Nikol Pashinyan - © Asatur Yesayants/Shutterstock

Nikol Pashinyan - © Asatur Yesayants/Shutterstock 

As Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations appeared to have stalled over points of disagreement, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has implied that the matter of a controversial preamble to the country’s constitution could be resolved

27/02/2025 -  Onnik James Krikorian

Last week, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan addressed the nation with what was billed as an “ideological message”. Since early last year, he has been pushing his own vision of the country’s future that would represent an almost total overhaul of traditional Armenian thinking since independence was declared in 1991.

“This ideology equates the homeland with the internationally recognised state – the Republic of Armenia – and patriotism serving the interests of this state within the framework of its laws and obligations”, he stated.

His critics, however, charge that his plans to transform the country from a “Historical Armenia”, which lays claims to territory within Azerbaijan and Turkey, with a more contemporary “Real Armenia” serves other purposes.

Simply, they allege, that is to rewrite history in such a way as to absolve himself of criticism of the way he lost the country’s war with Azerbaijan in 2020. It might also be the only way he can win re-election in parliamentary elections scheduled for mid-2026.

In the hour long address, Pashinyan outlined 14 key points in a framework concept for this “Real Armenia”. Meanwhile, Yerevan and Baku continue to negotiate an agreement to normalise relations, leading the opposition to accuse him of making unilateral concessions, especially in terms of changing the country’s constitution which contains a preamble alluding to pursuing territorial claims on Azerbaijan and Turkey . In his address, Pashinyan did not state that this would be removed, but rather it is believed that it will be. Failure to do so could be taken as a casus belli by Baku.

Nonetheless, ever since coming to power in 2018, Pashinyan has long planned to change the constitution. Pandemic and the war prevented him from doing so.

The removal of the preamble, which references the 1990 Declaration of Independence, however, was not included. It was only in 2023 that Pashinyan first remarked that the controversial preamble would forever keep Armenia in conflict with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Last year, Baku began to consistently demanded that it be removed if a peace deal is to be signed. Though not included in the still incomplete proposed agreement, it nonetheless remains an obstacle .

“It isn’t possible to have real and thriving independence, prosperity, and security without peace”, Pashinyan stated in Washington D.C. in early February. On the same visit, he also told a group of American-Armenians that defeat in 2020 now gave Yerevan the opportunity to form an “independent and sovereign state”. Moreover, he argued, his “Real Armenia” would allow the country to “transition from the residual practices of a stateless nation to the practices of state-building people”.

Not surprisingly, one of his main detractors, former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian, has already called on the opposition to turn the concept against him. He described Pashinyan as an “empty excuse for incompetence, defeatism, and the betrayal of Armenia’s dignity”.

Pashinyan’s supporters, as well as the European Union and the former Biden administration in the United States, believe that it would instead usher in a new period of peace and stability in the South Caucasus. Domestically, given a lack of trust in the existing constitution, would also aid the country as it seeks to democratise and diversify away from Russian influence.

Passing a new constitution, however, will not be easy. In order to do so, a minimum turnout will be necessary as well as gaining the support of a majority of voters. Pashinyan’s electoral popularity currently stands at 11 percent according to a survey held in January.

Though the opposition hardly fares any better, many Armenians remain apathetic or disillusioned with all political forces on offer. Nonetheless, if Pashinyan can deliver on his promise to pursue the “peace agenda” with Azerbaijan he promised in snap-elections in 2021, and also present growing ties with the West as a major success, his trademark populism could prove effective. Extra-parliamentary forces believed loyal to him have also successfully managed to put the issue of an EU membership bid on the government’s agenda.

For Baku, if Pashinyan can demonstrate that the country’s population supports an end to a conflict that has been waged for over three decades now, and that he alone can gain a mandate for doing so, it could usher in a new period for both countries. However, failure to do so would represent the opposite and even reason for new hostilities in the future.

For now, however, if drawing up a new constitution was expected by the beginning of 2027, Pashinyan has not brought that forward to before the 2026 elections. It could be that holding a referendum at the same time as elections would entice more voters to participate.

Though the outcome remains uncertain, a much needed and unprecedented discussion about the country’s future has at least started and the coming months will likely prove more important than at any time before.