Bidzina Ivanishvili © Gevorg Ghazaryan/Shuttertsock
The ruling party “Georgian Dream” acts on the basis of the obsessions of its founder, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who sees threats to his interests coming from the West and from a potential change of government. The risk is an authoritarian turn, not a pro-Russian course
In Georgia there is no numerically significant component among the population and the main political forces that can effectively be characterised as "pro-Russian". Precisely for this reason, defining a law such as the one approved earlier this week on foreign agents as "Russian" has the aim of discrediting it: the negative connotation is immediate and incontrovertible.
There are certainly significant common features with the analogous law approved in Russia in 2012 (and later tightened), but even more than the text of the law, what is actually worrying is the context in which it was approved, as well as the decision-making process that led to its promulgation.
Overall, beyond the geopolitical dimension, it clearly emerges that the actual objective of this law is to strengthen control over the Georgian political space by the ruling party, “Georgian Dream”, and in particular by its founder, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili.
To avoid any misunderstanding, it should be pointed out that the law is in itself very problematic: if the Georgian government had actually intended to introduce measures aimed at increasing transparency in the non-profit sector, it could have done so without much drama, in active collaboration with the many organisations in the field. At the very least, it would have waited for the opinion of the Venice Commission .
Obviously, this was not the the intended goal. Even beyond the obligations and fines introduced by law, insisting on assigning the title of "agents of foreign influence", for example, to associations that deal with various facets of the European integration process is problematic: if the path of Euro-Atlantic integration is not only a declared objective of the government, but even a constitutional requirement (article 78), activities that favour it are consistent with the expression of an entirely Georgian ambition, not of external interference. Instead, there is room to argue that this law on foreign agents is unconstitutional and contrary to Georgia's interests precisely because it is an obstacle to integration with the EU.
Obviously, this is a political choice. If the process of European integration is perceived not as a path of alignment and collaboration between partners with common objectives, but as external interference, then it is would be appropriate to draw the consequences and denounce it. Indeed, Georgia is a sovereign country and can legitimately decide to change course. To do this, however, the constitution should change, or at least the government should express its preferences in this regard more clearly. For now, however, the representatives of the "Georgian Dream" continue to insist, implausibly, on their sincere intention to take Georgia forward on its path to European integration.
Apparently, they do not feel ready (yet?) to set up the electoral campaign for the vote scheduled for October on an explicitly anti-Western platform, although the tone of recent statements by prominent figures including the prime minister and Bidzina Ivanishvili hints clearly in this direction.
In recent days, a delegation of heads of the foreign committees of various European parliaments was not received by government officials; Ivanishvili refused to meet with US envoy James C. O'Brien, who noted that if Georgia no longer looks to the United States as a partner, ongoing assistance programmes will have to be reviewed (the reference is to a package of 390 million dollars that includes not only support for civil society, but also economic development and defence).
The Bidzina Ivanishvili factor
Ivanishvili justified his refusal to meet O'Brien because he believes he is the victim of unspecified "de facto" sanctions.
Targeted sanctions against him, however, do not exist. These types of statements, according to which Ivanishvili believes himself to be the victim of a conspiracy hatched against him by the West, are quite fundamental for understanding the developments that have determined the urgency of introducing this law on foreign agents and in general the government's increasingly anti-Western tone.
The private interests and personal obsessions of Ivanishvili, who in recent years has often treated the "Georgian Dream" party and sometimes the government itself as if it was one of the companies in his business portfolio, seem to have a decisive role in defining the current dynamics.
In a long speech at a pro-government rally held on April 29, the founder of "Georgian Dream" clearly expressed some elements of his political interpretation of the current international context.
In no uncertain terms, Ivanishvili announced that after the next elections he will punish opposition representatives and traitors of previous governments (2004-2012), which were allegedly imposed from outside. He has repeatedly attacked an alleged “Global War Party”, which would have pushed Ukraine itself towards conflict and would now like to use Georgia to open a new war front with Russia (the reference to this "Global War Party" is not occasional, but also recurring in speeches by the prime minister , who speaks about it in a peculiarly mysterious tone: “Many people know about these forces. We can't talk about it. It's too delicate”).
In this view, opposition parties and NGOs are nothing more than instruments of this "Global War Party" and for this they must be punished, in order to finally allow Georgia to be sovereign; this same "Global War Party", which among other things would have forced the European parliament to adopt anti-Georgian (and "anti-European") resolutions, evidently controls the West and equally evidently wants to bring down the government of “Georgian Dream” and therefore punish Ivanishvili as the last protector of Georgian sovereignty, which it would like to destroy.
These high-sounding words correspond to much more immediate private interests. Regardless of the origin of Ivanishvili's obsessions, it seems clear that the billionaire believes that his wealth scattered around the world is no longer safe in this era of sanctions and international tensions (at least in part, this seems to be related to a trial that Ivanishvili has underway for hundreds of millions of dollars with Credit Suisse , for an old issue completely unrelated to sanctions).
Ivanishvili therefore seems intent on repatriating part of his assets, but to do so in a cost-effective way he needs measures in the Georgian tax system favourable to the repatriation of capital - measures in fact approved last April and then blocked by the Georgian president's veto.
On the other hand, in this vision of the world, repatriating capital is not enough if the threat is that of Western sanctions and above all if there is political alternation in Georgia: assets are safe only as long as the Georgian government is controlled or at least close to Ivanishvili, while they would be immediately at risk if anyone else came to power.
It is difficult to determine the relevance of each of these elements in Ivanishvili's calculation. The overall effect, from a substantial point of view, remains the same: everything that could hinder a consolidation of the control of the “Georgian Dream” over the political space of the country, including therefore Western-funded NGOs and the European governments that support them, are considered as a threat to be countered.
This is why it was important to act urgently now, before the elections scheduled for October, knowing full well that the initiative would trigger protests. At the moment, the members of the governing party continue to solidly maintain the line dictated by the founder of "Georgian Dream", even if it is certainly a risky political calculation.
Indeed, the risk for unitended consequences is high: initiatives essentially aimed at strengthening the dominant political role of the "Georgian Dream" and protecting Ivanishvili from sanctions could have the opposite effect. If the repression of the protests becomes harsher or Georgia more explicitly promotes the evasion of sanctions against Russia, Ivanishvili could find himself the target of real, not just imaginary, sanctions. If the opposition forces finally manage to create a united front, "Georgian Dream" risks losing elections that looked like an easy win until a few months ago, before the introduction of the laws on foreign agents.
On the other hand, the outcome of this political phase is far from a given and perhaps only with the October elections the internal balance and the main vectors of Georgian foreign policy for the next few years be defined. For now, we can only register the extraordinary public mobilisation against the initiatives of this government and in favour of European integration that has been observed for weeks in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities.
International context
A final consideration on the international context. The Kremlin would certainly look favourably at a scenario featuring Georgia becoming less integrated with the European Union and NATO - if not openly aligned in opposition to them. It is difficult to say how much Ivanishvili's concerns are influenced by his relations with Russia: some of his obsessions certainly follow narratives promoted by Moscow, but personal and internal political dynamics in Georgia can explain the events of recent days equally well, without needing to see necessarily the long arm of the Kremlin.
Even in this context in which the highest government and party officials express substantially (though not formally) anti-Western narratives, an explicitly pro-Russian government in Georgia remains implausible.
Finally, it is important to highlight how this political phase must also be a lesson for the European Union , which last December decided to grant Georgia candidate status despite the increasingly apparent signs of democratic involution. The European Union is strong when it acts in a manner consistent with its founding values, while it makes itself vulnerable when it supports governments with authoritarian tendencies out of political or geopolitical opportunism. The EU must be able to deserve the esteem and trust of the tens of thousands of people who have been taking to the streets of Tbilisi for weeks, choosing the European flag as a symbol of hope for a better future.
