Transnistria “under blockade”

A media analysis of Transnistria’s main news agency and TV station shows just how insistently local media and politicians talk about being “under blockade”. The expression is exceedingly dramatic. But Chișinău should do more to allay immediate and pragmatic concerns of local residents

As a landlocked entity, often geographically described with expressions such as "a sliver of land sandwiched between Moldova and Ukraine", it is easy to understand how public discourse in Transnistria may be susceptible to concerns about limited access to the outside world. This preoccupation is only reinforced by the fact that Transnistria does not share a land border with Russia, its main patron. The border that de facto separates Transnistria from right-bank Moldova has never been really closed for local residents, yet at different points in time authorities in Tiraspol have claimed to be under "blockade".

Blockade has obviously ominous connotations. In contemporary Russia, the term ("блокада") is strongly associated with the long-lasting siege of Leningrad during the second world war, and is thus imbued with new meanings: a strenuous but victorious resistance against evil Nazi forces. This exceedingly dramatic association echoes with contemporary Russian and local memory politics, that – oversimplifying – would see Transnistria as surrounded by Ukrainian Nazi on the one side, and Romanian fascists on the other, referring implicitly or explicitly to Romania's control over the region in 1941-1944 (while present, such characterisations are however not necessarily dominant, with more pragmatic approaches common both in media representations and in practice, as confirmed by local trade statistics that point at Romania as Transnistria’s main export destination).

Well beyond historical parallelisms, reference to "blockade" have often been used to refer to specific trade-related measures introduced by Chișinău, or new limitations to direct crossings into Ukraine agreed with Kyiv. These never really amounted to a "blockade", as ultimately Tiraspol always had a way out, which eventually implied accepting in whole or in part the conditions set by Chișinău for enabling transit of goods, such as registering Transnistria-based companies with Moldovan customs (as was the case in the largest "blockade"-related confrontation in 2006 ) or accepting additional taxes on some imports (as was the case in the latest "blockade"-related confrontation in early 2024 ). More recently, further complications have stemmed from war-related sanctions limiting exports to Russia: as some of the products that Transnistria-based companies used to sell in Russia could be used for military purposes , Chișinău blocked their export to Russia as part of its efforts to fully comply with sanctions. Besides, with the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, direct border crossings from Transnistria into Ukraine have been blocked, and have only partly been reopened since then . Undeniably, such issues have complicated further what is already a complex economic situation for Transnistria-based economic actors, and, in some instances, they have led to price increases for local residents and to unemployment .

Preparing the ground, finding solutions

In principle, demands from Chișinău have not been unreasonable, even if they have often not been advanced as graciously and carefully as could have been the case. This would imply not only proposing pragmatic solutions to the difficulties stemming from new regulations, but also striving to communicate to Transnistria’s residents the need for these measures, highlighting how their welfare has been accounted for when they have been decided.

The latest customs duties introduced effectively without advance notice in January 2024 are a case in point: it is unclear if the abruptness of the measure was due to carelessness or was a strategic choice, i.e. to create a fait accompli rather than open the way for months of extenuating negotiations and recriminations. Either way, it surely opened the way for a new wave of "blockade"-related statements in Transnistrian official discourse and local media. This is not unusual: as a quantitative analysis of Transnistria’s main news agency and TV stations has showed , thousands of references to “blockade” can be found in local media through the last decade. This video clip showing hundreds of references to “blockade” in the first five months of 2024 on Transnistria’s main TV station offers a glimpse of the prevalence of the expression in the local public discourse.

All occurrences of the word “blockade” on Transnistria’s TV in 2024

It remains difficult to understand the extent to which residents of Transnistria absorb and accept the official narratives promoted by authorities in Tiraspol about being “under blockade". Do they feel that Chișinău really wants to cut them off from the outside world? Either way, as in the short term these measures contribute to economic difficulties, increased prices, and unemployment, it is reasonable to expect they are largely seen as hostile moves on the left bank of the Dniester. Even if the expression "blockade" is overtly dramatic and clearly used to escalate the political stakes in phases of tense confrontation, it is based on an understandable concern rooted in the geography of this landlocked entity: new types of "blockade" always feel plausible, just an escalation step further in conflict dynamics. For example, as preoccupation about the long-term viability of the provision of Russian gas to the region mounts, references to “gas blockade” may become more prevalent.

Fundamentally, Chișinău does not seem to be interested in challenging the "blockade" narrative, as Transnistria's residents are hardly the target of dedicated communication efforts when such measures are introduced. In some instances, as was the case with the latest changes to customs regulations earlier this year, these policies are not really much debated at all in Moldova's media, as they are overshadowed by domestic politics or broader international issues. Agenda setting in Moldova may well follow its own logics, but ultimately this leads to the fact that "blockade" narratives proposed by media and officials in Tiraspol remain largely unchallenged. To the extent that there is a counter-narrative proposed by Chișinău, it may be about the long term path of European integration and the fact that it will benefit all of Moldova, but there are scant efforts to address the more pragmatic, immediate, and understandable concerns of residents of areas controlled by Tiraspol.

Moldova's government may feel that in the current circumstances, as Tiraspol has ultimately no alternative to accepting the terms set by Chișinău, there is no need for strategic communication aimed at blandishing Transnistria's residents. Yet it is exactly at this time, as the perspective of further integration of Transnistria into Moldova's economic space becomes more realistic and the need to find common political ground more urgent, that such efforts are most needed.

 

This article has been written within the project “Analysis of crisis scenarios in Moldova and Transnistria”, implemented in cooperation with the Agency for Peacebuilding .

This project is realized with the support of the Unit for Analysis, Policy Planning, Statistics and Historical Documentation - Directorate General for Public and Cultural Diplomacy of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in accordance with Article 23 ‒ bis of the Decree of the President of the Italian Republic 18/1967.

The views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.