The shifting tides of (post-)Yugoslav policy on Palestine

Initially in favour of Israel, Yugoslavia's stance shifted towards supporting the Palestinian liberation struggle. Post-Yugoslav states have largely abandoned the Non-Aligned Movement principles, taking divergent positions on the Palestinian question

More than a year ago the Israeli invasion of Gaza began, following the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023. Since then, most of the former Yugoslav states have reacted by showing solidarity with Israel and aligning themselves with the positions of the European Union and the United States. However, Yugoslavia has not always acted this way. There was a time when diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv were severed and concrete support was offered to the Palestinian liberation struggle. It was the period of the Non-Aligned Movement, an approach that none of the post-Yugoslav states seems to have maintained when it comes to the Middle East.

Yugoslavia-Palestine: a brief historical overview

Relations between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and Palestine went through several phases. “In the immediate postwar years, Yugoslavia was closely aligned with the URSS, following the Soviet strategy to push the old colonial powers out of the region”, says Slovenian historian Mateja Režek from the Institute of Historical Studies in Koper. “At that time – explains Režek – Yugoslavia actively supported the illegal immigration of European Jews to Palestine and facilitated the illegal transfer of weapons to the Israeli army during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War”. On 14 May 1948, David Ben Gurion, prime minister of the new state, officially proclaimed the birth of the State of Israel. Yugoslavia was among the first countries to recognize it.

Zagreb-based British sociologist Paul Stubbs, author of the book Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: social, cultural, political and economic imaginaries, identifies three phases in the relations between Yugoslavia and Palestine after the proclamation of the State of Israel: 1948-1953, 1953-1967, and from 1967 onwards”. In the first period (1948-1953), explains Stubbs, Yugoslavia showed “a degree of support for the establishment of the state of Israel in the context of the Holocaust”. In Yugoslavia the new state was perceived “if not as a socialist experiment, at least as a social experiment” and “the struggles of non-Jewish populations [were] largely unknown”.

The first turning point occurred in the mid-1950s. “This shift was driven by several factors: Tito's growing friendship with Egyptian President Nasser, the adoption of the doctrine of active peaceful coexistence, and the principle of non-alignment, which became the core of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy. During this period, Yugoslavia increasingly leaned towards Arab countries, leaving less room for cooperation with Israel”, explains Mateja Režek.

However, we are not yet at the breaking point. While SFRY – as pointed out by Stubbs – opted for “a stronger anti-Israel stance during the so-called Suez crisis of 1956”, it “maintained economic links with Israel and, at times, did not rule out playing the role of relatively detached mediator in the Middle East”.

From 1967 to 1990

1967 is the breakthrough year. When the Six-Day War shook the Middle East and Israel began to expand its territories, occupying the entire Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, Yugoslavia – explains Stubbs – reacted by “cutting diplomatic relations with Israel and offering tangible support to the Palestinian liberation struggle”.

However, Yugoslavia and Israel did not sever all contact. “Economic cooperation, though limited, continued, as did some intelligence exchanges. In fact, clandestine contacts between Yugoslavia and Israel, with the knowledge of the highest political leaders in both countries, were maintained throughout the existence of socialist Yugoslavia, with only a few brief interruptions”, points out Režek.

As for the support for the Palestinian cause, Yugoslavia offered humanitarian aid, scholarships for Palestinian students and, of course, political support, but remained very cautious about requests for military aid.

“Unlike a decade earlier, in terms of support for the Algerian liberation struggle almost regardless of how this would be perceived by France, with the Palestinian question you do begin to see a more contradictory, or at least a more cautious, stance from the side of the Yugoslavs: whilst medical aid and rehabilitation facilities are opened to the Palestinians within Yugoslavia, there is a reluctance to train Palestinian fighters within Yugoslavia”, says Paul Stubbs.

In 1971, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) opened its first representative office in Europe, located in Belgrade. It was an “Information Bureau” and Yugoslavia “refused to upgrade it to the status of an embassy”, explains Stubbs. PLO chairman from 1969 to 2004 Yasser Arafat visited Belgrade in 1972. “Arafat later is very clear that the Yugoslavs played a vital role in 1973 and 1974 in persuading the Soviets to offer more tangible support to the PLO”, adds the sociologist. In the 1980s, Yugoslav aid to the PLO was the largest among all liberation movements, but it gradually declined.

“The economic crisis and a shift in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy priorities contributed to this reduction, which, by the late 1980s, was also reflected in a rapprochement with Israel”, explains Mateja Režek.

From the mid-1980s onwards, direct contacts were established between the Mossad and the Yugoslav State Security Service. “While Yugoslavia recognized the State of Palestine in 1988, there were growing calls within the country to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. In 1990, the Yugoslav Presidency announced a gradual restoration of these relations, but the country dissolved before this could be realised”, concludes the historian.

Who inherited the YU perspective?

After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, none of its former republics or successor states remained committed to the policy of non-alignment and to clear support for the Palestinian struggle. It is worth mentioning that none of the former Yugoslav republics is member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). However, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Croatia have observer status.

Focusing on the Western Balkan region, in the recent years the six countries have expressed conflicted diplomatic stances on the Palestinian question. The case of Serbia is perhaps the most curious one. Oscillating quite clumsily between two sides, Belgrade has tried to align itself with the EU and the US position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while maintaining relations with the countries of the Middle East.

Serbia: a shift in diplomacy?

Historically an ally of Israel, Serbia has leveraged its ties for broader geopolitical goals, such as gaining favour in Washington. 2020 was a pivotal year in this regard: Serbia and Kosovo signed a US-brokered deal that involved Israel. The two Balkan countries agreed to strenghten ties with Israel, including moving embassies to Jerusalem (Serbia) and mutual recognition (Kosovo).

Reaching this agreement helped the US President Donald Trump score political points among the American electorate ahead of his re-election. At the same time, the agreement opened the door for Israel to expand its influence in the Balkans and even to re-introduce itself as a mediator between nations in conflict. With Trump’s approval, Israel assumed the role of a key player in the agreements on economic normalisation between Pristina and Belgrade, but also as a potential peace broker in other conflicts. A diplomatic move that the Israeli government elaborated for years, having understood that it could find new and valuable allies among the countries of the Western Balkans.

For analysts, like Vuk Vuksanović and Benny Morris, Israel’s interest in the Balkans is to be traced to its national security doctrine shift, after the diplomatic spat with Turkey in 2011 over the Mavi Marmara incident. Entering a period of frozen relations with a long-time ally, Israel decided to invest in building new alliances. What better way to do so than by strengthening ties with countries that not only are in direct antagonism with Turkey, but are diplomatically aligned with Israel’s position towards Hamas. Countries like Greece and Cyprus meet both criteria.

This approach was in line with Israel’s broader geopolitical interests, including countering Iranian influence and manageing tensions with Turkey. This strategy was also aimed at finding ways to erode the EU alignment on Palestine. It was during this period that Israel turned to the Western Balkans in search of new friends ahead of the UN vote on the recognition of a Palestinian state. In June 2011, Avigdor Liberman visited Albania . It was the first time in seventeen years that an Israeli foreign minister to visited the Balkan country as part of Israel’s diplomatic campaign against the Palestinian cause.

In the context of United Nations initiatives, Serbia's position reflects its ambiguous foreign policy. The country has often voted strategically on resolutions concerning Palestine, attempting to maintain good relations with both Israel and Arab countries. In 2012, Serbia was the only Western Balkan country to vote in favour of the palestinian request for non-member observer status at the UN. This is one of the few chapters in modern history in which Belgrade followed in the footsteps of the late Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, an ardent supporter of the Palestinian president Yasser Arafat and the PLO.

However, the recent vote on the Gaza Resolution highlighted a clear shift in Serbian foreign policy. On 26 October 2023, in the midst of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, Serbia decided to abstain from voting on the United Nations General Assembly resolution focused on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. UN called for an “immediate, durable, and sustained humanitarian truce” and demanded unhindered access to essential aid for civilians in Gaza, including food, water, and medical supplies.

The resolution emphasised compliance with international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians and the prevention of forced population transfers. It also urged the release of all hostages held by parties involved in the conflict. Unlike other Western Balkan countries, like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, that voted along with the majority, Serbia abstained once again. Also Albania and North Macedonia maintained the same position.

The Gaza resolution, proposed by Jordan, received broad support, with 120 votes in favour, 14 against, and 45 abstained. However, the fact that it had not directly addressed the 7 October Hamas attack led some countries like the US to criticise it for failing to explicitly condemn acts of terrorism. Amendments to include such condemnations were rejected, reflecting deep divisions among UN member states over how to balance the need to address immediate humanitarian concerns with broader political and security dimensions of the conflict. Serbia's stance reflected once again its balancing strategy between East and West.

This publication has been produced within the Collaborative and Investigative Journalism Initiative (CIJI ), a project co-funded by the European Commission. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa and do not reflect the views of the European Union. Go to the project page