁹

Enver Hoxha was aware of the country’s precarious political and economic condition and that he needed Yugoslavian support to stay in power. Hence the party propaganda pushed on the idea that the friendship, or rather the brotherhood, with the neighbour, was the best

¹⁵⁸ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume III”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 639.

¹⁵⁹ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 274.

choice to progress. Until 1948, Albania will significantly benefit from Yugoslavia's presence.

2.3 The Balkan Federation

Within this framework, the idea of the Balkan Confederation that would have included Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and Romania came up again. The project of a regional political and economic commonwealth was indeed nothing new. It was already a well-known idea at the end of the 19th century. Various unofficial proposals started to be developed, even though it didn't have much influence within their respective governments. The project was retaken by Marshall Tito and made public in 1947, while he had started a series of bilateral agreements with Albania and Bulgaria¹⁶⁰. The CPY was also sending economic and military aid to the Greek communist resistance¹⁶¹. Still, it was soon stopped by Stalin, who had previously agreed with Churchill to leave Greece to him within the so-called "percentages" agreement in 1944¹⁶². However, at first, within the Cominform, Tito and the Bulgarian communist leader, Georgi Dimitrov, discussed the elaboration of a union of the Balkan states under the communist umbrella.

However, years later, the Balkan confederation project would have played a peculiar role in constructing the enemy by Hoxha's government, as it would have been instrumentalized by the LPA once Yugoslavia has been expelled from Cominform. In his memoirs in 1982, the Albanian dictator elucidated:

"He (Tito) was a 'Trojan horse' in the socialist camp, the international communist movement, and, more specifically, the Balkans. By seizing on the 'Balkan Federation' idea, he aimed and struggled to annex the whole of the Balkans, including Albania, to Yugoslavia."¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ Veremis T., "The Modern Balkans: a concise guide to nationalism and politics. The rise and decline of the nation-state", LSEE Research on Southeast Europe, p.82, available at: [https://www.lse.ac.uk/LSEE-Research-on-South-Eastern Europe/Assets/Documents/Publications/Other/Veremis-Concise-Guide-to-Nationalism.pdf](https://www.lse.ac.uk/LSEE-Research-on-South-Eastern-Europe/Assets/Documents/Publications/Other/Veremis-Concise-Guide-to-Nationalism.pdf), p. 92, 93.

¹⁶¹ Ivi, p. 93.

¹⁶² Resis, A. (1978), "The Churchill-Stalin Secret Percentages Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944", *The American Historical Review*, 83(2), 368–387, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1862322>

¹⁶³ Hoxha, E. (1982), "The Titoites: Historical notes", Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 287.

In Hoxha's discourse of the 80s, it was clear that the 'Balkan Federation' proved the real intentions of Belgrade, which were far from solving the Kosovo question. Tito was compared to a *Trojan horse*, which through this project would have not only engulfed Albania but also taken over the control in the entire region. Anyway, at the end of June 1946, Enver Hoxha went to Belgrade to elaborate the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance while considering the possibility of a Balkan Federation¹⁶⁴. Later, in his memoirs, Hoxha stated:

“According to the Yugoslav leadership, the ‘economic union’ of our countries (including Bulgaria) should be carried out as the first step, and then we could go on to the other steps.”¹⁶⁵

Economic integration was indeed going on and implemented through several economic and social contracts. However, the first clashes and tension between the Albanian communist leadership and the Yugoslav started gradually. In his writing 'The Titoites' of 1982, regarding a visit that the Albanian Party leader made to Belgrade, he described Tito's residence “as a place of opulence with beautiful Persian carpets and an abundance of antique furniture”¹⁶⁶. At the same time, his counterpart was dressed in a white uniform, with golden features, multiple medals, and a diamond ring¹⁶⁷. In comparison, the Albanian delegation looked poor and unkempt, while Enver Hoxha felt probably humiliated and embarrassed by such excessive showing-off¹⁶⁸. During the first years of the Cold War period, Albania didn't have much choice given the precarious international situation rather than getting its support from Yugoslavia¹⁶⁹. Nevertheless, in 1947 a first signal of the growing diffidence occurred, when Nako Spiru was on a mission in Belgrade, the CPY proposed that him to sign a secret pact that would have assured the Yugoslav interests even if something would have that he signs a secret pact that would have assured the Yugoslav interests even if something had changed in the leadership of

¹⁶⁴ Nation R.C. (1996), “A Balkan Union? Southeastern Europe in Soviet Security Policy, 1944–8”, p. 133, In: Gori F., Pons S. (eds) “The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53”, Palgrave Macmillan, London, available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25106-3_8.

¹⁶⁵ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 363.

¹⁶⁶ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, p. 169.

¹⁶⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁹ Ivi, p. 170.

the Albanian communist party¹⁷⁰. He refused, and the mission was quickly closed, as the ALP perceived it as revealing the predatory interests of Tito¹⁷¹. Although the initial enthusiasm that followed a series of agreements aiming more than just an economic integration, Tito's project of a Balkan confederation came definitely to an end when the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, which would have brought the Albanian dictator to an end the friendship with Yugoslavia to align with Stalin's view. Stalin didn't approve of Tito's behaviour and autonomy, so he was soon pushed out of every communist organisation and activity dominated by the USSR. The more the relationship between Tito and Stalin was worsening, the more Tito was pressuring Albania to complete its integration and unification with the Yugoslav one¹⁷². This was done with the backing of the minister of interior, Koçi Xoxe and his faction, while communists opposed to the plan, such as Nako Spiru, were eliminated¹⁷³. During the 8th Plenum of the party, Hoxha was in a weak position compared to Xoxe, as he was forced to recognise Spiru's death as a suicide and condemned him¹⁷⁴. Later in his notes, Hoxha would denounce the Balkan Confederation project as a mere tool in the hands of Tito to assimilate Albania within Yugoslavia. In a conversation with the Chinese communist Zhou Enlai in 1966, he indeed underlined:

“As regards the activities of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Titoite group, Stalin's view was more penetrating, and he drew correct conclusions. Proof of this are the letters sent to Tito and the documents of the Cominform which are of great importance and when we read them, now especially, we can form a better judgment of how to correct Stalin's class views were.”¹⁷⁵

There isn't much left regarding what the Albanian dictator discussed with Tito before 1948, as he removed any trace of his support to the CPY, saying that it was more a question of surviving for the country after the war. This was also a result of his internal-

¹⁷⁰ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, p. 170.

¹⁷¹ Ibidem.

¹⁷² Ivi, p. 171-172.

¹⁷³ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁴ Ivi, p. 173.

¹⁷⁵ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 34. ????? (to check)

enemy construction discourse, which made it easier to ‘delegate’ any responsibility of the Yugoslav intervention to *agents* such as it happened with Koçi Xoxo.

2.4 From brothers to saboteurs

Despite the diplomatic attempts to create an economic union between the two countries, the image of the Yugoslav friend began inevitably to wobble. The first conflicts between the Albanian communist party and the Yugoslavian one occurred in the economic sphere, especially within the joint companies where there was no clear distinction of roles and responsibilities among the parties involved—several cooperative enterprises within sectors such as finance, infrastructure, transport, energy, and so on. Indeed, for instance, the duties among the two sides within likewise enterprises were most of the time unclear. Consequently, also their shared responsibilities became undefined¹⁷⁶. Even though not officially, the first divergences had started, and the Albanians became more and more distrustful of the Yugoslavs working in the country. This mistrust could be found predominantly within the several economic collaborations, as the Yugoslav were accused of having a well-known “lax attitude”¹⁷⁷. Not to mention the fact that the Yugoslav took advantage of the situation to buy the Albanian raw material at low prices¹⁷⁸.

During the summer 1947, Enver Hoxha went to Moscow to talk about the lack of Yugoslavian support and the willingness to direct relationship with Stalin rather than through Tito’s party. Nevertheless, Stalin refused to accept the Albanian’s requests, justifying his position as Albanian communism was still ‘immature’ and thus in need of his support¹⁷⁹. Soon the discontent of a specific part of the LPA regarding the behaviour of the CPY members started to grow. Still, the same Enver Hoxha was changing his perspective and was willing to try to free the country from the neighbour’s influence. Yugoslavians were seen and depicted as opportunists who, rather than supporting

¹⁷⁶ Mehilli E. (2017), “From Stalin to Mao. Albania and the Socialist World”, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, p. 42.

¹⁷⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁸ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I. B. Tauris, p. 167.

¹⁷⁹ Ibidem.

Albania, tried their best to make it dependent on them. The Economic Convention signed at the end of 1946 is revealed to be again more for the CPY than for the CPA, as Albania was losing much of its independence. Starting from the issue connected to the unification of currency, by the end of 1948 local newspapers such as *Luftetari* started to openly criticise:

“Even without having a clear view of the dark purposes of CPY, our government considered the issues of currency reconciliation and unification of prices as unfair”¹⁸⁰.

The gradual transition from “friend” to “enemy” had started, and it’s depicted by the fact that the CPY has so far had only *dark purposes* that make them untrustful and dishonest. At the beginning, the small dispute started ‘underground’ around 1947 merely the economic level, while it emerged officially at the end 1948, when the PLA began to openly disagree with the CPY. If before they were addressed as supporters and teachers by Hoxha and his party, now they emerge as an antagonist in the Albanian socialist path. The Yugoslav were accused of taking advantage of Albania’s imbalanced economic integration project.

“From ignorance, mistakes could easily be made, and grasping at this, our ‘friends’ deliberately, for ulterior motives, strove with all their might to confuse us, to put us on a fatally wrong course by offering us their ‘aid’ and ‘experience’.”¹⁸¹

The image depicted of the CPY was indeed one of an “evil”¹⁸² that exploited the precarious situation of Albania after the war and the *ignorance* of the PLA in its first years. Therefore, it appears clear that the problem was escalating quickly, considering that before the communist government was doing everything that was in its power to promote a positive and significant image of Yugoslavia, describing it as a sort of “big brother” who was willing to help in the communist’s path. The goal of the Albanian

¹⁸⁰ Shameti O., Dibra P. (2014), “Economic Agreements in the Yugoslav-Albanian Relations”, Mediterranean Journal of Science, Vol 5, No 13, p. 291, DOI: [10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n13p289](https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n13p289), available at: <https://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/view/3583>

¹⁸¹ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 17.

¹⁸² Ibidem.

leadership, through this new narrative, was to explain their decision of having a close relationship with Yugoslavia since the beginning.

“While Tito, during his lifetime, and the whole of Yugoslav propaganda arsenal, [...] have praised to the skies the Yugoslav-Albanian economic relations in the years 1945-1947 as an example of ‘fraternal relations’, ‘sacrifice’, and the ‘generous spirit’ of the Titoites towards us, we, for our part, have always said the opposite.”¹⁸³

Not even the economic aid brought by the CPY was worth the struggle Albania had to pass through due to the Yugoslav plotting. The products received by its neighbour were considered like ‘rubbish’, while the CPY unfairly set up the prices of the Albanian material. The economic and political assistance was downsized and deconstructed in the Albanian communist narrative. In addition, the country's current economic problems resulted from the wrong advice that had come from Belgrade in that period. The construction of the Yugoslav enemy had to go inevitably through the deconstruction of the Yugoslav image of a friend. The increasing influence of Yugoslavia in the Balkan region was viewed as a threat to Hoxha’s power. Although he still needed Tito’s economic support, he was trying to negotiate a better relation directly with the Soviet Union. Later, in his memoirs, he explained:

“All the documents and facts prove that the leaders of the CPY, headed by Tito, had made plans to subjugate the Communist Party of Albania, to put it under their direct leadership, and consequently make our National Liberation War an appendage of their war.”¹⁸⁴

The history of the relationship between the two parties was hence described as a history against the conspiracies of the Yugoslav communist party to subjugate its Albanian counterpart¹⁸⁵. The Albanian party narrative wanted to prove that although they made a mistake trusting the Yugoslavs, at the same time, it wasn’t their fault as they were deceived.

¹⁸³ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 300.

¹⁸⁴ Ivi, p. 15.

¹⁸⁵ Ivi, p. 38.

“All those whom Tito and the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia sent to us, allegedly to assist us and exchange experience, came with plans prepared in advance, with ‘directives’ which they dictated to us, and we were supposed to apply, come as ‘masters’ of the revolution and national liberation war to ‘their apprentices’.”¹⁸⁶

The PLA plainly recognized the condition of subjection and mentorship to which they had been put the last years by their *masters*, the only difference, compared to the past, is that now they attack it as a conspiracy against them. Albania was the first country of the socialist bloc to denounce Yugoslavia after its removal from the Cominform¹⁸⁷. Right after it, in July 1948, all the economic agreements with Yugoslavia were declared invalid and their information centre in Tirana was put down¹⁸⁸. The age of Albania as a Yugoslav satellite came officially to an end, as Enver Hoxha was determined to put the country aligned with the USSR and make it the new main sponsor and ally.

“When behind ‘the outstanding leader Tito’ we discovered the inveterate renegade Tito, when behind the ‘internationalism’ of Tito and his henchmen we discovered nationalism and chauvinism, when behind their ‘friendship’ we discovered the bonds of a new enslavement [...]”¹⁸⁹

It is true that the Albanian leader had long waited to have a direct dialogue with Stalin rather than through Tito, therefore now he had no intention of missing the opportunity to do so. Regarding the communist Koçi Xoxe, he was finally expelled in November 1948 and substituted by Mehmet Shehu. By the end of November, all the pro-Yugoslav elements within the PLA were definitely eliminated¹⁹⁰. With the lot of the cooperation with Belgrade, the unresolved ‘Albanian question’ came out again as a playground of tension between the two countries¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁶ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 16.

¹⁸⁷ Elsie R. (2015), “Albania in a Nutshell: a brief history and chronology of the events”, position 279 (e-book).

¹⁸⁸ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I. B. Tauris, p. 173.

¹⁸⁹ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, P. 19.

¹⁹⁰ Elsie R. (2015), “Albania in a Nutshell: a brief history and chronology of the events”, position 877 (e-book).

¹⁹¹ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I. B. Tauris, p. 174.

3 The process of the “enemy construction.”

3.1 *The education system and the history books*

As soon as Tito and Stalin broke up in 1948, the Communist Party of Enver Hoxha took it as the perfect sign to act and free itself from the CPY influence. As it has been said in the previous chapter, their relationship was already having some major issues, and Hoxha took the chance to free himself from Tito’s influence and dependence. Portraits of Tito disappeared from any national events, museums, and public spaces. The shifting of perspective was followed by a rewriting of its history and relations with its neighbours. It is essential to remind that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine was the spectrum through which record was revised by the Communist party and made coherent with its policy. For that matter, Enver Hoxha, during a speech delivered at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PLA in March 1968, affirmed:

“Everything that exists in our new school must be subjected to the meticulous analysis of Marxism-Leninism, since our new socialist school must be pervaded from end to end and guided in everything by our materialist philosophy.”¹⁹²

Starting from the education system, the LPA used to often update history books under the light of new changes in their internal and foreign policies. The construction of the enemy, as it has been envisaged by Schmitt, is based on the identification of “the other, the stranger” that is assumed to constitute an existential threat to the unity of the political system. In 1965, the “History of Albania for high schools” published by the Institute of School Studies and Publications of Tirana, talks about the relationship with Yugoslavia still under the light of the Proceedings of the First Congress of the Albanian Communist Party in November 1948¹⁹³. In fact, the title of the XX chapter is “Albania on the road to building socialism”, hence preserving a positive image of Tito and his party as a supporter

¹⁹² Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume III. The Revolutionization of the School”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 348.

¹⁹³ Halili R., Pavloviq, Hysa A., & Zaharijeviq (2016), “Figura e armikut: ripërfytyrimi i marrëdhënieve shqiptaro-serbe”, Qendra Multimedia: Prishtine, p. 213.

in the Leninist path. On the contrary, in the book written by Kristo Frasheri and Stefanaq Pollo in 1982, the Albanian-Yugoslav relation is depicted in chapter 62 entitled “The protection of the Albanian independence from the Yugoslav intervention”¹⁹⁴. Given the fact that this school text is published in the 80s, it is the natural product of the worsening of the diplomatic relation between the two countries. This comparison shows the result of the construction of a new narrative around the image of the Yugoslav, that from being a mentor becomes an enemy that could threaten the independence of Albania. An interesting example is the book “The History of Albania: a brief survey” written by the historian Kristo Frasheri in 1964. His book pictured an image of the Yugoslav as it follows:

“Proceeding from the principle of fraternal international relations that should characterize two countries led by their Communist party, the Albanian revolutionary leaders placed too much faith in the internationalist assertions of the Yugoslav leaders. This confidence was exploited by Marshal Tito and his following by interfering, employing “advice” in the economic and political life of Albania. These interferences had begun during the war, and more precisely in November 1944, while in liberated Berat the Second Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party was meeting, the Titoists agents, who had succeeded in winning to their side Koçi Xoxe (...). During the years 1945-1947, the Yugoslav pressure, exerted under the slogan of “strengthening friendly relations”, all the while increased to intolerable proportions. The economic and political conventions concluded during the years 1945-1947 by Albania and Yugoslavia were exploited by the Yugoslav government with the view of reducing Albania to the status of dependency on Belgrade.”¹⁹⁵

First, the country’s major economic problems rather than a failure of the Albanian Labour Party’s reforms were accused to be a result of Tito’s interference. While reading two main

¹⁹⁴ Halili R., Pavloviq, Hysa A., & Zaharijeviq (2016), “Figura e armikut: ripërfytyrimi i marrëdhënieve shqiptaro-serbe”, Qendra Multimedia: Prishtine, p. 213. .

¹⁹⁵ Frasheri, K. (1964), “The history of Albania: (a brief survey)”, Tirana, p. 336-337.

opposite figures emerge promptly: on one side, one of the victims and naive, which correspond to the LPA, and on the other, the deceiver and dishonest who took advantage of the “confidence” and trust that was given to him. As a matter of fact, the Albanian communist government, apart from Koçi Xoxe¹⁹⁶, is indeed relieved from any economic and political instability of the country. On the contrary, Tito and his followers lose their previous privilege of being the supporters and engineers behind the Albanian communist party, hence the history of their relationship is removed evidently. In fact, they are said to have firstly interfered in Albanian’s political affair only in 1944, cutting the umbilical cord that held them together before. In doing so, the CPY went from being an “old friend” to an external element, that had nothing to do with the internal political and economic affair of the country, in brief recreating the division of “Us” vs “Them”. They are accused of having been hiding behind “the slogan of friendly relations”¹⁹⁷ while their only scope was to surround Albania under a “status of dependency”¹⁹⁸. This condition of dependency touched its major point with the project of the Balkan Federation, which would have seen the incorporation of Albania. Consequently, Tito and his party are now portrayed by a nationalistic rhetoric as a threat to the independence of the country. However, even though it’s a potential territorial threat, Titoists are primarily depicted as an ideological enemy, as they are a threat to communism as such. Within the same book, indeed, it keeps on:

“In the summer of 1948, when Belgrade’s pressure was stronger than before, the decision of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties (...), made it possible for Albania to find its way out of the intricate situation. The Albanian Communist Party immediately broke with the Yugoslav Communist Party, and resolutely and quickly corrected all the mistakes which had been committed in Albania as a result of Titoists emissaries’ interference. (...) In November of that year, the First Congress of the Party (...) censured the mistakes that had been committed, as well as

¹⁹⁶ Member of the LPA, head of the Sigurimi, the Albanian secret police, he was accused of being a Titoist.

¹⁹⁷ Frasheri, K. (1964), “The history of Albania: (a brief survey)”, Tirana, p. 336-337.

¹⁹⁸ Ibidem.

the persons principally responsible for the mistakes; (...) in alliance with all the socialist camp and particularly with the Soviet Union.”¹⁹⁹

Once again, the Albanian Labor Party refers to the Yugoslavs as the “Titoists”, with the depreciative meaning given by Stalin to whoever was accused to be similar to Tito or one of his followers. Titoites were accused to be an enemy of the Communist countries, and as such, to be eliminated, like it happened with the minister of interior Koçi Xoxe. An “interference”, a sort of problem that had to be dealt with to pursue the true path of socialism.

After glorifying all the economic improvements and gains achieved in the country thanks to the implementation of several economic plans, Frasheri stated:

“These successes were achieved not without a struggle against the internal and external enemies. (...) Albania was given some trouble by the provocation of the Greek and Yugoslav governments, but these provocations too fizzled out.”²⁰⁰

Hoxha’s government came out victorious against the deceptions and mistakes settled by its enemies, including the Yugoslavs. As it can be seen, the “Yugoslav” enemy rhetoric began with the reduction and almost removal of their economic and strategic contribution to the Albanian partisan resistance movement during the war, hence they have nothing to owe to them. Rather, the economic problems of the country are explained as a result of the unbalanced relationship between the two, that determined the exploitation of Albanian resources. In this case, the result is the delegitimization of their role and their status of mentors and supporters. In another history book written by Frasheri and Pollo in 1982, it was once again remarked the deception of Yugoslavia:

“The Albanian government called it the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, following the principles of

¹⁹⁹Frasheri, K. (1964), “The history of Albania: (a brief survey)”, Tirana, p. 337.

²⁰⁰ Ivi, p. 343.

internationalism proletarian. However, it was used from the Yugoslav side to have Albania politically under its influence and to isolate it from the other socialist countries, and especially from the Soviet Union.”²⁰¹

Yugoslavia is once again accused of having tried to undermine the independence of the country playing the card of the friendship, while the Albanian government appears as the victim of such behaviour. Concepts like internationalism and nationalism were openly used to reach their interests, as one of the aims of Hoxha was to free himself of Tito as an intermediary between him and Stalin. The nationalist rhetoric was therefore the main tool of the communist political discourse against Yugoslavia. Within the same history volume, it was in fact again stressed:

“The Yugoslav leaders made systematic efforts to transform Albania in a country dependent on Yugoslavia and, in the best case, in one of its federative republics.”²⁰²

Similarly, the same issue is addressed, in a history book written by an Albanian-American scholar, Peter R. Prifti, entitled “Socialist Albania since 1944. Domestic and Foreign Developments” in 1978. In this case, it gives much more recognition to the CPY role during the war:

“Albania’s economic cooperation with Yugoslavia after 1944 was the natural extension of the wartime collaboration between the Partisan movements of the two countries.”²⁰³

Moreover, given the fact that Prifti was free from following Hoxha’s version of the story, as he was living abroad, he points out the lack of acknowledgement by the Albanians of the aid given by its neighbour. Nevertheless, Prifti’s book, confirms what was the main image constructed around the CPY and how it was depicted by the Albanian communist government. This came into playing especially after the failure of the economic plans

²⁰¹ Halili R., Pavloviq, Hysa A., & Zaharijeviq (2016), “Figura e armikut: ripërfytyrimi i marrëdhënieve shqiptaro-serbe”, Qendra Multimedia: Prishtine, p. 215.

²⁰² Ivi, p. 216.

²⁰³ Prifti R. P. (1978), “Socialist Albania since 1944. Domestic and Foreign Developments”, Studies in Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution, The MIT Press, p. 77.

and reforms implemented by the LPA, which were attributed to the actions of its internal and external enemies, and in particularly Yugoslavia.

“The Albanians (...) have charged instead that the Yugoslav government pursued an economic policy of ‘colonial exploitation’ in their country. They claim that the Yugoslavs tried to persuade them to produce “raw industrial and agrarian materials to meet the needs of the Yugoslav industry; that is, turn the country into a supply base for the processing industry of Yugoslavia.”²⁰⁴

In the Albanian History books, Belgrade was nothing more than one of the enemies of the country, at the same level of the Western capitalist and imperialist countries such as the USA or the United Kingdom. Under this light, all the economic agreements signed so far were used to prove the point. The goal was to teach the Albanian students in which terms to think about the Yugoslavs, especially to see them as the main culprits of the economic issues and inefficiencies of the country. In particular, the use of the terms such as “enemy of the party and the people” creates a rhetorical framing directly around Tito, the Yugoslavs, and the Titoists. In another schoolbook “History of Albania: for the class VIII”, this condition is remarked as such:

“Concerning the activities of the Yugoslav revisionists, the -first- Congress (of the LPA) defined them as anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian. The Congress also condemned the deeds against the party and of the people by traitors such as Koçi Xoxe and his friends.”²⁰⁵

What happened to figures such as Koçi Xoxe was that they followed the same path due to their preferential relationship with the CPY when Yugoslavia became the enemy. Xoxe was indeed described by Hoxha as a “non-intellectual, conceited, pretentious and easily brainwashed by the Yugoslavs”²⁰⁶. The LPA, thus, embracing the paradigm of the defence of the Marxist-Leninist principles, was accusing Xoxe of revisionism, as it was

²⁰⁴ Prifti R. P. (1978), “Socialist Albania since 1944. Domestic and Foreign Developments”, Studies in Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution, The MIT Press, p. 77.

²⁰⁵ Grillo, Dh. (1968). Historia e Shqipërisë: për klasën VIII in “Figura e armikut: ripërfytyrimi i marrëdhënieve shqiptaro-serbe”, Qendra Multimedia: Prishtinë, p. 214.

²⁰⁶ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I.B.Tauris. p. 158.

the same accusation given to the CPY. Consequently, Xoxe became an internal enemy of the party and of the Albanian people that must be eliminated in order to pursue the socialist path, and hence he posed an existential threat to the entire system. Interestingly enough, other schoolbooks of the 60s explain why Xoxe had to be considered as a threat:

“He wanted to overthrow the Marxist-Leninist leadership of our party and replace it with a revisionist leadership of the Titoists type, that was under the service of imperialism for the takeover of the popular power and the restoration of capitalism in Albania. Koçi Xoxe violated the socialist law and committed numerous crimes against the party and the people.”²⁰⁷

Koçi Xoxe, former minister of interior and pro-Yugoslav, was therefore depicted as an enemy of the party and the people, as he was accused of having acted in contrast with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In this case, he became an enemy for his allegedly being a “revisionist” of the “Titoists type”, creating a clear link between Xoxe and Yugoslavia. This perfectly reflects Schmitt’s definition of an internal enemy as those who since they don’t recognise the external public enemy as such, they “join their side and aid them”²⁰⁸, which was what happened to the former minister of interior. Additionally, one of the characteristics of an internal enemy is undermining the external enemy, without recognizing its ‘existential threat’ to the community, which represent the situation of Xoxe who was a well-known pro-Yugoslav. In fact, he tried to isolate Hoxha and limit his power, while pressing “for the rapid integration of Albania within Yugoslavia”²⁰⁹. Soon, the Albanian dictator understood that Xoxe and the CPY constituted a menace to his power.

Generally, when the party’s rhetoric is based around terms such as “Titoist”, “revisionist”, “capitalism”, “imperialism”, “crimes against the party and the people” create the image of a threat mainly from an ideological point of view. Koçi Xoxe is just the tip of the iceberg of a system where people were often accused of being enemies due to their

²⁰⁷ Halili R., Pavloviq, Hysa A., & Zaharijeviq (2016), “Figura e armikut: ripërfytyrimi i marrëdhënieve shqiptaro-serbe”, Qendra Multimedia: Prishtine, p. 215.

²⁰⁸ Schmitt C. (2007), “The concept of the political. Expanded Edition”, George Schwab trans., The University and Chicago Press, p. 107, ISBN-13: 978-0-226-73892-5.

²⁰⁹ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, p. 168.

connection with external threats, and thus rightly killed or incarcerated. Through these state-owned publications, children and students were taught how to recognize and treat an enemy of the party. The consequences were a justification and acceptance of any acts which aimed at their eradication from society at any cost. Xoxe was condemned for treason and quickly executed in May 1949²¹⁰. On the contrary, Enver Hoxha emerges as the only one able to defend Albania's interests against Tito. In this regard, the question of the Albanians living in Yugoslavia came back again after having been dismissed by Hoxha at the beginning of the dictatorship. For that matter, the education sector played an important role in promoting the Party's view and propaganda, as the goal was to "form and temper the new communist man"²¹¹. The role of this new communist generation will be to defeat any attempt to deviate perpetuated by the revisionists, which included both the Titoites and the Khrushchevites:

"The modern revisionists have wrecked the Soviet school and are turning it into a bourgeois school to create an anti-communist younger generation as a prop of the capitalist regime which they have restored in their country."²¹²

In this sense, the PLA was determined to build up a socialist school capable to face all "these dangers" and build a revolutionary generation. Additionally, the cultural sector played its part to promote Party's voice:

"The comrade writers, poets, musicians, artists, actors and directors of drama, opera and ballet theatres, cinematography, etc., inspired by the work and heroic deeds of the people, have achieved very great progress in the development of literature and art in our country."²¹³

In fact, "The Writers' Union" was basically meant to promote Party's propaganda²¹⁴. In conclusion, as it is often the case under an authoritarian system, the Albanian education

²¹⁰ Elsie R. (2015), "Albania in a Nutshell: a brief history and chronology of the events", position 292 (e-book).

²¹¹ Hoxha E. (1982), "Selected Works. Volume III. The Revolutionization of the School", The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The "8 Nentori" publishing house: Tirana, p. 376.

²¹² Ivi, p. 377-378.

²¹³ Ivi, p. 893.

²¹⁴ Vickers M. (2011), "The Albanians: A Modern History", I. B. Tauris, p. 183.

and cultural system were a pervasive and an essential instrument in implementing the reality as envisaged by the PLA under the communist principles. The dictator's writings and notes were used as lenses through which understand the Albanian communist fact, consequently the cultural and education system were adapt and updated following his instructions. In Hoxha's opinion, this was one of the ways to demonstrate to the modern revisionist "the great force of Marxism-Leninism in Albania"²¹⁵. The construction of the enemy was an essential tool in the hands of the party propaganda as it created an internal or external enemy that could be addressed as the most critical problem of the country, while making people accept its precarious economic condition or the persecution of specific political figures. Indeed, labour concentration camps were a well-known tool in the hands of the Albanian communist party pointing "the so-called enemy groups"²¹⁶, dissenters or members within the party²¹⁷. However, at this stage, the enemy target is the ideological and political one represented by Tito, his party and the Titoites, his followers.

3.2 The Khrushchevites by Enver Hoxha

After the Stalin-Tito break up in 1948, the second milestone in the definition of the enemy construction is the Khrushchev-Tito reproaching in 1953-1956, crowned by the process of de-Stalinization after the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956²¹⁸. These two events were seen as a threat by the PLA, as it would have had inevitably direct repercussions to the Albanian Stalinist regime. To Hoxha, already the death of Stalin in 1953 was seen as a terrible event as he was his guardian²¹⁹. Enver Hoxha was in fact not willing to lose or share his power with anyone else, therefore the situation was perceived as unacceptable. In his memoirs entitled "The Khrushchevites", he primarily manifested his discontent while describing how he decided it was time to close the relations with the new Soviet

²¹⁵ Hoxha E. (1982), "Selected Works. Volume III. The Revolutionization of the School", The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The "8 Nentori" publishing house: Tirana, p. 916.

²¹⁶ Këlliç K. (2020), "Defining the Internal Enemy: Detention Camps in Early Communist Albania, 1945–1950", *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość*. 2:138-152, p. 143, available at: <https://www.cceol.com/search/article-detail?id=1009385>.

²¹⁷ Ibidem.

²¹⁸ Ostermann F. C. (2007/2008), "Albania is not Cuba. Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split", *Cold War History Project Bulletin*, Issue 16, Wilson Center, p.183, available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-16-fall-2007winter-2008>

²¹⁹ Vickers M. (2011), "The Albanians: A Modern History", I.B. Tauris. p. 180.

Party Secretary. His writings played a relevant role in shaping the Albanian political sphere and the filter through which interpret the Albanian communist society.

The first warning of this reproachment was a letter received from Khrushchev in June 1954, in which he addressed the Yugoslav question of 1948 as a mistake, which was conceived as an unacceptable statement by Hoxha.

“Khrushchev’s flirtations with Tito were particularly unpleasant for us. We, for our part, continued to fight Titoite Yugoslav revisionism with the greatest severity and defended the correct Marxist-Leninist stands of Stalin and the Information Bureau towards the Yugoslav revisionist leaders. [...] And this is the stand we should always maintain towards Yugoslav revisionism until it is destroyed ideologically and politically.”²²⁰

The enemy's construction takes a different shade after what the Albanian leader heard about the betrayal from his Soviet counterpart. The ideological enemy of the Titoite Yugoslav revisionists was now linked to the Khrushchevites one. There was only one *correct Marxist-Leninist stand* which the PLA intended to maintain after the death of Stalin. Furthermore, this enemy must be eliminated *ideologically* and *politically* hence it remained a class battle against the enemies of communism. The Yugoslav-Soviet reproached was condemned as an “anti-Marxist, capitalist logic”²²¹. The reaction was even more shocking for the Albanian dictator when he discovered about the invitation of Tito to his Soviet counterpart to visit Belgrade in April 1955:

“Tito sent the good news to his new sweetheart that he was ready for the marriage and invited him to hold the ‘wedding ceremony’ either ‘on a ship on the Danube, or if you agree, in Belgrade. In our opinion’, continued the *kralj* (king) of Belgrade ‘the meeting should be opened and made public.’”²²²

²²⁰ Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers’ Publishing House: London, p. 102.

²²¹ Ivi, p. 108.

²²² Ivi, p. 118.

Hoxha's tone got more emotional in this occasion and let transpired sentiments of anger, sarcasm and feeling of betrayal from the Soviet leader. Targeting Tito as *kralj of Belgrade* aimed at mocking the Yugoslav leader as conceited and arrogant. The metaphor of a *wedding ceremony*, not only revealed a sarcastic tone but also reinforced the idea that Khrushchev had become a revisionist at the same level of Tito. The relation between them was the tool used to evaluate it:

“For us, the struggle against American imperialism and Yugoslav Titoism was a touch-stone to assess the stands of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites with the Marxist eye.”²²³

The Yugoslav issue was particularly challenging for Hoxha as he feared to go back under the ‘Tito wing’. He needed him as an enemy to secure his power and the country independence, therefore the reproachment undertaken by Khrushchev posed a direct threat to his leadership. Hoxha felt abandoned by the Soviet Party in his struggle against Yugoslavia²²⁴. Furthermore, his instances on the de-Stalinization were even trickier for a Stalinist leader as Enver Hoxha, and the consequences were inevitable.

“On the Yugoslav question, which was clear to us, and that is why we did not shift from our stand, the Khrushchevites chopped and changed, and ebbed and flowed like the tide. The Khrushchevist sometimes abused and sometimes kissed the Yugoslav leaders. When they were abusing the Titoites, the Soviet revisionists said we were right, when they were kissing them, they tried to make us soften our stand towards the Titoite revisionists.”²²⁵

Khrushchev and his followers were untrustful and unreliable, as they changed their minds over the Titoites, while betraying the Marxist-Leninist principles. Khrushchev in fact began to push Tirana to reconsider their relationship with Belgrade. Moreover, from Hoxha's perspective, the Soviet leader was purely exploitation Tito to validate his instances against Stalin:

²²³ Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers' Publishing House: London, p. 103.

²²⁴ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I.B. Tauris. p. 181.

²²⁵ Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers' Publishing House: London, p. 104.

“Khrushchev had his eyes fixed on the leadership of Yugoslavia and wanted at all costs, if not to subjugate it, to line it up on his side. Of course, in Tito he was seeking both an ideological ally and a leader whom he could take under his wings as the ‘big brother’ he was. In other words, Tito was very dear to Khrushchev, because he was the first to attack Stalin and reject Marxism-Leninism.”²²⁶

The Soviet and the Yugoslav enemy are united by the fact that they both are ideological enemies for the Socialist Albania. They are indeed *ideological allies*, consequently a threat to Hoxha, also said “two chiefs of modern revisionism”²²⁷. More specifically, Tito is nothing more than “the communist dear to American imperialism and world capitalism”²²⁸, in other words “an American agent in Belgrade”²²⁹. Despite the fact that both the Soviet and the Yugoslav leader were perceived as a menace, the latter was labelled in worse terms.

“Tito, for his part, had long dreamed of shifting the epicenter of the leadership of this alleged communism from Moscow to Belgrade, and that Belgrade should replace Moscow in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Tito’s scheme has made no progress from the time he fell out with Stalin, who detected and sternly attacked the diabolical work of this renegade. Having the assistance of the Americans, Tito brought out this plan again when he saw that Nikita Khrushchev and his group were smashing the work of Lenin and Stalin.”²³⁰

As a matter of fact, Tito remained the biggest enemy from Hoxha’s lens: his *diabolical plan* was to take over the leadership of the socialist bloc and substitute Moscow once for all. The Albanian leader was openly harsher in his words, as he was projecting himself as the last fortress against the revisionist challenge after the death of Stalin. On the contrary, Khrushchev and Tito were “brothers in revisionism”²³¹, while the term of

²²⁶ Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers’ Publishing House: London, p. 104.

²²⁷ Ivi, p. 105.

²²⁸ Ivi, p. 104.

²²⁹ Ivi, p. 105.

²³⁰ Ivi, p. 105.

²³¹ Ivi, p. 106.

‘brother’ was once the same that Hoxha used to describe his relationship with the Yugoslav counterpart. The process of enemy construction started from the deconstruction of ‘friend image’ as it was envisaged before. The argument of Khrushchev over the split up between Belgrade and Moscow in 1948 were not credible, neither enough to Hoxha to justify or even forgive Yugoslavia.

“But we, Albanian communists, who had been fighting the Belgrade traitor clique tooth and nail far more than ten years, who had experienced their evil-doings and courageously resisted them, were not and could never be in agreement with this solution of the Yugoslav problem.”²³²

The message was clear: the PLA *versus* the revisionist brothers, ‘Us’ against ‘Them’, as it had been for already ten years against the CPY. On one side, there are the *evil-doings* of the Titoites, on the other side there are the Albanian communists who *courageously resisted*, and they were not going to forget and forgive soon. At the same level, if the fault of the Tito-Stalin split was to blame only on Tito, it was the same story over the ending of the Tito-Hoxha relationship. In a conversation with Khrushchev, Hoxha explained:

“There is a very long history of our relations with the Yugoslav party and state, that the Yugoslav leadership itself was to blame for ruining our relations, and that if the Albanian-Yugoslav state relations were at a very low ebb, this was no fault of ours but a consequence of the unceasing anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian stands and actions of the leaders in Belgrade.”²³³

Belgrade is the only accountable for the deterioration of the Albanian-Yugoslav relation, as it took *anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian stands and actions*. They were the ‘evil’ and ‘diabolic’, henceforth nothing unpredictable for Hoxha. Although the real enemy is Tito, Khrushchev standpoint and attempt of reconciliation with the CPY made him an unreliable partner for the Albanian communists²³⁴.

²³² Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers’ Publishing House: London, p. 110.

²³³ Ivi, p. 113- 114.

²³⁴ Ivi, p. 117.

“For our part, we were not going to kiss and make up with the Titoites. [...] Our Party condemned Khrushchev’s going to Belgrade and especially his decision to cleanse the uncleanable Tito”²³⁵

In other words, for the Albanian leader there was no excuse, Khrushchev’s behaviour was perceived as a weakness and humiliating. Regarding Tito, he was *uncleanable*, an “enemy of international communism”²³⁶, consequently it was a perfect move for Hoxha to justify his refusal to revoke the Resolution of the Information Bureau of November 1949 that once condemned Yugoslavia. In particular, Hoxha pointed out the relation of the former interior minister Xoxe to the same Resolution:

“The hostile activity of the traitor gang of Koçi Xoxe had its source in and was linked with the anti-Marxist liquidationist and bourgeois-nationalist work of the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party.”²³⁷

Revoking such resolution would have meant admitting that the PLA acted wrongly while condemning Xoxe, making him a de-facto martyr of the Albanian communist regime. The Albanian dictator was unshakable in his position and belief: the Yugoslav communist could not be forgiven after all their *anti-Marxist and bourgeois-nationalist work*. In this view, Xoxe was the secret agents of the Yugoslav revisionist acting internally the Albanian political system. Xoxe served indeed as an internal enemy in Hoxha’s discourse in order to remove any pro-Yugoslav collaborationist. Concerning the threat posed by internal enemies, the Yugoslav embassy posed the same danger in Tirana.

“The activity of the Titoites who worked in the Yugoslav Embassy in Tirana, against our Party and country, was stepped out. Taking advantage of our correct behaviour and the facilities we had provided for them to carry out their task, the Yugoslav diplomats in Tirana, on orders and instructions from Belgrade, started to arouse and reactivate their old agents in our country, instructed them and gave them the signal to attack. [...] With their revisionist theses and ideas, the latter (the Khrushchevites) were the

²³⁵ Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers’ Publishing House: London, p. 117-118.

²³⁶ Ivi, p. 119.

²³⁷ Ivi, p. 129.

inspirers of the plot, while the Titoites and their secret agents were the organisers.”²³⁸

In fact, the Yugoslav embassy in Tirana was part of the internal enemy construction of the Albanian dictator, which posed a threat as it was an indirect arm of the external enemy, thus connected to it. They were indeed accused of having reactivated old agents following the orders of Belgrade, the ‘evil’ external enemy. During a meeting with Kim II Sung on September 1956, in Pyongyang, he recalled:

“After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, there was an attempt by anti-party elements to organise a plot against our Party and our Central Committee. The plot was a deed organized by the revisionists of Belgrade, and as soon as we became aware of it, we crushed it immediately.”²³⁹

In particular, the PLA leader stressed his resolute stand against “external and enemies”²⁴⁰, once again emphasising the link between the two. Even though at the beginning he was forced to submit to some extent to the pro-Yugoslav foreign policy of the Soviet Union, soon the repercussions in the internal political system of the country were unacceptable for him²⁴¹. The increasing internal criticism of his government arising from the de-Stalinization campaign of 1956 was stopped through Party purges. The complaint against Tito was nevertheless renewed after the Hungarian Revolution in the same year²⁴².

“According to them (the Soviet), the mountain of ice created between us and the Titoite revisionists could be broken with one chance meeting or contact, but this was not our opinion. There would be no ‘spring thaw’ in the ideological field in our relations with Yugoslavia, and we had no intention of plunging into the murky waters of the Khrushchev and the Titoites.”²⁴³

²³⁸ Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers’ Publishing House: London, p. 198.

²³⁹ Ivi, p. 236.

²⁴⁰ Ibidem.

²⁴¹ Ostermann F. C. (2007/2008), “Albania is not Cuba. Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split”, Cold War History Project Bulletin, Issue 16, Wilson Center, p.183, available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-16-fall-2007winter-2008>.

²⁴² Ibidem.

²⁴³ Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers’ Publishing House: London, p. 139.

The use of metaphor to describe the frozen relationship between the Yugoslav and the Albanians showed the position of Hoxha towards Khrushchev's decision. He had nothing to win by opening the dialogue with its neighbour, and he preferred to lose the Soviet economic and political support instead to submit to its request. Moreover, his criticism got worse after the events in Hungary and Poland, as he described revisionists as an "infection" that revived the counter-revolutionary elements in the socialist and communist parties²⁴⁴. Behind events in Hungary and Poland, there were, in Hoxha's view, there was undoubtedly the clandestine activity of the CPY. The Titoites and Khrushchevites were therefore described as counter-revisionists by Hoxha. Consequently, their goal was to stop the communist revolution from spreading around the world:

"The Yugoslav have carried out a hostile activity against our Party and country for a long time, and they are continuing to do so now. We believe that the Yugoslav leaders are anti-Marxists, and together with the agencies of American imperialism, are among the main inspirers of the events in Hungary. Our relations with Yugoslavia should be normalised only on a Marxist-Leninist Road, without making any concessions such as have been made. [...] We, for our part, will maintain only state and commercial relations, but will not in any way maintain party relations with the Yugoslavs."²⁴⁵

The contraposition 'us' versus 'them' emerges prominently, as the PLA arose as the only true heir of the Marxist-Leninists doctrine. The hostile Yugoslav *activity* is merely equivalented to *American imperialism*. At the same time, the PLA had the duty to fight and stop revisionists from spreading their seeds within the other countries of the socialist bloc²⁴⁶.

In a visit to China with Mao Zedong, Hoxha elucidated his standing with the condemnation of Yugoslavia by the Information Bureau as accurate:

²⁴⁴ Hoxha E. (1980), "The Khrushchevites. Memoirs", Workers' Publishing House: London, p. 257.

²⁴⁵ Ivi, p. 320.

²⁴⁶ Ivi, p. 344.

“We have supported its well-known analyses and stands towards the activity of the Yugoslav leadership and have considered them to be correct. Our long-standing relations with the Yugoslav leadership have convinced us that the line and stands of the Yugoslavs have not been and are not Marxist-Leninist. Tito is an incorrigible renegade.”²⁴⁷

Tito in Hoxha’s speech has the feature of an *incorrigible renegade*; in other words, he’s a traitor, a betrayer that cannot be justified or ‘saved’. The Yugoslav leader was hence on the wrong side of history. Hoxha’s visit attempted to find support in his battle against the revisionists, politically and economically, as the USSR was also depicted with the exact words. Tirana obtained: Mao’s approval and support of their “correct Marxist-Leninist line”²⁴⁸.

Another essential element was constituted by the condition of the Albanian living in Yugoslavia:

“This same ‘Marxist’ (Tito) not only did not raise the issue of Kosova, which was truly Albanian, to give it to Albania to which it belonged but did his utmost to prevent any talk about it. The Belgrade clique, massacred people from Kosova, alleging that they were Ballists, and later also attempted to gobble up the whole of Albania and turn it into the seventh republic of Yugoslavia.”

At this point, the tone got more nationalistic rather than ideological; Tito was blameworthy for having taken away Kosovo from Albania and *massacred* them. He affirmed firmly that Kosovo *belonged* to Albania, in open contraposition with his actual position when he came in power after the war. Indeed, the unification of all the ethnic Albanians under one state was advocated by *Balli Kombetar*, which was instead treated as an enemy by the PLA and as interference in strengthening the relationship with the Yugoslavs. The attempt of the Albanian leader was also to remove himself from any responsibility toward the situation in Kosovo:

²⁴⁷ Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers’ Publishing House: London, p. 272.

²⁴⁸ Ivi, p. 245.

“This is a delicate and important question for us because they are not only organising intense activity against our country from Kosova but are also trying to liquidate the Albanian population of Kosova by displacing them *en masse* to Turkey and other countries.”²⁴⁹

Additionally, the argument of Tito as a threat to the country’s independence was still on the plate, emphasizing the nationalistic tone of the discourse:

“The Yugoslav leadership has never given up its aim of overthrowing the people’s power in Albania. Thus, the Yugoslav revisionists are a danger, not only to our country but also to all the other socialist countries because [...] they are not reconciled to our socialist system, are opposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat and have abandoned Marxism-Leninism.”²⁵⁰

Finally, the Yugoslavs are considered a *danger* for the entire communist world, especially for Albania. In Hoxha’s speech and discourse, the image of the CPY and Tito is recurrent as an ideological enemy, and still, remains in his 50s party narrative. On one side, the enemy construction had been settled by referring to them as ‘Titoites’, ‘revisionists’, ‘imperialists’, ‘anti-Marxists’, ‘opportunists’ and so on, that must be eliminated ideologically and politically. An enemy had found in the Khrushchevites an ally, as they are represented as ‘brothers in revisionism’. On the other side, there are Hoxha and his party, that have the “permanent duty to defend our correct ideological and political line and to unceasingly expose opportunism and revisionism”²⁵¹, in better words, ‘the good ones. In his writing “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, the Albanian dictator illustrated how he discovered and condemned revisionist movements in the socialist bloc while proclaiming his party as one of the last heirs of the *correct* Leninism-Marxism.

Eventually, Moscow started to withdraw its economic aid to Albania, causing a severe setback to its economy, till finally the clashes between the two brought to the expulsion

²⁴⁹ Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers’ Publishing House: London, p. 355.

²⁵⁰ Ivi, p. 356.

²⁵¹ Ivi, p. 357.

of Albania from the Warsaw Pact and COMECON in 1962²⁵². Soon, the Soviet economic support was substituted with the Sino solidarity, which was instead promoted in Albania as an “Everlasting friendship”²⁵³ united by the fight against ‘modern revisionism’. The two leaders had something in common: they both had a solid nationalist stance²⁵⁴. They were breaking the relationship with Khrushchev as he was accused of revisionism by “suppressing individual nationalisms”²⁵⁵.

3.3 Articles published in the newspaper ‘Zëri I popullit’

Zëri I Popullit (literally, The People’s voice) was the official newspaper of the Albanian communist party, firstly issued on 25th August 1942 as a clandestine organ press that incited the Albanians to revolt against the fascists²⁵⁶. It remained an essential vehicle of the state propaganda throughout Hoxha’s regime, where he regularly published. In an article published on 11 May 1966, entitled “The fascist coup in Indonesia and the lessons communists draw from it”, Enver Hoxha addressed the Indonesian coup as the consequence of the imperialist intervention of the USA and the Khrushchevist revisionists. Indonesia’s event is taken as a model of what happens to the communist parties whenever the revisionist (Titoists and Khrushchevites) intervenes.

In the article, he stated:

“The Marxist-Leninist party and every genuine revolutionary must consistently and resolutely pursue a revolutionary line and fight courageously against opportunism and its most hideous manifestations — Khrushchevite and Titoite modern revisionism. [...] It is precisely the opportunist and revisionist line, the influence of Khrushchevite and other revisionists, that have turned many communist parties, which once

²⁵² Ostermann F. C. (2007/2008), “Albania is not Cuba. Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split”, Cold War History Project Bulletin, Issue 16, Wilson Center, p. 184, available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-16-fall-2007winter-2008>.

²⁵³ Ibidem.

²⁵⁴ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I.B. Tauris. p. 188- 189.

²⁵⁵ Ibidem.

²⁵⁶ Ivi, p. 147.

represented a major revolutionary force, into parties of social reform, into appendages and assistants of the reactionary bourgeoisie.”²⁵⁷

This article was written after the breakup with the Soviet Union due to the change of policy undertaken by Khrushchev. In particular, Khrushchev was even more depicted as a traitor when he reopened the talks with Tito. The reaction from the Albanian dictator was then automatic: Khrushchev and Tito were, from his point of view, the same category of enemy. They both were accused of being revisionist, a threat to the Leninist-Marxist principles. Therefore, Titoists and Khrushchevites were sides of the same ‘revisionist coin’ and served the reactionary bourgeoisie. The two enemies described by Enver Hoxha were ideological. Still, their figures were a threat to communism and connected to the greater communist enemy, which corresponded to imperialism, the bourgeoisie and, more generally, to the West. Interestingly enough, the revisionist were dangerous enemies as they were *appendages* and *assistants* of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, Hoxha didn’t just describe the negative influence of the revisionists in the communist world; rather he claimed that each communist party:

“[...] must have a clear-cut stand towards opportunism, towards Khrushchevite and Titoite revisionism. It is not enough to be in solidarity with the struggle of the Marxist-Leninists against revisionism, but the party must fight uncompromisingly and openly against the revisionist betrayal because only in this way are the communists educated in a revolutionary spirit and the party protected from any danger of revisionism. Without fighting courageously and consistently against opportunism and Khrushchevite revisionism, imperialism cannot be fought, reaction cannot be fought, and the cause of the revolution and socialism cannot be carried forward.”²⁵⁸

After targeting the enemies as *opportunists* and *revisionists*, Hoxha made a clear call to all the “genuine Marxist-Leninist parties”²⁵⁹ to fight them and avoid making any sort of

²⁵⁷ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 25.

²⁵⁸ Ivi, p. 25-26.

²⁵⁹ Ivi, p. 27.

alliances with them. The call for a fight to face the danger posed by the revisionists reinforced the image of *us*, the ‘genuine’ communists, versus *them*, ‘the revisionists/imperialist betrayers. To the Albanian dictator, the only way to defend the international communist revolution was to fortify the international unity of Marxist-Leninists²⁶⁰, claiming it to be “a life-and-death struggle, a struggle of great international importance”²⁶¹. In the same article, the threat is indeed labelled as an existential one for the unity of the communist world as such:

“The struggle between our enemies and us is a bitter, merciless class struggle, with no quarter sought or given. [...] The traitors to Marxism-Leninism, the Khrushchevite and Titoite revisionists and their lackeys, have worked to a well-defined plan to hinder the unity of the Marxist-Leninists, and in general, to discredit the objective necessity for this unity.”²⁶²

Hoxha’s battle is indeed labelled as a *class struggle*, an ideological one, that is *bitter and merciless*. As envisaged by Schmidt, the ‘intensity’ of the enmity plays a relevant role in the enemy construction process. Once again, the enemy is the ‘other’, an *enemy and a traitor to Marxism-Leninism*. Enver Hoxha presented himself as the leader in the ideological war against this enemies, especially in order to “defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism from modern revisionism”²⁶³.

On March 15, 1968, Hoxha wrote an article entitled “The Budapest Carnivals”, expressing his discontent on the Carnival week on February where the ‘modern revisionists’ met in Budapest to discuss their further initiatives. To the Albanian communist leader, Tito was a divergent revisionist compared to the Soviet one:

“The section bent most aggressively on breaking away from and openly eroding the Soviet hegemony amongst the revisionists is, at the moment,

²⁶⁰ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 29.

²⁶¹ Ibidem.

²⁶² Ivi, p. 29-30.

²⁶³ Ivi, p. 32.

represented by the Tito clique and its closest associates. [...] Other new followers of Tito's example have begun to advance on this road..."²⁶⁴

The ideological enemy constituted by Tito and his *brothers in revisionism* was indeed, as it has been explained in the previous paragraph, is described by Hoxha as an infection, a virus that is spreading among the socialist bloc and that constituted a danger to the Marxist-Leninist parties, especially the PLA. In particular, he depicted the Soviet revisionists as naïve in relation to Tito, as he was far from easy to be controlled. In fact, to Hoxha:

“In the first place there is Tito, for whom the Soviet revisionists have very great need, because if he stays out everything is ruined, while if he comes in, he demands great concessions. In their dilemma the Soviet revisionists are ready to make concessions to him, but not all that Tito would like, because he wants both the keys and the house, their mother and their father and the title deeds.”²⁶⁵

The Yugoslav communist leader was portrayed as unreliable even within the revisionist group, as he wanted to be the chef. Hence things had to be done under his conditions. To Hoxha was unacceptable to go back under the Yugoslav influence as a satellite. The result of this writing was not only to present the inevitable defeat of the revisionist bloc as they lacked unity but also to defend his decision to not depart from the Soviet party stands.

Concerning the Kosovo question, on August 31 in 1966, an article entitled “Who is responsible for the crimes of genocide in Kosova?”, written by Enver Hoxha, appeared in the state-owned newspaper *Zëri I populli*. The article came in a period of general disapproval and public attack against the condition of the ethnic Albanians living in the Yugoslav territory. This was the consequence of the policy change of Enver Hoxha over the Albanian question, particularly evident in the title itself as he talks about *crimes of genocide*. In his work, he publicly accused the national policy toward the various

²⁶⁴ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 386.

²⁶⁵Ivi, p. 396.

nationalities put forwarded by Tito since he came into power as being “characterized by oppression and inequality, exploitation and economic and cultural discrimination”²⁶⁶. Indeed, he especially criticize the politics promoted against the Albanians living in Yugoslavia:

“In particular the Titoites have applied the most ferocious bloody terror, maiming and physical liquidation against the Albanian population in Yugoslavia. The bloody oppression which the Albanian population in Yugoslavia has suffered from the chauvinist denationalization policy of the enslaving Titoite regime, is a powerful irrefutable indictment of the police order of Belgrade. Persecution of the fascist type, physical and spiritual torture and the crime of genocide have been applied on a wide-scale against this population.”²⁶⁷

The intensity of Hoxha’s denouncement against Tito had become even harsher, as his regime is described as a *terrorist*, *fascist* and a *bloody* one. Unlike before, the enemy construction is not merely an ideological one. Instead it reinforces the Titoites as an existential threat to the ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo²⁶⁸. The language gets more emotional and less cold than the Yugoslav enemy's ideological narrative. He kept on affirming:

“We have the right to raise our voice to defend the vital interests of the Albanian population living in Yugoslavia, under the terror of the Tito clique and the UDB, under the permanent threat of denationalisation and mass extermination.”²⁶⁹

The reference to the defence of the *vital interests* of the Albanians and their *mass extermination* creates an enemy beyond the ideological sort of indeed. The enemy

²⁶⁶ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 77.

²⁶⁷ Ibidem.

²⁶⁸ Pavlović, A., Draško, G.P., & Halili, R. (Eds.), (2019), “Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations Figuring Out the Enemy: Figuring out the Enemy (1st ed.)”, position 4463 (ebook), Routledge, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351273169>.

²⁶⁹ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 80.

construction is thus justified by a series of tragic events where the Albanians living in Kosovo were victims of tortures and mass killings. It goes, therefore, beyond the ideological sphere as it has been done so far concerning Tito and the CPY. Within the same article, he illustrated a series of events such as:

“The Albanian population in Yugoslavia will never forget the tragic event of autumn 1944 when the Tito-Ranković gang arrested 10,000 Albanians in Tetova and shot 1,200 of them out of hand without trial, not to mention those who died in the prisons. Cynicism, savagery and fury to exterminate the Albanians have always characterised the actions of the Titoite bandits.”²⁷⁰

The conditions compared to the past undoubtedly changed: before 1948, the anti-fascist war was praised as where the Yugoslav and Albanian soldiers fought against the occupiers. Now the same period is characterised by a *tragic event* with thousands of Albanians captured and killed indiscriminately. The enemy is critically defined as a criminal by terms like *Tito-Ranković gang* and *Titoite bandits*, while their deeds are characterised by *cynism*, *savagery* and *fury*.

“For more than twenty years, it has stopped at nothing in its fight against the Albanian people, against the PLA, against the PRA, and the socialist state and social order established in Albania. The interference of the Titoite clique in Albania, its ceaseless plotting and subversive activity, its alliances with the most ferocious enemies of the Albanian people — from the fascists, the Ballists, the Zogites to the American imperialists, the Greek monarch-fascists and the Khrushchevite revisionists, [...], are now notorious throughout the world.”²⁷¹

Titoites and all his alleged allies, namely from the Fascist to the USSR, have done all in their power to undermine the Albanian communist party and their people, wherever and whenever they could. In this article, the Albanians appeared as victims of the Yugoslav

²⁷⁰ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 80.

²⁷¹ Ivi, p. 79.

plotting and subversive activity. The discourse is much more nationalistic; however, it remains ideological, referring to the past hostile action against the Albanian communist party. Therefore, the enemy construction of Hoxha sees an evolvement in the terms used so far, particularly when it comes to the Kosovo question, to which he refers as *genocide* and *massacres*. The tone would have become even more nationalistic in the book ‘The Titoites’ of 1982.

On 8th April 1981, the Albanian dictator came out with another article entitled “Why were police violence and tanks used against the Albanians of Kosova?”²⁷², commenting on the current situation occurring in the Kosovo area. In spring 1981, the Kosovo area was characterised by uprisings suppressed by the security policy²⁷³. The first riots started in March when the students in Pristina protested for the precarious economic conditions, then other cities followed. The Yugoslav government condemned the situation as “a nationalist and counter-revolutionary threat”²⁷⁴, announcing the state of emergency. Specifically, in the article, the Albanian communist leader expressed his malcontent to the Yugoslav media system:

“The Yugoslav press, radio and TV have set up a great clamour of misinformation about the reasons which impelled the working people and students of Kosova to come out in demonstrations. [...] The demonstrations have erupted as the result of an intolerable situation which has been going on for tens of years [...]”²⁷⁵

Enver Hoxha generally described and defended the situation of the Kosovars under the Serb’s subjection, while they should have “more freedoms and democratic rights”²⁷⁶. He also accused that self-determination was applied only to a particular minority, while the

²⁷² Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 146.

²⁷³ Logoreci A. (1982), “Riots and trials in Kosovo: Why the Albanian population in Yugoslavia took the streets”, Index on Censorship, Sage Journals, Volume:11 issue:2, pp. 23-25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03064228208533359>.

²⁷⁴ Ivi, p. 23.

²⁷⁵ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 146-147.

²⁷⁶ Ivi, p. 149.

Albanians were wholly left aside. In this sense, there was a “complete independence and equality, but under the wing of Serbia”²⁷⁷. The Albanian dictator stressed that Yugoslav leadership had denied a picture of the Albanians of Kosovo as brave people who fought for their rights rejected by the Yugoslav leadership. In particular, he referred mainly to the following:

“[...] feeling of resentment and hostility towards the Albanians among the peoples of Yugoslavia, that all the forces are mobilised to attack, to abuse, to kill, to injure and imprison the flower of the valiant Albanian youth of Kosova and other Albanian regions.”²⁷⁸

The “extraordinary brutality” envisaged by Hoxha in the events was responsible, which is not the Albanian communist party. In this case, the Albanian leader referred to the accusation presented by the CPY that behind the protest in the Kosovo area, there is the Albanian party leadership²⁷⁹. Although the articles that appeared in the party newspaper contributed

“In expressing our views about the recent events in Kosova, we are not interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. But we are raising our voice, and we have the right to raise it when injustices are done to our brothers when violence and repression are used against them when such slogans as Albanian chauvinism, irredentism, etc. are used to discredit the Albanian youth and people of Kosova.”²⁸⁰

Therefore, basically in this article, the Albanian communist leadership explained that the current situation resulted from “the failure of Yugoslav’s domestic policy”²⁸¹ while

²⁷⁷ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 150.

²⁷⁸ Ivi, p. 153.

²⁷⁹ Logoreci A. (1982), “Riots and trials in Kosovo: Why the Albanian population in Yugoslavia took the streets”, Index on Censorship, Sage Journals, Volume:11 issue:2, pp. 23-25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03064228208533359>.

²⁸⁰ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 157-158.

²⁸¹ Logoreci A. (1982), “Riots and trials in Kosovo: Why the Albanian population in Yugoslavia took the streets”, Index on Censorship, Sage Journals, Volume:11 issue:2, pp. 23-25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03064228208533359>.

supporting the claims of the Kosovar marchers. The enemy construction, in this case, remains more on an ideological level. The discourse of Hoxha is a reply to the Yugoslav allegations of Tirana's implications in the protests, and the terminology emphasises a nationalistic discourse. Although, it must be underlined that the enemy is addressed as the Great Serb²⁸² at the beginning of the same article. The tone is more aggressive and emotional than the one used to refer to the Yugoslav enemy.

On May 17, 1981, a new article entitled "The Status of a Republic for Kosova is a Just Demand"²⁸³ appeared on *Zëri I Popullit*. This time, the report does not explain the reasons behind the Kosovo protests; instead, it's a firm attack.

"A wave of Great-Serb and anti-Albanian chauvinism is sweeping Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leaders are competing with one another in oratory to cover up the real causes of the demonstrations and revolts of the Albanian population in Kosova, to conceal the monstrous massacres and barbarities of the Serb armies, to denigrate the Albanians of Kosova."²⁸⁴

This time the discourse is built up around the Great Serbs as the main enemy and the Yugoslav as their allies against the Albanians of Kosovo. Yugoslavia, in his view, is characterised by a wave of *Great-Serb and anti-Albanian chauvinism*, unable to see the truth of what was happening. Hoxha also recalled the contribution of the Albanians living in the Kosovo area in the National liberation war against the occupiers in the Second World War. The 'us' versus 'them' relation emerged promptly once again. The Albanians of Kosovo were seen as a group of peaceful and courageous people who only sought to have the same status as the other nationalities of the Yugoslavian republic.

"The capitalist and the imperialist world have perpetrated many evils against the Albanian people at all times. Now, too, it is trying to distort the truth about Albania. [...] Yugoslav leaders, make a correct assessment of

²⁸² The term 'Great Serb' refers to the adepts of the Serbian nationalist ideology based on the establishment of a Serbian state that would englobe all the territories that could have any historical significance to the Serbian nation. Generally, it takes inspiration from the Serbian Empire of the 14th Century.

²⁸³ Hoxha E. (1982), "Selected Works. Volume IV", The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The "8 Nentori" publishing house: Tirana, p. 170.

²⁸⁴ Ibidem.

the lofty virtues of this part of the Albanian nation which lives in Yugoslavia, don't make them enemies by violating the rights that belong to them, because this is not good, either for you or for them.”²⁸⁵

The ideologic divergence between the two countries is put aside by Hoxha, despite trying to depict the LPA's role as minimal as possible in the Kosovo riots of the last years. The enemies of the Albanians are *evils*, contrary to the Albanians who seemed to have done nothing wrong to deserve such “nationalistic and chauvinistic measures”²⁸⁶. Moreover, regarding the Great Serbs, Hoxha mainly attacked Peter Stambolić, a Serbian communist politician who in those same years was serving as Vice-President of the Serbian Republic.

“Mr Stambolić employs a sleight of hand: the Albanian ethnic entity is nationalist and fascist, but not the Serbian. However, he can't get away with this sleight of hand: either both ethnic entities lead to nationalism and fascism, or neither of them does so, but in no way can it be that one does, and the other does not.”²⁸⁷

Hoxha's narrative presents the Yugoslav and the Serbs as the only ones responsible for the current situation, where they mistakenly target the Albanians of Kosovo as the problem. The enemy construction remains an ideological and nationalistic one. The Albanian dictator refers to the Yugoslav and the Serb as an enemy only because they are an existential threat to the Albanian minorities of Yugoslavia.

“The new leaders of Serbia accuse us Albanians of hating the Serbian people. This is monstrous slander. We have loved the Serbian people and still do. We hate only Serbian chauvinism, Albanian chauvinism, and any other chauvinism. We are Marxist-Leninists because we are internationalists.”²⁸⁸

²⁸⁵ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 187 & 190.

²⁸⁶ Ivi, p. 193.

²⁸⁷ Ivi, p. 201.

²⁸⁸ Ivi, p. 202.

In Hoxha's perspective, the accusation of hating the Serbian people is mere defamation, as, on the contrary, his party is only against any form of *chauvinism*. In this sense, Hoxha presented a narrative based on the fact that Albanians have nothing to do with the 'Great Albania' project as it is a product of Fascist Italy and nothing more than²⁸⁹. In the end, his tone remained calm, and the article was aimed at officially justifying the accusation received from Belgrade. Therefore, the dichotomy Yugoslav/Serbian enemy corresponded to two different types of enemies, although they were both to blame for the Kosovo question. On one side, the Yugoslav didn't maintain their promise to let the Albanian people of Kosovo decide on their destiny, nor did they solve the problem in light of the Leninist principle of self-determination up to secession. On the other side, the Serbian minority was responsible for the actual persecution of the Albanians living there.

3.4 The Titoites and the Kosovo Question

While during the 50s and 60s, Albania was experiencing some economic growth due to the investments coming firstly from the USSR, then from China, the question of Kosovo remerged in the national political sphere. A crucial moment in the Yugoslav-Albanian relation was the exit from the scene of Aleksandar Ranković, the former Chief of the Yugoslav State Security, that with Tito and Kardelj, was one of the leading prominent figures of the CPY. During his career, Ranković had been officially against the decentralisation of the Yugoslav political system while promoting and enforcing a period of Serbian domination in Kosovo province²⁹⁰, particularly from 1949 to 1965. That same time was characterised "by the region's nominal autonomy and an over-representation of Serbs in the administrative apparatus"²⁹¹. However, even though Kosovo was gaining more and more autonomy, it was treated more or less as "a district of Serbia"²⁹². Even the local Communist Party was nothing more than an arm of the SKS, the Serbian Communist

²⁸⁹Hoxha E. (1982), "Selected Works. Volume IV", The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The "8 Nentori" publishing house: Tirana, p. 204.

²⁹⁰ Petrović, A., & Stefanović, Đ. (2010), "Kosovo, 1944-1981: The Rise and the Fall of a Communist *Nested Homeland*", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 62(7), p. 1081, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20787615>.

²⁹¹ Ibidem.

²⁹² Ibidem.

League. Generally, as it has been analysed so far, the condition of the ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo wasn't an issue for Enver Hoxha at the beginning of his rule:

“In the Party and among the people we said openly that our national question as a whole, hence that of Kosova and the other Albanian territories attached to old Yugoslavia, too, could never be solved by Nazi-fascism”²⁹³

The Albanian national question, which would have included Kosovo, was indeed linked to the so-called ‘Great Albania’ project promoted by the Fascist regime and by *Balli Kombetar*, therefore for Hoxha was unacceptable to agree with the enemy and pursue that same path. On the contrary, in his narrative, he defended his choice of collaborating with the CPY during the Liberation War:

“The Communist Party of Yugoslavia demanded that the population of Kosova and the other Albanian regions of Yugoslavia should be mobilised in the fight under its leadership, and immediately after the war, this population would decide its future based on the Leninist principle of the right of self-determination. This demand we considered reasonable and fair.”²⁹⁴

The explanation proposed by the Albanian dictator presented, as in the other case, a justification of the Albanian communists in believing in the ‘promises’ made by their Yugoslav counterparts, relying upon the *Leninist principle of the right of self-determination*. The enemy’s construction is thus based on the idea of an unforeseen Yugoslav plot, a conspiracy against all the ethnic Albanians. Such a type of view became public mainly after 1948 when Hoxha started to instrumentalise the Kosovo question in a more nationalistic narrative, talking about “the age-old anti-Albanian sentiments and aims of the Serbs Pan-Slav expansionism”²⁹⁵. However, in his memoirs of the 80s, when recalling the end of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia of the inter-war period, his tone got more nationalistic and aggressive:

²⁹³ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 78.

²⁹⁴ Ivi, p. 80.

²⁹⁵ Ivi, p. 15.

“[...] as a result of the savagely oppressive chauvinist Great Serb policy towards other people and nations within the former Kingdom, the feelings of division, old and new jealousies, and animosities had become more profound.”²⁹⁶

It transpires that the enemy's construction started to delineate differently from the other times: the enemy is explicitly defined as the 'Great Serb', with a much more ethnic connotation. At the same time, referring to the ethnic Albanians living within the borders of new-born multiethnic Yugoslavia, Enver Hoxha outlined their peculiarity compared to the other groups:

“They (the Albanians) were part of a people and a nation that had been attached, not only artificially but, more importantly, quite arbitrarily to Yugoslavia. Albania was their trunk; they were part of this trunk. [...] But, as I said, we agreed to concede the CPY to avoid any cause of unnecessary arguments and discussion which would have been harmful at the moment.”²⁹⁷

One thing in the Albanian dictatorship's propaganda was clear: the ethnic Albanians living in Yugoslavia were inevitably part of Albania. The Albanian communists didn't fight for it to avoid clashes with the CPY in an already precarious situation. Indeed, in his memoirs 'The Titoites' he specified:

“Hence, let Kosova be transformed from an old bone of contention into a territory for the affirmation of the friendship between peoples and their fraternisation in the war, a territory to prove that the communist parties can provide wise solutions for all problems. Leftover from history.”²⁹⁸

The Albanian communist leader proposed thus an image of the LPA as totally unaware of the CPY conspiracy while explaining that he only acted faithfully in light of the Marxist-Leninist principles. Kosovo was considered “artificially and unjustly attached to

²⁹⁶ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 80-81.

²⁹⁷ Ivi, p. 83.

²⁹⁸ Ivi, p. 86.

Yugoslavia”²⁹⁹, contrary to their right to national self-determination. However, Hoxha only claimed this standpoint some years after, as, at the time, he didn’t express any opposition, even though he wasn’t in the position to impose anything on the CPY. Despite this, he reinforces the ‘Yugoslav enemy’ image by remembering the Albanians under the Yugoslav domain, which, during the war against the Fascist invaders, got killed or persecuted by the CPY.

“Under the mask of the fight to eliminate ‘counter-revolutionary forces’, the special detachments of the Yugoslav NLA poured fire and bullets indiscriminately upon all the patriots and other honest Albanians of those parts, upon those who dared express their legitimate surprise: ‘why should we Albanians be under Yugoslavia.’”³⁰⁰

Despite being patriots and honest, the Albanians are indiscriminately victims of Yugoslav brutality. At the same time, Hoxha recalled a conversation with Fadil Hoxha, one of the main leaders of the Provincial Committee for Kosovo and Metohija at the end of the Second World War:

“The distrust felt in Kosova towards the CPY and the Yugoslav partisans because of the savage Great Serb oppression, and because ‘the Skojevaska’³⁰¹, also, have killed innocent Albanians [...]”³⁰²

Adding that, while he was visiting Tirana, Fadil Hoxha outlined the oppressive situation:

“He complained about the grave situation that existed in Kosova, about the situation of persecution, with reprisals and terror against Albanians that prevailed in the province [...]”

In his narrative, the Albanian dictator depicted a *persecution* situation, *with reprisals and terror* undergone by the *savage Great Serb oppression*. Interestingly enough, even though the criticism is generally against the Yugoslav administration, the role of the enemy is

²⁹⁹ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 85.

³⁰⁰ Ivi, p. 107.

³⁰¹ The Yugoslav communist youth.

³⁰² Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 115.

attributed to the Serbians. However, despite this first initial positive role of Fadil Hoxha, during the last 40 years, he became inevitably “with his hands and his pocket Titoized”:

“In the spring of 1981, (he) raises his hand and gives his vote in the Presidency of the SFR of Yugoslavia, to send in the tanks and bayonets of the Great-Serb army to kill, oppress and put down the people and youth in Kosova who rose to demand respect for their rights. [...] (he) went so far in his defence of the Great-Serb spokesmen that he stood before the Albanian demonstrators of 1981 and their dead and called them... ‘Scum’!”³⁰³

In the enemy construction process, from being a trustworthy Albanian communist of Kosovo, Fadil Hoxha revealed himself as an internal enemy, serving and defending the *Great-Serb spokespeople*. In the ‘Us’ vs ‘Them’ contraposition, the Albanians of Yugoslavia represent the victims killed, oppressed, and put down while being called ‘Scum’. Fadil Hoxha became part of the Albanian distrust as he betrayed his people standing on behalf of the oppressor³⁰⁴. As Enver Hoxha stressed several times, in his view Tito, in reality, had no willingness to solve the Kosovo question following the right of self-determination. Under this perspective, the enemy remains both ideological (Tito and the CPY) and ethnic (the Great Serbs); therefore, it confirms the double standard taken into consideration.

Undoubtedly, as introduced at the beginning of this paragraph, Ranković’s removal brought attention to the condition of the Kosovo Albanians³⁰⁵. He had reinforced and centralised the security police during his rule, mainly constituted of Serbs. Tito’s fault was not maintaining the promise of letting them decide their future, while the Yugoslav internal propaganda kept calling the protesters “irredentists, nationalists, counter-revolutionaries”³⁰⁶. Calling them in those terms was used to legitimise the security police of Ranković to persecute the Albanians of Kosovo and force them to leave the country³⁰⁷.

³⁰³ Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori, p. 115- 116.

³⁰⁴ Ivi, p. 116.

³⁰⁵ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I.B. Tauris. p. 191.

³⁰⁶ Ibidem.

³⁰⁷ Ibidem.

During the 25th Yugoslav anniversary at the end of November 1968, several demonstrations were happening in the main towns of Kosovo. In the capital, Prishtinë/Priština, the protesters demanded recognition as a republic while shouting slogans like “Long live Enver Hoxha” and “Long live Tito”³⁰⁸. However, Ranković’s removal brought also much more autonomy and a growing nationalist consciousness among the Kosovo Albanians. At the end of November 1976, during a visit to the Brazilian communist party, regarding the situation in Kosovo, Hoxha stressed:

“When the internal situation in Yugoslavia became acute, and the struggle for power with the Great-Serb clan became fiercer, Tito, who is a great acrobat, seeing the difficult situation, made certain ‘concessions’ towards the Albanian people of Kosova to manoeuvre better, and placed all the blame for the persecution of these people on Ranković.”³⁰⁹

No matter what, Enver Hoxha blamed both Tito and the ‘Great Serbs’ for the treatment reserved to the Albanians, which didn’t change that much after the dismissal of Ranković. The *concessions* made to the Yugoslav Albanians generally referred to their acquiring more autonomy, as thanks to the new Constitution of 1974, Kosovo obtained the status of an autonomous province. Naturally, also, for this reason, and because of the threat posed by the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia³¹⁰, the 70s saw a slight rapprochement in the cultural sector between Yugoslavia and Albania, especially for what regards Kosovo³¹¹. The death of Tito on the 4th of May 1980 wasn’t much of a concern for Enver Hoxha, as it seemed that the CPY intended to keep the same line as his former leader³¹². The Kosovo autonomous province had plenty of cultural events presented on tv or the radio directly produced in Tirana³¹³. However, despite these achievements, Hoxha recalled the terrible condition in which the Albanians found themselves under Ranković’s rule:

³⁰⁸ Petrović, A., & Stefanović, Đ. (2010), “Kosovo, 1944-1981: The Rise and the Fall of a Communist *Nested Homeland*”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 62(7), p. 1081, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20787615>.

³⁰⁹ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 162.

³¹⁰ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I.B. Tauris, p. 197.

³¹¹ *Ibidem*.

³¹² Ivi, p. 203.

³¹³ Ivi, p. 206.

“The Albanians in Yugoslavia have lived and continue to live enslaved, without freedom, and for years on end have been persecuted and forcibly expelled from Kosova to Turkey, where they were obliged to sleep outside in the streets or mosques.”³¹⁴.

Forced and pressured to leave the country, several Albanians from Kosovo went to Turkey to escape the permanent state of emergency and the maltreatment of those years. In 1981, in a report focused on the international situation of the time, the Albanian leadership still delineated the same enemies:

“The Great-Serb clan is powerful, but for tactical reasons is obliged to surrender the leadership to the Croat-Slovene clan [...]. The savage oppression of the people of Kosova and other Albanians who inhabit their ancestral territories in Yugoslavia continues.”³¹⁵

The ‘Great Serbs’ kept on being the main enemies of the time and responsible for the Albanian oppression in the Yugoslav region. At the same time, the only limit of their power was the Croatian and Slovenian communist parties.

Within this historical framework, a new figure emerged as an internal enemy of the LPA, Mehmet Shehu, a well-known Albanian communist, who served as Prime Minister from 1954 to 1980. Mehmet Shehu, indeed, in December 1981, was found dead in his house and accused of working in service of different foreign powers against the LPA. Officially, it was said that he committed suicide while most likely he was eliminated by Hoxha since he had started to disagree with him lately. In 1982, Enver Hoxha delivered a speech at the 4th Plenum of the CC of the PLA explaining the ‘truth’ behind Shehu:

“During the National Liberation War, Mehmet Shehu and his wife, Fiqret Sanxhaktari, were recruited as agents of the Yugoslavs, too, by Dušan Mugoša. To this end, the former was given the secret pseudonym MISH

³¹⁴ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 161.

³¹⁵ Ivi, p. 530.

(Mehmet Ismail Shehu), and the latter the pseudonym FISARI (Fiqret Sanxhaktari).”

Once again, the internal enemy construction follows the procedure applied to the case of Koçi Xoxe. Shehu was one of the closest advisers and collaborators of Hoxha at a point when it was believed that he was most likely to be his successor³¹⁶. The Albanian dictator’s health conditions were deteriorating, but Hoxha had already decided as his successor Ramiz Alia, who was perceived “less unpredictable and extremist than Shehu”³¹⁷. Despite the prominent role played by Shehu before 1980, the internal enemy construction process started by de-legitimizing his contribution to the Albanian communist party since its start as an agent *of the Yugoslavs* during the National Liberation War. Furthermore, the link with the external enemy, the CPY, is fabricated through the figure of Dušan Mugoša. The nicknames were given to him, and his wife proved his collaboration with the enemy. Shehu was accused of being in service of different foreign powers, from the Soviet to the Yugoslav and the British to the Americans³¹⁸. In the same speech, Hoxha continued:

“Mehmet Shehu placed himself in the service of the chief of the Soviet military mission in Albania, the agent of Soviet counter-intelligence, major Ivanov, by giving him secret reports against the leadership and the line of our Communist Party, in which he demanded an intervention either by the Soviets or Tito (whom he describes as a big figure) to change the situation in Albania because it was hard to go on like that with Enver Hoxha.”³¹⁹

As is often the case with Hoxha’s speeches in his ‘Selected Works’, he is pretty detailed in reconstructing the historical relationship with his enemy, who once was his closer collaborator, to justify and argue his new standpoint. This was what happened to Xoxe, Shehu, and others. In the end, from being a comrade, Shehu was judged as never being

³¹⁶ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I.B. Tauris, p. 207.

³¹⁷ Ibidem.

³¹⁸ Ivi, p. 208.

³¹⁹ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 570-571.

“a communist and partisan”³²⁰. Within this context, Hoxha also draws a link between Kosovo’s oppressive situation and the contribution of Mehmet Shehu in Albania.

“Apart from the slanders that these demonstrations (in Kosovo) had allegedly been inspired by Albania, the Yugoslavs had to take immediate measures to discredit the Stalinist-Albanian leadership to disturb and overturn the tough situation in Albania, as well as to confuse the patriotic-revolutionary forces in Kosova. They demanded that their agent Mehmet Shehu act.”³²¹

Based on Hoxha’s speech, Shehu tried to destabilise the internal situation in Albania under Yugoslav instructions but failed to fulfil ‘his mission’ as the LPA discovered his plan. That was also the explanation for his alleged suicide:

“Caught between two fires — the order of the UDB, which was driven to desperation as it lost ground in Kosova, and his fear of the unity of the Party and the people, Mehmet Shehu could see no alternative but the shameful course of suicide.”³²²

In the end, Shehu was considered to be nothing more than a traitor of his people, and the Albanian communist party adopted this as the only possible truth. This same truth was then presented all over the country through any official means, like the radio, the television and the press. Hoxha will keep commenting on Kosovo’s situation with a harsher and more nationalistic tone in his last years. During his speech at the beginning of November 1982, the Albanian dictator referred to the Kosovo question:

“All Kosova and the Albanian regions of Yugoslavia have been placed under savage chauvinist military pressure. Now the ‘differentiation’, which means making Albanians spy on Albanians in favour of sinister Serbian forces, is going on a large scale. But the people of Kosova cannot accept

³²⁰ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 570.

³²¹ Ivi, p. 580.

³²² Ivi, p. 600.

this shameful course because it leads to fratricide, while the Great Serbs will rub their hands in glee.”³²³

The ‘Great Serbs’ and the *sinister Serbian* forces are leading the Albanians of Kosovo to *fratricide*, inciting them into “blood feuds”³²⁴. It is interesting to notice how Hoxha differentiated between the Serbian people from the ‘Great Serbs’ considered responsible for the current situation within the enemy construction process. The enemy construction didn’t consider all the Serbs, as the aim of Hoxha is to make the Albanian people look like the good ones, who, contrary to their enemies, “speak with the language of reason”³²⁵. Consequently, the Serbs were also victims of the decisions of a small group of the Serbian leadership:

“The Serbs and Montenegrins were rightly frightened by this policy of terror and began to flee from fear and because of the poverty that prevails in Kosova. [...] they (the Great Serbs) are responsible for the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins”³²⁶

The ‘Great Serbs’ were the only ones responsible for the region’s emigration of the Slavic population. It could be said that the enemy construction narrative had an ethnic and nationalistic element, although it remained more sectorial as it didn’t englobe all the Serbian people. The ‘Great Serbs’ were the ones to blame for all the persecutions and maltreatments of the Yugoslav Albanians. Hoxha was clear when saying that they “set in motion the ‘science’ of extermination, the ideology and means of the pogrom”.³²⁷ The ‘Great Serbs’ were thus perceived as an existential threat to the ethnic Albanians for their anti-Albanians sentiments and their measures towards them in Yugoslavia.

In one of his last speeches, during the 7th Plenum of the LPA in 1983, Hoxha expressively mentioned the Serbs:

³²³ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 623.

³²⁴ Ibidem.

³²⁵ Ibidem.

³²⁶ Ivi, p. 625.

³²⁷ Ivi, p. 637.

“The Titoite group inherited all the Albanian secret agents in the service of the Serbs and, during the National Liberation War, increased their ranks with recruits. All the Yugoslav Titoite secret agents, from Koçi Xoxe to Mehmet Shehu and Kadri Hazbiu³²⁸, were recruited during and after the war.”³²⁹

The real target of the CPY was “to annex the new Albanian state”³³⁰. Some Albanian communists served as agents to achieve the scope of making Albania the 7th Yugoslav republic. Hoxha maintained this final standpoint over the Yugoslav Federation until the end of his rule. To him, the Yugoslavs had tried their best to undermine socialism in Albania, while the Albanians in Kosovo has been persecuted by the hand of the “Great Serb chauvinist circles”³³¹. Two types of external enemies arise: on one side, the ideological one of the Titoites, and on the other side, the ethnic one, the Great-Serbs with their “barbarous, oppressive and denationalising actions”³³² against the Albanians in the Yugoslav Federation. Despite this, the Albanian leadership was convinced to have made it through all its obstacles, as socialism survived in Albania.

In the end, Enver Hoxha’s aim was his party and rule survival, and that was reflected in his policy that brought him to isolate the country from the rest of the world³³³. He cut the ties first with the Yugoslav Federation, the USSR, and China. Before he died in 1985, on the 40th anniversary of the Liberation, he made one last speech condemning all his enemies: the Titoites, the Soviet revisionists and China³³⁴.

³²⁸ Albanian communist politician, arrested and then executed in September 1983.

³²⁹ Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume IV”, The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana, p. 732.

³³⁰ Ibidem.

³³¹ Ivi, p. 835.

³³² Ivi, p. 839.

³³³ Vickers M. (2011), “The Albanians: A Modern History”, I.B. Tauris, p. 209.

³³⁴ Ibidem.

4 Conclusion

Enver Hoxha's friend and enemy construction process took different shapes and paths throughout his communist dictatorship³³⁵. The enemy construction tool was certainly one of the main means of control of the Albanian dictator to consolidate his power throughout his career. He was famous for his long speeches and public discourse, not to mention his ability to 'change his skin' whenever it was more convenient to him. Indeed, his allies changed from the Yugoslav Federation to Soviet Russia and China. As seen, the Stalinist rule of Hoxha was mainly influenced by his writings and memoirs, which were used as a filter to interpret Albanian society and its traditions. Each Albanian history book and the state-owned media echoed the Albanian communist leader thought and principles as presented during his speeches and in his notes. Some crucial elements emerge from the current discourse analysis.

First of all, the relation between the external and internal enemy in Hoxha's narrative. Indeed, as envisaged by Schmitt, there must be a link between the internal and external enemy, and in this case, it took the form of clandestine cooperation. In the first phase, at the end of the Second World War, the enemy was represented by the Nazis and the Fascists, described as invaders and occupiers. The internal enemies were exemplified by *Balli Kombetar*, a nationalistic movement, and *Legaliteti*, a monarchic faction, as both were accused of collaborating with the occupiers, the external enemies. This was functional for the Albanian communist leadership to concentrate the power and get rid of any potential competitor by linking them with the occupiers and invaders. After 1948, it was the turn of Tito and his followers, targeted as an agent of revisionism, considered a threat at the same level of the worst enemies of communism: imperialism and capitalism. This time, the internal enemy was embodied by Koçi Xoxe, a prominent Albanian communist figure, considered to be competitor to Hoxha's leadership. Xoxe was an advocate of complete integration with the Yugoslav Federation. Undoubtedly, the internal

³³⁵ Hoxha E. (1982), "Selected Works. Volume I/II/III/IV", The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The "8 Nentori" publishing house: Tirana.

enemy construction allowed targeting specific members of the LPA as Titoites through a series of purges and eliminating political adversaries as internal enemies³³⁶. The same process emerged in addressing the Soviet enemy after the death of Stalin, to cut the relation with Khrushchev. The Soviet leader was indeed a threat to Hoxha's rule as he condemned the Stalinist type of regime during the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 and decided to open the dialogue with Tito. Targeting him as an enemy was thus a matter of survival to the Albanian dictator, as it is underlined in his memoirs³³⁷. In the 80s, one of the main internal enemies was the Albanian communist Mehmet Shehu, who was accused, along with his wife, of being a spy of the Albanian imperialist enemies, including the CPY. Shehu was considered to be one of Hoxha's favourites and his probable heir, however as he started to disagree with the Albanian leader's decisions³³⁸. Similarly, as Xoxe, all Shehu's contributions in the construction of Albanian communism delegitimised and judged as mere opportunism since the beginning. In this regard, the Albanian dictator is very careful and detailed in justifying his standpoint against an alleged internal enemy. The suicide of Mehmet Shehu was explained as a fear of having been discovered.

Second of all, the Yugoslav/Serbian enemy elaborated by Enver Hoxha revealed a double standard: the ideological and the ethnic enemy. After the first and brief phase of friendship, Tito and the CPY became a crucial ideological enemy under the name of 'Titoites' in the Albanian communist discourse. Titoite became a synonym of revisionist, imperialist, evil, anti-Marxist, anti-communist. For almost 50 years, the primary focus of the Albanian communist propaganda was the ideological enemy represented by the Yugoslav Communists and their agents. However, the Kosovo question played evidently a crucial role in the creation of the ethnic and existential enemy represented by the 'Great Serbs', especially after the 60s when the major protests in Kosovo took place³³⁹. In

³³⁶ Këlliç K. (2020), "Defining the Internal Enemy: Detention Camps in Early Communist Albania, 1945–1950", *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość*. 2:138-152, available at: <https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=1009385>.

³³⁷ Hoxha E. (1980), "The Khrushchevites. Memoirs", Workers' Publishing House: London.

³³⁸ Vickers M. (2011), "The Albanians: A Modern History", I.B. Tauris.

³³⁹ Hoxha E. (1982), "Selected Works. Volume I/II/III/IV", The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The "8 Nentori" publishing house: Tirana.

particular, Hoxha's discourse and tone got more nationalistic and emotional while targeting the 'Great Serbs' as an existential threat to the Albanians living in Yugoslavia. Interestingly enough, in this case, there was the delimitation between Yugoslav ideological enemy and the 'Great Serbs' existential enemy which were committing a *genocide* against the Yugoslav Albanians. In this regard, within Hoxha's narrative, the CPY was guilty of not having stopped the 'Great Serbs' from oppressing and persecuting the Albanian population in the region. The 'us', the good Albanians, versus 'them', the revisionist Yugoslavs and the evil 'Great Serbs' emerged prominently in Hoxha's narrative. However, despite openly condemning their behaviour, the Albanian communist leadership didn't take any concrete action against the CPY nor the Serbian leadership. This had also emerged in the response of the Albanian communist government after the death of Hoxha, and afterwards of the democratic government, which had generally been "restrained" in front of the "escalating violence in Kosovo" at the end of the 90s³⁴⁰. Nevertheless, it is relevant to notice that the ethnic enemy is not represented by the entire Serbian population, who, on the contrary, is described as a victim of the Serbian nationalist leadership.

Finally, both elements, the external-internal enemy framework and the ideological-ethnic one, underlined the capability of Enver Hoxha to use the party narrative to manipulate and concentrate the power in his hands.

³⁴⁰ International Crisis Group (1998), "Kosovo- The view from Tirana", report 36/Europe and Central Asia, available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/kosovo-view-tirana>.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Frasheri, K. (1964), “The history of Albania: (a brief survey)”, Tirana.

Hoxha E. (1980), “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs”, Workers’ Publishing House: London.

Hoxha E. (1982), “Selected Works. Volume I/II/III/IV”, The institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, The “8 Nentori” publishing house: Tirana.

Hoxha, E. (1982), “The Titoites: Historical notes”, Tirana: 8 Nentori.

Prifti R. P. (1978), “Socialist Albania since 1944. Domesic and Foreign Developments”, Studies in Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution, The MIT Press.

Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance Between the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and The People’s Republic Of Albania, 9 July 1946, available at: <http://www.forost.ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19460711-1.pdf>.

Secondary Sources

Andersen Jones R., Grown Sun L. (2017), “Enemy construction and the press”, BYU Law Research Paper No. 17-23, SSRN.

Angermuller J. (2015), “Discourse Studies”, International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), Elsevier, pp. 510-515, ISBN 9780080970875, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.03216-5>.

Assmann, J., & Czaplicka, J. (1995), “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity”, New German Critique, 65, 125–133, <https://doi.org/10.2307/488538>.

Bevir, M., Daddow, O. (2012), “Interpreting Foreign Policy: National, Comparative and Regional Studies”, *International Relations* 29, n. 3: 273–87, p.4, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815600930>.

Bevir, M., Daddow, O., & Hall, I. (2013), “Introduction: Interpreting British Foreign Policy”, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 15(2), 163–174. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2012.00537.x>.

Bevir, M., Rhodes, R.A.W. (2002), “Interpretive Theory”, In *Theory, and Methods in Political Science*, Second edition. London, Macmillan, 2000, available at: <https://escholarship.org/content/qt0bk3k2nq/qt0bk3k2nq.pdf>.

Bevir, Mark (2005) “Interpretation and Its Others (with R.A.W. Rhodes)”, *Australian Journal of Political Science* 40, 169–87.

Bevir, Mark, e Oliver Daddow (2012), “Interpreting Foreign Policy: National, Comparative and Regional Studies”, *International Relations* 29, n. 3: 273–87, p.4, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815600930>.

Blendi F. (2016), “The Iron Fist Of Albania”, I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London/ New York.
Dian M. (2017), “Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy”, Elsevier, p. 24, ISBN 9780081020272, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102027-2.00001-8>.

Chomsky N. (1997), “Media Control. The Spectacular Achievements Of Propaganda”, *The Open Media Pamphlet Series*, Seven Stories Press First Edition.

Elsie R. (2015), “Albania in a Nutshell: a brief history and chronology of the events”, (e-book).

Glenny M. (2017), “The Balkans, 1804-2012: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers”, Granta Books.

Halili R., Pavloviq, Hysa A., & Zaharijeviq (2016), “Figura e armikut: ripërfytyrimi i marrëdhënieve shqiptaro-serbe”, Qendra Multimedia: Prishtine.

Hanisch-Wolfram, A. (2014), “Totalitarian Propaganda as Discourse: A Comparative Look at Austria and France in the Fascist Era”, In K. Postoutenko (Ed.), *Totalitarian Communication: Hierarchies, Codes and Messages*, p. 201, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839413937-009>.

Hosbawm E., Ranger T. (1983), “The Invention of Tradition”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

International Crisis Group (1998), “Kosovo- The view from Tirana”, report 36/Europe and Central Asia, available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/kosovo/kosovo-view-tirana>.

Këlliç K. (2020), “Defining the Internal Enemy: Detention Camps in Early Communist Albania, 1945–1950”, *Pamięć I Sprawiedliwość*. 2:138-152, p. 140, available at: <https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=1009385>.

Klemendi I., “Aleanca mes Jugosllavisë dhe Shqipërisë gjatë viteve 1945-1961”, PhD thesis.

Kotkin, S. (1998), “1991 and the Russian Revolution: Sources, Conceptual Categories, Analytical Frameworks.”, *The Journal of Modern History* 70 (2): 384–425.

Kujawski J. (2020), “Enemy and War in Carl Schmitt’s Political Theory”, *Zoon Politikon* Issue 11, p.30-31, DOI: 10.4467/2543408XZOP.20.002.12529.

Lamont, C.K (2015), “Research methods in international relations”, Los Angeles: Sage.

Logoreci A. (1982), “Riots and trials in Kosovo: Why the Albanian population in Yugoslavia took the streets”, *Index on Censorship*, Sage Journals, Volume:11 issue:2, pp. 23-25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03064228208533359>.

Margit Feischmidt (Ed.) and others (2017), “Mobilization through Enemy Images in Central and Eastern Europe”, *Centre for Social Sciences Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Intersections, EEJSP*,3(3): 5-13. DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v3i3.397.

Mehilli E. (2017), “From Stalin to Mao. Albania and the Socialist World”, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London.

Nation R.C. (1996), “A Balkan Union? Southeastern Europe in Soviet Security Policy, 1944–8”, p.133, In: Gori F., Pons S. (eds) “The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53”, Palgrave Macmillan, London, available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25106-3_8.

Ostermann F. C. (2007/2008), “Albania is not Cuba. Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split”, *Cold War History Project Bulletin*, Issue 16, Wilson Center, p.183, available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-16-fall-2007winter-2008>.

Paltridge B. (2021), “Discourse Analysis: an introduction”, Bloomsbury Academic, London.

Pavlović, A., Draško, G.P., & Halili, R. (Eds.), (2019), “Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations Figuring Out the Enemy: Figuring out the Enemy (1st ed.)”, position 4463 (ebook), Routledge, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351273169>.

Petrović P. (2009), “Enemy as the Essence of the Political”, *Review Article*, n.13, WBSO, UDK: 141.7 ШМИТ К.

Petrović, A., & Stefanović, Đ. (2010), “Kosovo, 1944-1981: The Rise and the Fall of a Communist *Nested Homeland*”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 62(7), p. 1081, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20787615>.

Previšić, M. (2021), “Breaking Down Bipolarity: Yugoslavia's Foreign Relations during the Cold War”, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, p.43, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110658972>.

Resis, A. (1978), “The Churchill-Stalin Secret “Percentages” Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944”, *The American Historical Review*, 83(2), 368–387, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1862322>.

Ritchie J., Lewis J. (2003), “Qualitative Research Practice. A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers”, SAGE Publication: London.

Schmitt C. (2007), “The concept of the political. Expanded Edition”, George Schwab trans., The University and Chicago Press, ISBN-13: 978-0-226-73892-5.

Shameti O., Dibra P. (2014), “Economic Agreements in the Yugoslav-Albanian Relations”, *Mediterranean Journal of Science*, Vol 5, No 13, p. 291, DOI: [10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n13p289](https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n13p289), available at: <https://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/mjss/article/view/3583>.

Silverstein, B. (1989), “Enemy Images: The Psychology of US Attitudes and Cognitions Regarding the Soviet Union”, *American Psychologist*, 44(6): 903-913, <https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066x.44.6.903>.

Somers MR, Gibson GD (1994), “Reclaiming the epistemological other: narrative and the social constitution of identity”, In *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, ed. C Calhoun, pp. 35.99, Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Stamova, M. (2017), "The Albanian Factor in Serbia/Yugoslavia in 19th and 20th Centuries", *Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne*, 2017, Tom XXV, p. 229-238, pa. 2017. ISSN 2543-733X. Available at: <https://www.ejournals.eu/SSB/2017/Tom-XXV/art/10035/>, doi: <https://doi.org/10.4467/2543733XSSB.17.015.7261>.

Stephen Schwartz (2009) "'Enverists' and 'Titoists' – Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941–99: From the Partisan Movement of the Second World War to the Kosova Liberation War", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 25:1, 48-72, p. 51, DOI: 10.1080/13523270802655613.

V. Pavlaković (2020), "Memory politics in the Former Yugoslavia", *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 18, z. 2, s. 9-32.

Veremis T., "The Modern Balkans: a concise guide to nationalism and politics. The rise and decline of the nation state", *LSEE Research on Southeast Europe*, p.85, available at: <https://www.lse.ac.uk/LSEE-Research-on-South-Eastern-Europe/Assets/Documents/Publications/Other/Veremis-Concise-Guide-to-Nationalism.pdf>

Veremis T., "The Modern Balkans: a concise guide to nationalism and politics. The rise and decline of the nation-state", *LSEE Research on Southeast Europe*, p.82, available at: <https://www.lse.ac.uk/LSEE-Research-on-South-EasternEurope/Assets/Documents/Publications/Other/Veremis-Concise-Guide-to-Nationalism.pdf>.

Vickers M. (2011), "The Albanians: A Modern History", I.B. Tauris, ISBN 978-0-85771-025-3.

Villari, G. (2007), "A Failed Experiment: The Exportation of Fascism to Albania", *Modern Italy*, 12(2), 157-171, doi:10.1080/13532940701362698, available at: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/modern-italy/article/abs/failed-experiment-the-exportation-of-fascism-to-albania/16E2F314D5574ECA42487BFAA6B49AE9>

Vucinich, W. S. (1951), "Communism gains in Albania: Part II", *Current History*, 21(124), 345–352, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45308031>.

Zavalani T. (2015), "History of Albania", Createspace Independent Publishing Platform.