Armenia, Yerevan © Christian Kober/Shutterstock
The dispute over the modifications to the Armenian Constitution requested by Azerbaijan continues to hinder the normalization of relations between the two countries and the achievement of peace agreements
Early last month, Azerbaijan's President, Ilham Aliyev, announced that an agreement to normalize relations with Armenia is unlikely to be signed unless it changes its constitution. Specifically, this would mean removing a controversial preamble that references the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which in turn is based on the 1989 Joint Statement on the “Reunification of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh.”
Pashinyan has acknowledged that the text amounts to territorial claims on Azerbaijan and should be removed, but there is still no idea of when.
Instead, Yerevan has made it clear that it does not take kindly to demands on what it considers to be an internal matter while Baku believes that this fails to acknowledge that it concerns its own national security and ignores the central issue that triggered the conflict in the first place. Despite its dissolution at the beginning of the year, revanchist circles in Armenia continue to make claims not only on the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) but also on the seven formerly occupied regions that surrounded it.
The situation has been complicated by opposition claims that remarks on constitutional changes by Pashinyan since last year were made under duress. Yet Armenian officials charge that Azerbaijan's demands are intended to prevent a deal from being signed while their counterparts in Baku allege that Pashinyan is playing for time enough to rearm.
The matter of the constitution, however, is not that simple. Pashinyan's rationale for his own proposed changes made since 2019 concern the future of the country in general. Amendments adopted by referendum in 2005 and 2015 were marred by allegations of widespread fraud and inflated voter turnout. The last of those plebiscites was seen as a manoeuvre by Pashinyan's predecessor to retain power by taking the premiership when his final term as president ended in 2018. Street protests followed, propelling the current government to power instead.
As a result, the population still lacks a sense of ownership of what should be the foundation of the state. These issues accompany widespread political disengagement and apathy even though any changes would require approval by over 50 percent of voters, with turnout needing to exceed over 25 percent of the total electorate. Last year's municipal vote in the capital highlighted the challenge this represents. Voter turnout was just 28 percent, down over 15 points compared to 2018, and the government scraped through with 32.57 percent of the actual vote.
This puts Pashinyan in a difficult position. If voters were to reject the changes then this could be seen as risking a new war over peace. A referendum in which the changes were passed but voter turnout was insufficient to make it valid could also be misconstrued the same way.
But while some media portrayed the demand as requiring constitutional changes before signing an agreement, some analysts in Baku see it differently. They suggest a commitment to make such changes can be included in the text of any peace deal. Former British Ambassador to Azerbaijan James Sharpe notes that a similar provision was included in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement between the United Kingdom and Ireland to end the troubles in the North.
Farid Shafiyev, Chair of the Baku-based Centre of Analysis of International Relations (AIR), has suggested that a commitment to amend the constitution within a year of signing, if included in an agreement, could also be acceptable but that timeframe could be too short. Pashinyan still needs to engage the public further in informed discussion regarding the necessity and benefits of peace.
The Armenian government has so far not commented on these suggestions. Instead, on 19 June, media unexpectedly reported that Pashinyan had a month earlier directed the Council on Constitutional Reforms to draft a new constitution by the end of 2026. Nonetheless, members of the council were quoted as saying they were not informed and do not even know when they are next to meet. Baku has yet to remark on the development.
Nonetheless, a mature discussion has emerged among analysts in Baku, though it is lacking among their counterparts in Yerevan. Azerbaijani MP Rasim Musabekov has also acknowledged that Pashinyan could lose power if a referendum was to fail but, he says, the government could approach the Constitutional Court to request that the legality of the preamble be reviewed instead. If deemed null and void then this obstacle would disappear. Later it could be addressed through constitutional reform.
While Baku might still view that as a risk, it is anyway not in a hurry to sign an agreement. For Pashinyan, however, the stakes are higher. He will need to show tangible results from his widely publicised peace agenda in the next elections if he is to justify what are perceived as unilateral concessions made to date. The United States and the European Union remain optimistic that an agreement is close. Azerbaijan does too, but so far only if the constitutional impasse is resolved.
