Pro-Öcalan demonstration - © Yasemin Yurtman Candemir/Shutterstock
In an unexpected move, the Turkish political establishment has once again sent signals of openness to the Kurdish armed struggle. But what are the deep reasons behind this strategy? We asked sociologist Mesut Yeğen
In early October, Devlet Bahçeli, secretary general of the nationalist MHP party, shook hands with several MPs from the pro-Kurdish DEM party, formerly HDP. This unusual gesture was followed by a groundbreaking speech on October 22, in which he called on PKK leader and founder Abdullah Öcalan to declare the end of the armed struggle from the parliament podium. How do you assess this development?
I have no doubt that this was a historic speech: we are talking about the leader of the MHP, one of the most influential politicians in the country, a right-wing man, who would not have taken such a step just for reasons of political convenience.
Between 2013 and 2015 there was the last attempt at negotiations between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the so-called "peace process", which unfortunately ended unsuccessfully.
The siege of the town of Kobane by ISIS and the closing of the borders between Turkey and Syria created tension within some fringes of supporters of the Kurdish movement, which resulted in protests and riots in several provinces of the country.
Bahçeli's opening signals the Turkish government's willingness to return to the negotiating table, a sort of paradox in light of the growing authoritarianism, which has worsened after the Gezi events and the attempted coup in 2016.
What do you think is the reason for this latest "Kurdish opening"?
Turkey fears a deterioration in regional stability, and to prevent any chances it needs first of all to make peace with the Kurds living in the country and in neighbouring countries. The disproportionate reaction by the Israeli state to the attack carried out by Hamas on October 7 is viewed with concern by Ankara, the war has spread to Lebanon and even Iran.
A weakening of the Islamic Republic could galvanise the armed wing of the PKK in Iran (PJAK) and Iraq (PÇDK), a scenario that the Turkish authorities want to prevent at all costs, and to do so the role of Öcalan is fundamental.
It is not a risk-free decision for the government, some power centres within the army and the nationalist movement certainly do not like these developments.
How much power is Abdullah Öcalan really able to wield?
Öcalan is still a key figure for the PKK, despite being been locked up since 1999 in the maximum security prison of İmralı, an islet in the Sea of Marmara. During this period, the organisation he founded has continued to exist, and its prestige remains intact. Of course, the abandonment of the armed struggle, if Öcalan really pronounces these words, may not be accepted by the PKK in its entirety, the military wing will make its assessments based on the concessions of the Turkish state.
How do you assess the possible rewriting of the Turkish constitution? How much could it influence the new peace process?
The current constitution was drafted in 1982 by the military junta that carried out the 1980 coup, after which Turkey was governed by General Kenan Evren for almost a decade.
A new constitution has been discussed for some years, and certainly President Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan has every interest in this plan succeeding. At the same time, it is not so fundamental for the political future of the Turkish leader.
The Turkish state felt the need to offer peace primarily for reasons of internal and neighbourhood security, the constitution and the related concessions to the Kurds are a consequence, a means, not the main reason.
What are the main demands of the DEM on the rewriting of a new constitution? What changes does the Kurdish people aspire to?
There are expectations that do not require a constitutional change, but only a change of attitude by the government, I am thinking for example of the release of certain political figures and civil society.
The requests are known: the most pressing is the recognition of Kurdish as a national language and the possibility of receiving education in the language, thus obtaining a status on par with that of Turkish.
The Kurds also ask for their identity and that of other ethnic groups and faiths that coexist within the borders of the republic to be recognised. Finally, the implementation of federalism in the Kurdish majority areas and greater representation within the state machine.
On October 23, an armed group (Immortals Battalion) linked to the PKK claimed responsibility for the attack on the headquarters of the Turkish Aerospace Industry (Tusaş) near Ankara. In the morning, Ömer, a DEM MP and Öcalan's nephew, had been allowed to visit his uncle in prison, after 43 months of isolation. Just a coincidence?
It was an event on which one could easily build a conspiracy theory. Personally, I believe it was a previously organised armed attack, but I admit it is possible to argue that within the PKK there are those who do not like the abandonment of the armed struggle, and with this operation they wanted to muddy the waters and create tension between the parties.
As a sociologist, how do you define the Kurdish element? And how much has Kurdish society in Turkey changed in the twenty years of Erdoğan's rule?
From a sociological point of view, it is undeniable that there is a Kurdish nation, although it does not have its own state. Kurds live and are the majority in certain areas of four countries in the region: Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In each of them there is a different relationship with the central authority, but what binds them is a common awareness of identity.
Over the last twenty years, Kurdish society has developed a greater political awareness, in addition to knowing its own history better, the wrongs suffered and the mistakes made.
In Turkey, the process of emigration from villages to cities has continued steadily. Urbanisation has created an interesting dichotomy: on the one hand, it has accentuated the process of assimilation into Turkish society, on the other, a need has developed to see one's identity recognised both politically and culturally.
People speak less Kurdish but feel more Kurdish, a contradiction that I have noted in my field studies.
Mesut Yeğen, sociologist, political commentator and director of the democratisation programme at the think tank "Reform Institute". His writings, published by "İletişim", focus on the relationship between Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question.
